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title: 翻譯共筆：美國對中戰略方針（2020）
image: https://i.imgur.com/9a1eI2o.png
---

# 翻譯共筆：美國對中戰略方針（2020）

2020年5月20日，美國白宮發布《美國對中華人民共和國戰略方針》（United States Strategic Approach toThe People' s Republic of China），該文重新評估了對中政策，承認過往對中政策方向錯誤。

本翻譯由Google translate生成。歡迎大家一起動手修正為信達雅的翻譯，成果將以CC0授權釋出。

[原文網址](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/U.S.-Strategic-Approach-to-The-Peoples-Republic-of-China-Report-5.20.20.pdf)


## 協作方式

請點選右上角筆狀符號即可進入編輯介面。


## 貢獻者

* 雨蒼
* Justin Tu

## 全文翻譯

### United States Strategic Approach to The People’s Republic of China

美國對中華人民共和國的戰略方針

#### Introduction

引言

Since the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) established diplomatic relations in 1979, United States policy toward the PRC was largely premised on a hope that deepening engagement would spur fundamental economic and political opening in the PRC and lead to its emergence as a constructive and responsible global stakeholder, with a more open society. More than 40 years later, it has become evident that this approach underestimated the will of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to constrain the scope of economic and political reform in China. Over the past two decades, reforms have slowed, stalled, or reversed. The PRC’s rapid economic development and increased engagement with the world did not lead to convergence with the citizen-centric, free and open order as the United States had hoped. The CCP has chosen instead to exploit the free and open rules- based order and attempt to reshape the international system in its favor. Beijing openly acknowledges that it seeks to transform the international order to align with CCP interests and ideology. The CCP’s expanding use of economic, political, and military power to compel acquiescence from nation states harms vital American interests and undermines the sovereignty and dignity of countries and individuals around the world.

自1979年美國和中華人民共和國建立外交關係以來，美國對華政策有很大程度冀望加深接觸將刺激中國根本性的經濟和政治開放，並使其成為具有建設性和負責任的全球利益相關者、社會更加開放。40多年後，很明顯，這種做法低估了中國共產黨限制中國經濟和政治改革範圍的意願。在過去的20年中，改革放慢，停滯或逆轉。中國經濟的快速發展和與世界的互動不斷增加，並沒有導致美國所希望的中國向以公民為中心，自由和開放秩序融合。中共反而選擇利用自由、開放、基於規則的秩序，並試圖以有利於它的方式重塑國際體系。北京公開承認，它尋求改變國際秩序，以符合中共的利益和意識形態。中共越來越多地利用經濟，政治和軍事力量來迫使國家默認這些行為，這損害了美國的重要利益，破壞了世界各國和個人的主權和尊嚴。

To respond to Beijing’s challenge, the Administration has adopted a competitive approach to the PRC, based on a clear-eyed assessment of the CCP’s intentions and actions, a reappraisal of the United States’ many strategic advantages and shortfalls, and a tolerance of greater bilateral friction. Our approach is not premised on determining a particular end state for China. Rather, our goal is to protect United States vital national interests, as articulated in the four pillars of the 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS). We aim to: (1) protect the American people, homeland, and way of life; (2) promote American prosperity; (3) preserve peace through strength; and (4) advance American influence.

為了應對北京的挑戰，美國政府對中國採取了一種競爭性方法，即對中共的意圖和行動進行了清晰的評估，重新評估了美國的許多戰略優勢和不足之處，以及更接納對雙邊關係的不合。我們的方法並非以確定中國的特定最終狀態為前提。相反的，我們的目標是保護美國至關重要的國家利益，正如《 2017年美國國家安全戰略》（NSS）的四個支柱所述。我們的目標是：（1）保護美國人民、家園和生活方式； （二）促進美國繁榮； （三）透過力量維護和平； （4）提高美國的影響力。

Our competitive approach to the PRC has two objectives: first, to improve the resiliency of our institutions, alliances, and partnerships to prevail against the challenges the PRC presents; and second, to compel Beijing to cease or reduce actions harmful to the United States’ vital, national interests and those of our allies and partners. Even as we compete with the PRC, we welcome cooperation where our interests align. Competition need not lead to confrontation or conflict. The United States has a deep and abiding respect for the Chinese people and enjoys longstanding ties to the country. We do not seek to contain China’s development, nor do we wish to disengage from the Chinese people. The United States expects to engage in fair competition with the PRC, whereby both of our nations, businesses, and individuals can enjoy security and prosperity.

我們對中國的競爭方法有兩個目標：第一，提高我們的機構，聯盟和夥伴關係的適應能力，以應對中國提出的挑戰。第二，迫使北京停止或減少有害於美國的生命，國家利益以及我們的盟國和夥伴利益的行動。即使我們在與中國競爭時，我們也歡迎在我們利益一致的情況下進行合作。競爭不必導致對抗或衝突。美國對中國人民有著深刻而持久的尊重，與中國有著長期的聯繫。我們既不尋求遏制中國的發展，也不想脫離中國人民。美國期望與中國進行公平競爭，從而使我們兩國，企業和個人都能享有安全與繁榮。

Prevailing in strategic competition with the PRC requires cooperative engagement with multiple stakeholders, and the Administration is committed to building partnerships to protect our shared interests and values. Vital partners of this Administration include the Congress, state and local governments, the private sector, civil society, and academia. The Congress has been speaking out through hearings, statements, and reports that shed light on the CCP’s malign behavior. The Congress also provides legal authorities and resources for the United States Government to take the actions to achieve our strategic objectives. The Administration also recognizes the steps allies and partners have taken to develop more clear-eyed and robust approaches toward the PRC, including the European Union’s publication in March 2019 of EU-China: A Strategic Outlook, among others.

要想與中國進行戰略競爭，就需要與多個利益相關者的合作。政府致力於建立夥伴關係，以保護我們的共同利益和價值觀。本屆政府的重要合作夥伴包括國會，州和地方政府，私營部門，民間社會和學術界。國會一直在通過聽證會，發言和報告等方式發表講話，以闡明中共的惡行。國會還為美國政府提供法律權力和資源，以採取行動實現我們的戰略目標。政府還認識到盟友和合作夥伴為發展對中國的看法採取了更加明確和有力的措施，包括歐盟於2019年3月發布了《中歐：戰略展望》等。

The United States is also building cooperative partnerships and developing positive alternatives with foreign allies, partners, and international organizations to support the shared principles of a free and open order. Specific to the Indo-Pacific region, many of these initiatives are described in documents such as the Department of Defense June 2019 Indo- Pacific Strategy Report and the Department of State November 2019 report on A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision. The United States is working in concert with mutually aligned visions and approaches such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nation’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, Japan’s free and open Indo-Pacific vision, India’s Security and Growth for All in the Region policy, Australia’s Indo-Pacific concept, the Republic of Korea’s New Southern Policy, and Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy.

美國也在建立合作夥伴關係，並與外國盟友，合作夥伴和國際組織發展積極的選擇，以支持自由開放秩序的共同原則。某些特定於印度太平洋地區的舉措在文件中有所描述，例如國防部2019年6月《印度太平洋戰略報告》和美國國務院2019年11月關於自由和開放的印度太平洋：推進共同願景的報告。美國正在與相互一致的願景和方法進行合作，例如東南亞國家聯盟對印度太平洋的看法，日本的自由開放的印度太平洋觀點，印度的「本地區所有人的安全與增長」政策，澳大利亞的印度太平洋概念，大韓民國的新南方政策和台灣的新南向政策。

This report does not attempt to detail the comprehensive range of actions and policy initiatives the Administration is carrying out across the globe as part of our strategic competition. Rather, this report focuses on the implementation of the NSS as it applies most directly to the PRC.

本報告並未試圖詳細介紹政府作為我們戰略競爭的一部分而在全球範圍內採取的行動和政策舉措的全面範圍。相反，本報告側重於NSS的實施，因為它最直接適用於中國。

#### Challenges

挑戰

The PRC today poses numerous challenges to United States national interests.

現今的中國對美國國家利益帶來許多挑戰。

##### 1. Economic Challenges

1.經濟挑戰

Beijing’s poor record of following through on economic reform commitments and its extensive use of state-driven protectionist policies and practices harm United States companies and workers, distort global markets, violate international norms, and pollute the environment. When the PRC acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, Beijing agreed to embrace the WTO’s open market-oriented approach and embed these principles in its trading system and institutions. WTO members expected China to continue on its path of economic reform and transform itself into a market-oriented economy and trade regime.

北京堅持執行經濟改革承諾的糟糕記錄，以及廣泛使用國家主導的貿易保護主義政策和做法，這損害了美國公司和工人，扭曲了全球市場，違反了國際準則並污染了環境。當中國於2001年加入世界貿易組織（WTO）時，北京同意接受WTO對市場開放的態度，並將這些原則納入其貿易體系和機構中。世貿組織成員期望中國繼續其經濟改革的道路，並將自己轉變為以市場為導向的經貿體系。

These hopes were not realized. Beijing did not internalize the norms and practices of competition-based trade and investment, and instead exploited the benefits of WTO membership to become the world’s largest exporter, while systematically protecting its domestic markets. Beijing’s economic policies have led to massive industrial overcapacity that distorts global prices and allows China to expand global market share at the expense of competitors operating without the unfair advantages that Beijing provides to its firms. The PRC retains its non-market economic structure and state-led, mercantilist approach to trade and investment. Political reforms have likewise atrophied and gone into reverse, and distinctions between the government and the party are eroding. General Secretary Xi’s decision to remove presidential term limits, effectively extending his tenure indefinitely, epitomized these trends.

這些希望並未實現。北京沒有將基於競爭的貿易和投資的規範和做法內在化，而是利用了加入世貿組織的好處，成為世界上最大的出口國，同時系統地保護了其國內市場。北京的經濟政策導致了巨大的工業產能過剩，扭曲了全球價格，使中國擴大了全球市場份額，以犧牲競爭對手的利益為代價，而北京卻沒有為其企業提供不公平的優勢。中國保留了其非市場經濟結構以及貿易和投資的國家主導的重商主義方法。政治改革也萎縮了，倒退了，政府與黨的分歧正在逐漸消失。習近平秘書長取消總統任期限制，有效地無限期延長任期的決定體現了這些趨勢。

In his 2018 Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) determined that numerous acts, policies, and practices of the PRC government were unreasonable or discriminatory, and burden or restrict United States commerce. Based on a rigorous investigation, USTR found that the PRC: (1) requires or pressures United States companies to transfer their technology to Chinese entities; (2) places substantial restrictions on United States companies’ ability to license their technology on market terms; (3) directs and unfairly facilitates acquisition of United States companies and assets by domestic firms to obtain cutting edge technologies; and (4) conducts and supports unauthorized cyber intrusions into United States companies’ networks to access sensitive information and trade secrets.

美國貿易代表（USTR）在其1974年《根據1974年貿易法》第301條對與技術轉讓，知識產權和創新有關的中國法令，政策和實踐進行調查的調查結果中，確定許多法令，政策，中國政府的行為是不合理或歧視性的，給美國商業造成負擔或限制。根據嚴格的調查，美國貿易代表辦公室發現中國：（1）要求或施加壓力，要求美國公司將其技術轉讓給中國實體； （2）嚴格限制美國公司以市場條件許可其技術的能力； （3）指導和不公平地促進國內公司收購美國公司和資產以獲取尖端技術； （4）進行並支持未經授權的網絡入侵美國公司網絡，以訪問敏感信息和商業秘密。

The list of Beijing’s commitments to cease its predatory economic practices is littered with broken and empty promises. In 2015, Beijing promised that it would stop government- directed cyber-enabled theft of trade secrets for commercial gain, reiterating that same promise in 2017 and 2018. Later in 2018, the United States and a dozen other countries attributed global computer intrusion campaigns, targeting intellectual property and confidential business information, to operators affiliated with the PRC’s Ministry of State Security – a contravention of Beijing’s 2015 commitment. Since the 1980s, Beijing has signed multiple international agreements to protect intellectual property. Despite this, more than 63 percent of the world’s counterfeits originate in China, inflicting hundreds of billions of dollars of damage on legitimate businesses around the world.

北京關於停止掠奪性經濟做法的承諾清單上充斥著破碎而空洞的承諾。 2015年，北京承諾將停止以政府為導向的網路盜竊商業秘密的行為，以謀取商業利益，並在2017年和2018年重申了同樣的承諾。在稍晚的2018年，美國和其他十幾個國家將全球電腦入侵運動歸功於該行動，針對與中國國家安全部有關聯的運營商，以知識產權和機密商業信息為目標，這違反了北京2015年的承諾。自1980年代以來，北京簽署了多項國際協議來保護知識產權。儘管如此，全世界超過63％的仿冒產品還是來自中國，對全球的合法企業造成了數千億美元的損失。

While Beijing acknowledges that China is now a “mature economy,” the PRC continues to argue in its dealings with international bodies, including the WTO, that it is still a “developing country.” Despite being the top importer of high technology products and ranking second only to the United States in terms of gross domestic product, defense spending, and outward investment, China self-designates as a developing country to justify policies and practices that systematically distort multiple sectors globally, harming the United States and other countries.

儘管北京承認中國現在是「成熟經濟體」，但中國繼續與包括世貿組織在內的國際機構打交道，認為中國仍然是「發展中國家」。儘管中國是高科技產品的最大進口國，在國內生產總值，國防支出和對外投資方面僅次於美國，但中國仍自稱為發展中國家，以證明有系統地歪曲全球多個行業的政策和做法，危害美國和其他國家。

One Belt One Road (OBOR) is Beijing’s umbrella term to describe a variety of initiatives, many of which appear designed to reshape international norms, standards, and networks to advance Beijing’s global interests and vision, while also serving China’s domestic economic requirements. Through OBOR and other initiatives, the PRC is expanding the use of Chinese industrial standards in key technology sectors, part of an effort to strengthen its own companies’ position in the global marketplace at the expense of non-Chinese firms. Projects that Beijing has labeled OBOR include: transportation, information and communications technology and energy infrastructure; industrial parks; media collaboration; science and technology exchanges; programs on culture and religion; and even military and security cooperation. Beijing is also seeking to arbitrate OBOR-related commercial disputes through its own specialized courts, which answer to the CCP. The United States welcomes contributions by China to sustainable, high-quality development that accords with international best practices, but OBOR projects frequently operate well outside of these standards and are characterized by poor quality, corruption, environmental degradation, a lack of public oversight or community involvement, opaque loans, and contracts generating or exacerbating governance and fiscal problems in host nations.

一帶一路（OBOR）是北京的總稱，用以描述各種舉措，其中許多旨在重塑國際規範，標準和網絡，以提升北京的全球利益和視野，同時也滿足中國的國內經濟需求。通過「一帶一路」倡議和其他舉措，中國正在擴大在關鍵技術領域中使用中國工業標準的力度，這是在不以非中國公司為代價的情況下加強自身公司在全球市場中地位的努力的一部分。北京標記為「一帶一路」的項目包括：交通，信息和通信技術以及能源基礎設施；工業園區；媒體合作；科技交流；文化和宗教方案；甚至軍事和安全合作。北京也正在尋求通過其自己的專門法院對與一帶一路相關的商業糾紛進行仲裁，這將對中共作出回應。美國歡迎中國為符合國際最佳做法的可持續高質量發展做出的貢獻，但一帶一路項目經常在這些標準之外運作，其特點是質量差，腐敗，環境惡化，缺乏公眾監督或社區參與，不透明的貸款以及在東道國產生或加劇治理和財政問題的合同。

Given Beijing’s increasing use of economic leverage to extract political concessions from or exact retribution against other countries, the United States judges that Beijing will attempt to convert OBOR projects into undue political influence and military access. Beijing uses a combination of threat and inducement to pressure governments, elites, corporations, think tanks, and others – often in an opaque manner – to toe the CCP line and censor free expression. Beijing has restricted trade and tourism with Australia, Canada, South Korea, Japan, Norway, the Philippines, and others, and has detained Canadian citizens, in an effort to interfere in these countries’ internal political and judicial processes. After the Dalai Lama visited Mongolia in 2016, the PRC government imposed new tariffs on land-locked Mongolia’s mineral exports passing through China, temporarily paralyzing Mongolia’s economy.

鑑於北京越來越多地利用經濟槓桿來從其他國家獲得政治讓步或對其他國家作出應有的報應，美國認為北京將試圖將「一帶一路」項目轉變為不適當的政治影響和軍事准入。北京利用威脅與誘使相結合的方式，常常以一種不透明的方式，向政府，精英，企業，智囊團等施加壓力，以屈服於中共路線，並實行不受審查的言論。北京限制與澳大利亞，加拿大，韓國，日本，挪威，菲律賓和其他國家的貿易和旅遊業，並拘留了加拿大公民，以期干預這些國家的內部政治和司法程序。達賴喇嘛於2016年訪問蒙古後，中國政府對通過中國的內陸蒙古礦產品出口徵收新關稅，暫時癱瘓了蒙古的經濟。

Beijing seeks global recognition for its environmental efforts and claims to promote “green development.” China, however, has been the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter by a wide margin for more than a decade. Beijing has put forward vague and unenforceable emissions reduction commitments that allow China’s emissions to keep growing until “around 2030.” China’s planned growing emissions will outweigh the reductions from the rest of the world combined. Chinese firms also export polluting coal-fired power plants to developing countries by the hundreds. The PRC is also the world’s largest source of marine plastic pollution, discharging over 3.5 million metric tons into the ocean each year. The PRC ranks first in the world for illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in coastal nations’ waters around the world, threatening local economies and harming the marine environment. Chinese leaders’ unwillingness to rein in these globally harmful practices does not match their rhetorical promises of environmental stewardship.

北京因其在環境方面的努力而尋求全球認可，並宣稱將促進「綠色發展」。但是，十多年來，中國一直是世界上最大的溫室氣體排放國。北京提出了模糊而無法執行的減排承諾，使中國的排放量能夠持續增長直到「2030年左右」。中國計劃增加的排放量將超過世界其他國家的減排總量。中國企業還向發展中國家出口了污染嚴重的燃煤電廠。中國還是世界上最大的海洋塑料污染源，每年向海洋排放超過350萬噸。在全世界沿海國家的水域中，中國因非法、隱瞞不報、不管制捕魚而居世界第一，威脅當地經濟並損害海洋環境。中國領導人不願遏制這些對全球有害的做法，與他們對環境管理的口頭承諾不符。

##### 2. Challenges to Our Values

2.挑戰我們的價值觀

The CCP promotes globally a value proposition that challenges the bedrock American belief in the unalienable right of every person to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under the current generation of leadership, the CCP has accelerated its efforts to portray its governance system as functioning better than those of what it refers to as “developed, western countries.” Beijing is clear that it sees itself as engaged in an ideological competition with the West. In 2013, General Secretary Xi called on the CCP to prepare for a “long-term period of cooperation and conflict” between two competing systems and declared that “capitalism is bound to die out and socialism is bound to win.”

中共在全球範圍內倡導一項價值主張，挑戰美國堅信每個人都享有生命，自由和追求幸福的不可剝奪權利的信念。在當前這一代領導人的領導下，中共加快了努力，將其治理體系描繪為比所謂的「發達的西方國家」運作得更好。北京顯然認為自己參與了與西方的意識形態競爭。 2013年，習近平總書記呼籲中共為兩個競爭體系之間的「長期合作與衝突時期」做準備，並宣布「資本主義必將消亡，社會主義必將獲勝。」

The CCP aims to make China a “global leader in terms of comprehensive national power and international influence,” as General Secretary Xi expressed in 2017, by strengthening what it refers to as “the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics.” This system is rooted in Beijing’s interpretation of Marxist-Leninist ideology and combines a nationalistic, single- party dictatorship; a state-directed economy; deployment of science and technology in the service of the state; and the subordination of individual rights to serve CCP ends. This runs counter to principles shared by the United States and many likeminded countries of representative government, free enterprise, and the inherent dignity and worth of every individual.

正如習近平總書記在2017年表示，中共旨在通過增強所謂的「中國特色社會主義體系」，使中國成為「綜合國力和國際影響力的全球領導者」。該制度植根於北京對馬克思列寧主義思想的解釋，並結合了民族主義的單黨專政。國家主導的經濟；為國家服務而部署科學技術；服從中共的個人權利從屬關係結束。這與美國和代議制政府，自由企業的許多志趣相投的國家以及每個人固有的尊嚴和價值背道而馳。

Internationally, the CCP promotes General Secretary Xi’s vision for global governance under the banner of “building a community of common destiny for mankind.” Beijing’s efforts to compel ideological conformity at home, however, present an unsettling picture of what a CCP-led “community” looks like in practice: (1) an anticorruption campaign that has purged political opposition; (2) unjust prosecutions of bloggers, activists, and lawyers; (3) algorithmically determined arrests of ethnic and religious minorities; (4) stringent controls over and censorship of information, media, universities, businesses, and non-governmental organizations; (5)surveillance and social credit scoring of citizens, corporations, and organizations; and (6) and arbitrary detention, torture, and abuse of people perceived to be dissidents. In a stark example of domestic conformity, local officials publicized a book burning event at a community library to demonstrate their ideological alignment to “Xi Jinping Thought.”

在國際上，中共在「建立人類共同命運共同體」的旗幟下，宣傳習近平總書記的全球治理願景。然而，北京為在國內強迫意識形態整合而做出的努力，卻令人不解地看到了中共領導的「社區」在實際中的樣子：（1）一場反腐運動清除了政治反對派； （2）對博客，活動家和律師的不公正起訴； （3）以算法確定的逮捕少數民族和宗教少數群體的行為； （4）對信息，媒體，大學，企業和非政府組織進行嚴格控制和審查； （五）對公民，企業和組織的監督和社會信用評分； （6）任意拘留，酷刑和虐待被視為異議人士的人。在國內合規的一個鮮明例子中，地方官員在社區圖書館宣傳了一場焚書活動，以證明他們的思想觀念與「習近平思想」保持一致。

One disastrous outgrowth of such an approach to governance is Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang, where since 2017, authorities have detained more than a million Uighurs and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in indoctrination camps, where many endure forced labor, ideological indoctrination, and physical and psychological abuse. Outside these camps, the regime has instituted a police state employing emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and biogenetics to monitor ethnic minorities’ activities to ensure allegiance to the CCP. Widespread religious persecution – of Christians, Tibetan Buddhists, Muslims, and members of Falun Gong – includes the demolition and desecration of places of worship, arrests of peaceful believers, forced renunciations of faith, and prohibitions on raising children in traditions of faith.

這種治理方式的災難性後果是北京在新疆的政策，自2017年以來，當局已在灌輸營地拘留了超過100萬維吾爾人和其他少數民族和宗教少數群體的成員，在那里許多人忍受著強迫勞動，意識形態灌輸和身心虐待。在這些難民營之外，政權建立了一個警察局，採用人工智能和生物遺傳學等新興技術來監測少數民族的活動，以確保效忠中共。對基督徒，藏傳佛教徒，穆斯林和法輪功成員的廣泛宗教迫害包括對禮拜場所的拆除和褻瀆，逮捕和平信徒，強迫放棄信仰，以及禁止以信仰傳統養育子女。

The CCP’s campaign to compel ideological conformity does not stop at China’s borders. In recent years, Beijing has intervened in sovereign nations’ internal affairs to engineer consent for its policies. PRC authorities have attempted to extend CCP influence over discourse and behavior around the world, with recent examples including companies and sports teams in the United States and the United Kingdom and politicians in Australia and Europe. PRC actors are exporting the tools of the CCP’s techno-authoritarian model to countries around the world, enabling authoritarian states to exert control over their citizens and surveil opposition, training foreign partners in propaganda and censorship techniques, and using bulk data collection to shape public sentiment.

中共強迫意識形態整合的運動並不止於中國邊界。近年來，北京干預了主權國家的內政，以爭取對其政策的同意。中國當局試圖擴大中共在全球話語和行為上的影響力，最近的例子包括美國和英國的公司和運動隊以及澳大利亞和歐洲的政客。中國參與者正在向世界各國出口中共技術獨裁模式的工具，使獨裁國家能夠控制其公民並監督反對派，培訓外國合作夥伴的宣傳和審查技巧，並利用大量數據收集來塑造公眾情緒。

China’s party-state controls the world’s most heavily resourced set of propaganda tools. Beijing communicates its narrative through state-run television, print, radio, and online organizations whose presence is proliferating in the United States and around the world. The CCP often conceals its investments in foreign media entities. In 2015, China Radio International was revealed to control 33 radio stations in 14 countries via shell entities, and to subsidize multiple intermediaries through providing free, pro-Beijing content.

中國的黨國控制著世界上資源最豐富的政治宣傳工具。北京通過國營電視、印刷、廣播和線上組織傳播其敘事，而這些組織在美國乃至世界範圍內的存在都在迅速增加。中共經常隱瞞對外國媒體實體的投資。 2015年，中國國際廣播電台被告知將通過空殼實體控制14個國家/地區的33個廣播電台，並通過提供免費的，親北京的內容來補貼多個中介機構。

Beyond the media, the CCP uses a range of actors to advance its interests in the United States and other open democracies. CCP United Front organizations and agents target businesses, universities, think tanks, scholars, journalists, and local, state, and Federal officials in the United States and around the world, attempting to influence discourse and restrict external influence inside the PRC.

除了媒體之外，中共還利用一系列行動者來提升其在美國和其他開放民主國家的利益。中共聯合陣線組織和特工針對美國和世界各地的企業、大學、智囊團、學者、新聞工作者以及地方、州和聯邦官員，試圖影響言論並限制中國內部的外部影響。

Beijing regularly attempts to compel or persuade Chinese nationals and others to undertake a range of malign behaviors that threaten United States national and economic security, and undermine academic freedom and the integrity of the United States research and development enterprise. These behaviors include misappropriation of technology and intellectual property, failure to appropriately disclose relationships with foreign government sponsored entities, breaches of contract and confidentiality, and manipulation of processes for fair and merit-based allocation of Federal research and development funding. Beijing also attempts to compel Chinese nationals to report on and threaten fellow Chinese students, protest against events that run counter to Beijing’s political narrative, and otherwise restrict the academic freedom that is the hallmark and strength of the American education system.

北京經常試圖強迫或說服中國公民和其他人進行一系列威脅美國國家和經濟安全，破壞學術自由和美國研發企業誠信的惡性行為。這些行為包括盜用技術和智慧財產權，未能適當披露與外國政府資助實體的關係，違反合同和保密規定以及操縱聯邦研究與開發資金的公平和基於功績分配的程序。北京還試圖迫使中國國民舉報和威脅中國同胞，抗議與北京的政治敘述背道而馳的事件，否則會限制學術自由，而這正是美國教育體系的特徵和力量。

PRC media entities, journalists, academics, and diplomats are free to operate in the United States, but Beijing denies reciprocal access to American counterpart institutions and officials. The PRC government routinely denies UnitedStates officials, including the United States Ambassador to the PRC, access to Department of State-funded American Cultural Centers, which are hosted in Chinese universities to share American culture with the Chinese people. Foreign reporters working in the PRC often face harassment and intimidation.

中國的媒體、記者、學者和外交官可以在美國自由活動，但北京方面拒絕與美國對等機構和官員進行往來。中國政府通常拒絕包括美國駐華大使在內的美國官員進入由國家資助的美國文化中心部，這些中心設在中國大學中，以便與中國人民分享美國文化。在中國工作的外國記者經常面臨騷擾和恐嚇。

##### 3. Security Challenges

3.安全挑戰

As China has grown in strength, so has the willingness and capacity of the CCP to employ intimidation and coercion in its attempts to eliminate perceived threats to its interests and advance its strategic objectives globally. Beijing’s actions belie Chinese leaders’ proclamations that they oppose the threat or use of force, do not intervene in other countries’ internal affairs, or are committed to resolving disputes through peaceful dialogue. Beijing contradicts its rhetoric and flouts its commitments to its neighbors by engaging in provocative and coercive military and paramilitary activities in the Yellow Sea, the East and South China Seas, the Taiwan Strait, and Sino-Indian border areas.

隨著中國實力的增強，中共利用威嚇和脅迫來嘗試消除其認為會對中國利益造成威脅的事物，以及向全球推展其戰略目標的的意願和能力也水漲船高。北京當局的行為牴觸中國領導人的主張，即他們反對威脅或使用武力，不干預他國內政或致力於通過和平對話解決爭端。北京在黃海、東海、南海、台灣海峽和中印邊界地區進行挑釁和脅迫性的軍事和準軍事活動中不僅違背了自己的言辭，也是對鄰國承諾的藐視。

In May 2019, the Department of Defense issued its annual report to the Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC, assessing current and future trajectories of China’s military-technological development, security and military strategies, and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) organizational and operational concepts. In July 2019, the PRC Minister of Defense publicly acknowledged that OBOR is linked to the PRC’s aspirational expansion of PLA presence overseas, including locations such as the Pacific Islands and the Caribbean.

2019年5月，美國國防部向國會發布了年度報告，《涉及中國的軍事與安全發展》，評估了中國軍事技術發展，安全與軍事戰略以及人民解放軍（PLA）組織和行動的當前和未來軌跡操作概念。 2019年7月，中國國防部長公開承認一帶一路與中國雄心勃勃的PLA在海外擴張勢力有關，包括在太平洋島嶼和加勒比海地區。

Beijing’s military buildup threatens United States and allied national security interests and poses complex challenges for global commerce and supply chains. Beijing’s Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy gives the PLA unfettered access into civil entities developing and acquiring advanced technologies, including state-owned and private firms, universities, and research programs. Through non-transparent MCF linkages, United States and other foreign companies are unwittingly feeding dual-use technologies into PRC military research and development programs, strengthening the CCP’s coercive ability to suppress domestic opposition and threaten foreign countries, including United States allies and partners.

北京的軍事建設威脅著美國和相關國家的安全利益，對全球商業和供應鏈構成了複雜的挑戰。北京的軍民融合（MCF）戰略使解放軍可以不受限制地進入民間實體，以開發和獲取先進技術，包括國有和私人公司，大學和研究計劃。通過不透明的MCF鏈接，美國和其他外國公司不知不覺地將雙重用途技術投入到中國的軍事研究與發展計劃中，從而增強了中共的壓制能力，以壓制國內反對並威脅包括美國盟友和夥伴在內的外國。

The PRC’s attempts to dominate the global information and communications technology industry through unfair practices is reflected in discriminatory regulations like the PRC National Cyber Security Law, which requires companies to comply with Chinese data localization measures that enable CCP access to foreign data. Other PRC laws compel companies like Huawei and ZTE to cooperate with Chinese security services, even when they do business abroad, creating security vulnerabilities for foreign countries and enterprises utilizing Chinese vendors’ equipment and services.

中國試圖通過不公平的做法統治全球信息和通信技術行業，這體現在歧視性法規中，例如《中華人民共和國國家網絡安全法》，該法要求公司遵守中國數據本地化措施，以使CCP能夠訪問外國數據。其他中國法律也強迫華為和中興等公司與中國的安全服務機構合作，即使它們在國外開展業務，也為利用中國供應商的設備和服務的外國和企業造成安全漏洞。

Beijing refuses to honor its commitment to provide travel documents for Chinese citizens with orders of removal from the United States in a timely and consistent manner, effectively blocking their removals from our country and creating security risks for American communities. In addition, the PRC’s violations of our bilateral consular treaty puts United States citizens at risk in China, with many Americans detrimentally affected by the PRC government’s coercive exit bans and wrongful detentions.

北京拒絕兌現其向中國公民提供旅行證件的承諾，以及時，一致的方式將其從美國驅逐出境，從而有效地阻止了他們從我國被驅逐出境，並給美國社區帶來了安全隱患。此外，中國違反了我們的雙邊領事條約，使美國公民在中國處於危險之中，許多美國人受到中國政府強制性的出境禁令和不當拘留的不利影響。

#### Approach

方法

The NSS demands that the United States “rethink the policies of the past two decades – policies based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in international institutions and global commerce would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners. For the most part, this premise turned out to be false. Rival actors use propaganda and other means to try to discredit democracy. They advance anti-Western views and spread false information to create divisions among ourselves, our allies, and our partners.”

NSS要求美國「重新考慮過去二十年的政策-這些政策基於這樣的假設：與競爭對手的接觸以及他們在國際機構和全球商業中的參與將使它們成為良性行為者和可信賴的伙伴。在大多數情況下，這個前提是錯誤的。敵對行為者使用宣傳和其他手段來破壞民主。他們提出反西方的觀點，散佈虛假信息，在我們自己，我們的盟友和我們的伙伴之間造成分歧。」

Guided by a return to principled realism, the United States is responding to the CCP’s direct challenge by acknowledging that we are in a strategic competition and protecting our interests appropriately. The principles of the United States’ approach to China are articulated both in the NSS and our vision for the Indo-Pacific region – sovereignty, freedom, openness, rule of law, fairness, and reciprocity. United States-China relations do not determine our Indo-Pacific strategy, but rather fall within that strategy and the overarching NSS. By the same token, our vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific region does not exclude China.

在回歸有原則的現實主義的指導下，美國對中共的直接挑戰作出了回應，承認我們處於戰略競爭中並適當地保護了我們的利益。 NSS和我們對印度太平洋地區的願景都闡明了美國對待中國的原則，即主權，自由，開放，法治，公平和互惠。美中關係並不決定我們的印度太平洋戰略，而是屬於該戰略和新的國家安全戰略之內。同樣，我們對印度太平洋自由開放地區的願景並不排除中國。

The United States holds the PRC government to the same standards and principles that apply to all nations. We believe this is the treatment that the people of China want and deserve from their own government and from the international community. Given the strategic choices China’s leadership is making, the United States now acknowledges and accepts the relationship with the PRC as the CCP has always framed it internally: one of great power competition.

美國要求中華人民共和國政府遵守適用於所有國家的相同標準和原則。我們認為，這是中國人民希望得到和應得的，應得到其本國政府和國際社會的待遇。鑑於中國領導人正在做出的戰略選擇，美國現在承認並接受與中國的關係，因為中共一直在內部構架它：這是大國競爭之一。

United States policies are not premised on an attempt to change the PRC’s domestic governance model, nor do they make concessions to the CCP’s narratives of exceptionalism and victimhood. Rather, United States policies are designed to protect our interests and empower our institutions to withstand the CCP’s malign behavior and collateral damage from the PRC’s internal governance problems. Whether the PRC eventually converges with the principles of the free and open order can only be determined by the Chinese people themselves. We recognize that Beijing, not Washington, has agency over and responsibility for the PRC government’s actions.

美國的政策並非以改變中國的國內治理模式為前提，也不是對中共關於例外主義和受害人的敘述作出讓步。相反，美國的政策旨在保護我們的利益並使我們的機構有能力抵禦中共的不良行為和因中國內部治理問題引起的附帶損害。中國最終是否會遵循自由開放秩序的原則，只能由中國人民自己來決定。我們認識到，北京而不是華盛頓對中國政府的行動負有代理責任並負有責任。

The United States rejects CCP attempts at false equivalency between rule-of-law and rule- by-law; between counterterrorism and oppression; between representative governance and autocracy; and between market-based competition and state-directed mercantilism. The United States will continue to challenge Beijing’s propaganda and false narratives that distort the truth and attempt to demean American values and ideals.

美國拒絕中共試圖在法治與法治之間建立虛假的對等關係。在反恐和壓迫之間；在代議制和專制之間；在基於市場的競爭與國家主導的重商主義之間。美國將繼續挑戰北京的宣傳和錯誤敘述，這些說法歪曲了事實，並企圖貶低美國的價值觀和理想。

Similarly, the United States does not and will not accommodate Beijing’s actions that weaken a free, open, and rules-based international order. We will continue to refute the CCP’s narrative that the United States is in strategic retreat or will shirk our international security commitments. The United States will work with our robust network of allies and like- minded partners to resist attacks on our shared norms and values, within our own governance institutions, around the world, and in international organizations.

同樣，美國也不會也不會接受北京削弱自由，開放和基於規則的國際秩序的行動。我們將繼續駁斥中共關於美國處於戰略撤退或將推卸我們的國際安全承諾的說法。美國將與我們強大的盟友和志同道合的伙伴網絡合作，在我們自己的治理機構，全球以及國際組織中抵抗對我們共同規範和價值觀的攻擊。

The American people’s generous contributions to China’s development are a matter of historical record – just as the Chinese people’s remarkable accomplishments in the era of Reform and Opening are undeniable. However, the negative trend lines of Beijing’s policies and practices threaten the legacy of the Chinese people and their future position in the world.

美國人民對中國發展的慷慨貢獻是歷史記錄，就像中國人民在改革開放時代所取得的顯著成就一樣。但是，北京政策和做法的消極趨勢線威脅著中國人民的遺產和他們在世界上的未來地位。

Beijing has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not offer compromises in response to American displays of goodwill, and that its actions are not constrained by its prior commitments to respect our interests. As such, the United States responds to the PRC’s actions rather than its stated commitments. Moreover, we do not cater to Beijing’s demands to create a proper “atmosphere” or “conditions” for dialogue.

北京一再證明，它不會為回應美國的善意而做出妥協，而且其行動不受先前尊重我們利益的承諾的束縛。因此，美國是對中國的行動而不是其明確的承諾作出回應。此外，我們不能滿足北京創造適當的對話「氣氛」或「條件」的要求。

Likewise, the United States sees no value in engaging with Beijing for symbolism and pageantry; we instead demand tangible results and constructive outcomes. We acknowledge and respond in kind to Beijing’s transactional approach with timely incentives and costs, or credible threats thereof. When quiet diplomacy proves futile, the United States will increase public pressure on the PRC government and take action to protect United States interests by leveraging proportional costs when necessary.

同樣，美國認為與北京進行象徵主義和選美活動沒有任何價值。相反，我們要求取得切實的成果和建設性的成果。我們以及時的激勵措施和成本，或對其施加的可信威脅，對北京的交易方式表示認可和回應。當安靜的外交被證明是徒勞的時，美國將加大對中國政府的公眾壓力，並採取必要的行動，通過在必要時利用成比例的成本來保護美國的利益。

The PRC government has fallen short of its commitments in many areas including: trade and investment; freedoms of expression and belief; political interference; freedoms of navigation and overflight; cyber and other types of espionage and theft; weapons proliferation; environmental protection; and global health. Agreements with Beijing must include stringent verification and enforcement mechanisms.

中國政府在許多領域都沒有兌現承諾，包括：貿易和投資；以及表達和信仰自由；政治干預；航行和飛越自由；網絡和其他類型的間諜和盜竊；武器擴散；環境保護；和全球健康。與北京的協議必須包括嚴格的核查和執行機制。

We speak candidly with the Chinese people and expect honesty from PRC leaders. In matters of diplomacy, the United States responds appropriately to the CCP’s insincere or vague threats, and stands up alongside our allies and partners to resist coercion. Through our continuous and frank engagement, the United States welcomes cooperation by China to expand and work toward shared objectives in ways that benefit the peace, stability, and prosperity of the world. Our approach does not exclude the PRC. The United States stands ready to welcome China’s positive contributions.

我們與中國人民坦誠交談，並期待中國領導人的誠實。在外交事務上，美國對中共的不真誠或含糊的威脅作出了適當反應，並與我們的盟國和夥伴站在一起抵抗脅迫。通過我們不斷坦率的接觸，美國歡迎中國進行合作，以有益於世界和平，穩定與繁榮的方式擴大和朝著共同目標努力。我們的方法不排除中華人民共和國。美國隨時準備歡迎中國的積極貢獻。

As the above tenets of our approach imply, competition necessarily includes engagement with the PRC, but our engagements are selective and results-oriented, with each advancing our national interests. We engage with the PRC to negotiate and enforce commitments to ensure fairness and reciprocity; clarify Beijing’s intentions to avoid misunderstanding; and resolve disputes to prevent escalation. The United States is committed to maintaining open channels of communication with the PRC to reduce risks and manage crises. We expect the PRC to also keep these channels open and responsive.

正如我們的方法的上述宗旨所暗示的那樣，競爭必定包括與中國的交往，但我們的交往是有選擇性的和以結果為導向的，每一項都促進我們的國家利益。我們與中國接觸，以談判和履行承諾以確保公平和互惠；闡明北京避免誤會的意圖；並解決爭端以防止升級。美國致力於與中國保持開放的溝通渠道，以降低風險和管理危機。我們預計中國也將保持這些渠道的開放性和響應性。

#### Implementation

實作

In accordance with the President’s NSS, the political, economic, and security policies outlined in this report seek to protect the American people and homeland, promote American prosperity, preserve peace through strength, and advance a free and open vision abroad. During the first 3 years of the Administration, the United States has taken significant steps in implementing this strategy as it applies to China.

根據總統的NSS，本報告中概述的政治，經濟和安全政策旨在保護美國人民和家園，促進美國繁榮，通過力量維護和平，並在國外推進自由開放的願景。在政府成立的頭三年中，美國為實施適用於中國的這一戰略採取了重要步驟。

##### 1. Protect the American People, the Homeland, and the American Way of Life

1.保護美國人民，家園和美國生活方式

The United States Department of Justice (DOJ)’s China Initiative and Federal Bureau of Investigation are directing resources to identify and prosecute trade secrets theft, hacking, and economic espionage; and increasing efforts to protect against malign foreign investment in United States infrastructure, supply chain threats, and foreign agents seeking to influence American policy. For example, DOJ informed PRC state media company CGTN-America of its obligation to register as a foreign agent as specified under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), which obligates registrants to disclose their activities to Federal authorities and appropriately label information materials they distribute. CGTN-America subsequently registered under FARA.

美國司法部（DOJ）的中國倡議和聯邦調查局正在引導資源，以識別和起訴盜竊，黑客入侵和經濟間諜活動中的商業秘密；並加大力度防止外國對美國基礎設施的惡意投資，供應鏈威脅以及尋求影響美國政策的外國代理。例如，司法部告知中國國有媒體公司CGTN-America，其根據《外國代理人註冊法》（FARA）的規定有義務註冊為外國代理人，該義務使註冊人有義務向聯邦當局披露其活動並適當標記他們分發的信息材料。 CGTN-America隨後根據FARA註冊。

The Administration is also responding to CCP propaganda in the United States by highlighting malign behavior, countering false narratives, and compelling transparency. United States officials, including those from the White House and the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice, are leading efforts to educate the American public about the PRC government’s exploitation of our free and open society to push a CCP agenda inimical to United States interests and values. In an effort to achieve reciprocity of access, the Department of State has implemented a policy requiring Chinese diplomats to notify the United States Government before meeting with state and local government officials and academic institutions.

政府還通過強調惡性行為，反對虛假陳述和令人信服的透明度來回應美國共產黨的宣傳。美國官員，包括白宮和美國國務院，國防與司法部的官員，正在領導教育美國公眾，了解中國政府如何利用我們的自由開放社會，推動對美國不利的CCP議程和價值觀。為了實現互惠互利，美國國務院已實施一項政策，要求中國外交官在與州和地方政府官員及學術機構會面之前，必須通知美國政府。

The Administration is raising awareness of and actively combatting Beijing’s co-optation and coercion of its own citizens and others in United States academic institutions, beyond traditional espionage and influence efforts. We are working with universities to protect the rights of Chinese students on American campuses, provide information to counter CCP propaganda and disinformation, and ensure an understanding of ethical codes of conduct in an American academic environment.

除傳統的間諜活動和影響力工作外，政府當局正在提高認識，並積極打擊北京對本國公民和其他人在美國學術機構中的加入和脅迫。我們正在與大學合作，以保護中國學生在美國校園的權利，提供信息來對抗中共的宣傳和虛假信息，並確保了解美國學術環境中的道德行為準則。

Chinese students represent the largest cohort of foreign students in the United States today. The United States values the contributions of Chinese students and researchers. As of 2019, the number of Chinese students and researchers in the United States has reached an all-time high, while the number of student visa denials to Chinese applicants has steadily declined. The UnitedStates strongly supports the principles of open academic discourse and welcomes international students and researchers conducting legitimate academic pursuits; we are improving processes to screen out the small minority of Chinese applicants who attempt to enter the United States under false pretenses or with malign intent.

中國學生是當今美國最大的外國學生群體。美國重視中國學生和研究人員的貢獻。截至2019年，美國的中國學生和研究人員數量達到了歷史最高水平，而拒絕中國申請人的學生簽證數量穩步下降。美國堅決支持公開學術討論的原則，並歡迎國際學生和研究人員進行合法的學術活動；我們正在改進程序，以篩選出少數以虛假藉口或惡意意圖進入美國的中國申請人。

In the United States research community, Federal agencies such as the National Institutes of Health and the Department of Energy have updated or clarified regulations and procedures to ensure compliance with applicable standards of conduct and reporting, in order to improve transparency and prevent conflicts of interest. The National Science and Technology Council’s Joint Committee on the Research Environment is developing standards for Federally-funded research, and best practices for United States research institutions. The Department of Defense is working to ensure grantees do not also have contracts with China’s talent recruitment programs, while also continuing to welcome foreign researchers.

在美國研究界，諸如美國國立衛生研究院和能源部之類的聯邦機構已更新或澄清了法規和程序，以確保遵守適用的行為和報告標準，以提高透明度並防止利益衝突。美國國家科學技術委員會研究環境聯合委員會正在製定聯邦資助研究的標準以及美國研究機構的最佳實踐。國防部正在努力確保受贈人也不會與中國的人才招聘計劃簽訂合同，同時還將繼續歡迎外國研究人員。

To prevent foreign malign actors from gaining access to United States information networks, the President issued the “Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain” and the “Executive Order on Establishing the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector.” The implementation of these Executive Orders will prevent certain companies associated with or answering to the intelligence and security apparatus of foreign adversaries from, for example, readily accessing the private and sensitive information of the United States Government, the United States private sector, and individual Americans. To ensure protection of our information worldwide, including sensitive military and intelligence data, the United States is actively engaging with our allies and partners, including in multilateral fora, to promote a set of common standards for secure, resilient, and trusted communications platforms that underpin the global information economy. To compel Beijing to adhere to norms of responsible state behavior, the United States is working with allies and like-minded partners to attribute and otherwise deter malicious cyber activities.

為防止外國惡性行為者進入美國信息網絡，總統發布了「確保信息和通信技術與服務供應鏈安全的執行令」和「建立外國參與性評估委員會的執行令」。美國電信服務部門。」這些行政命令的執行將阻止與外國對手的情報和安全裝置相關聯或對其作出答复的某些公司，例如，隨時獲取美國政府，美國私營部門和個別美國人的私人和敏感信息。 。為了確保保護我們在全球範圍內的信息，包括敏感的軍事和情報數據，美國正在與包括多邊論壇在內的盟友和合作夥伴積極合作，以促進建立一套安全，有彈性和受信任的通信平台的通用標準。全球信息經濟。為了迫使北京遵守負責任的國家行為規範，美國正在與盟國和志同道合的伙伴合作，歸因於並以其他方式阻止惡意網絡活動。

The Administration is implementing the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act to update and strengthen the capacity of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the UnitedStates (CFIUS) to address growing national security concerns over foreign exploitation of investment structures, which previously fell outside CFIUS jurisdiction. This includes preventing Chinese companies from exploiting access to United States innovation through minority investments in order to modernize the Chinese military. The United States has updated its export control regulations, particularly in light of Beijing’s whole-of-society MCF strategy and its efforts to acquire advanced technologies related to hypersonics, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and other emerging and foundational technologies. We are also engaging allies and partners to develop their own foreign investment screening mechanisms, and to update and implement export controls collaboratively through multilateral regimes and other forums.

政府正在實施《外國投資風險審查現代化法案》，以更新和加強美國外國投資委員會（CFIUS）的能力，以解決對外國剝削投資結構的國家安全日益關注的問題，這些問題以前不在CFIUS管轄範圍之內。這包括阻止中國公司通過少數股權投資來利用美國創新的手段，以使中國軍隊現代化。美國特別是根據北京的全社會MCF戰略及其努力獲取與超音速，量子計算，人工智能，生物技術以及其他新興和基礎技術相關的先進技術，更新了出口管制法規。我們還與盟國和合作夥伴合作，建立自己的外國投資審查機制，並通過多邊機制和其他論壇合作更新和實施出口管制。

The United States Government is also taking concrete actions to protect the American consumer from counterfeit and substandard products. Between 2017 and 2018, the United States Department of Homeland Security seized more than 59,000 shipments of counterfeit goods, produced in the PRC, valued at more than $2.1 billion. This represents five times the total shipments and value seized from all other foreign countries combined.

美國政府也正在採取具體行動，保護美國消費者免受假冒偽劣產品的侵害。在2017年至2018年期間，美國國土安全部緝獲了在中國生產的超過59,000批假冒商品，總價值超過21億美元。這是從所有其他外國緝獲的總發貨量和總價值的五倍。

In addition to falsely branded apparel, footwear, handbags, and watches, United States Customs and Border Protection intercepted three shipments containing 53,000 illegal Chinese gun parts and electronics that could have compromised the security and privacy of American businesses and consumers. United States law enforcement agencies are also targeting counterfeit pharmaceuticals and cosmetics originating from China, which have been found to contain high levels of contaminants, including bacteria and animal waste that pose a danger to American consumers.

除了假冒品牌的服裝，鞋類，手袋和手錶外，美國海關和邊境保護局還截獲了三批裝有53,000支中國非法槍支零件和電子產品的貨物，這可能損害美國企業和消費者的安全和隱私。美國執法機構還針對源自中國的假冒藥品和化妝品，發現這些藥品和化妝品含有大量污染物，其中包括對美國消費者構成威脅的細菌和動物廢物。

The United States is working with Chinese authorities to stem the deadly flow of illicit Chinese fentanyl from the PRC to the United States. In December 2018, the President secured a commitment from his Chinese counterpart to control all forms of fentanyl in the PRC. With the Chinese regulatory regime in place since May 2019, United States and PRC law enforcement agencies are sharing intelligence and coordinating to set conditions for enforcement actions that will deter Chinese drug producers and traffickers. The United States is also working with China’s postal agencies to improve tracking of small parcels for law enforcement purposes.

美國正與中國當局合作，阻止非法的中國芬太尼從中國流向美國。 2018年12月，總統獲得了中國總統的承諾，承諾在中國控制所有形式的芬太尼。自2019年5月起實施中國監管制度以來，美國和中國的執法機構正在共享情報並進行協調，以製定執法條件以阻止中國毒品生產者和販運者。美國還與中國的郵政機構合作，以改善對小包裹的追踪，以用於執法目的。

##### 2. Promote American Prosperity

2.促進美國繁榮

In response to the PRC’s documented unfair and abusive trade practices and industrial policies, the Administration is taking strong actions to protect American businesses, workers, and farmers, and to put an end to Beijing’s practices that have contributed to a hollowing-out of the United States manufacturing base. The United States is committed to rebalancing the UnitedStates-China economic relationship. Our whole-of-government approach supports fair trade and advances United States competitiveness, promotes UnitedStates exports, and breaks down unjust barriers to United States trade and investment. Having failed since 2003 to persuade Beijing to adhere to its economic commitments through regular, high-level dialogues, the United States is confronting China’s market-distorting forced technology transfer and intellectual property practices by imposing costs in the form of tariffs levied on Chinese goods coming into the United States. Those tariffs will remain in place until a fair Phase Two trade deal is agreed to by the United States and the PRC.

針對中國記錄在案的不公平和虐待性貿易慣例和產業政策，美國政府正在採取強有力的行動，以保護美國的企業，工人和農民，並製止北京的做法，這些做法助長了美國的空心化。國家製造基地。美國致力於平衡中美經濟關係。我們的整個政府方法支持公平貿易並提高美國的競爭力，促進美國的出口，並打破對美國貿易和投資的不公正壁壘。自2003年以來，美國未能說服北京通過定期的高層對話來履行其經濟承諾，但美國正通過對即將到來的中國商品徵收關稅的形式徵收費用，來應對中國的扭曲市場的強迫性技術轉讓和知識產權實踐。進入美國。在美國和中國達成公平的第二階段貿易協議之前，這些關稅將一直存在。

In response to Beijing’s repeated failure to reduce or eliminate its market-distorting subsidies and overcapacity, the United States imposed tariffs to protect our strategically important steel and aluminum industries. For those unfair Chinese trade practices that are subject to dispute settlement at the WTO, the United States continues to pursue and win multiple cases. Finally, to crack down on China’s dumping and subsidies across a broad range of industries, the Department of Commerce is making greater utility of United States antidumping and countervailing duties laws than in past administrations.

為應對北京一再未能減少或消除扭曲市場的補貼和產能過剩的問題，美國征收關稅以保護我們具有戰略意義的鋼鐵和鋁工業。對於那些有待在世貿組織解決爭端的不公平的中國貿易做法，美國繼續提起訴訟並贏得多個案件。最後，為了打擊中國對廣泛行業的傾銷和補貼，商務部正在比過去的政府更有效地利用美國的反傾銷和反補貼稅法。

In January 2020, the United States and the PRC signed Phase One of an economic and trade agreement that requires structural reforms and other changes to China’s economic and trade regime, addressing several longstanding United States concerns. The agreement prohibits the PRC from forcing or pressuring foreign companies to transfer their technology as a condition for doing business in China; strengthens protection and enforcement of intellectual property in China in all key areas; creates new market opportunities in China for United States agriculture and financial services by addressing policy barriers; and addresses longstanding, unfair currency practices. The agreement also establishes a strong dispute resolution mechanism that ensures prompt and effective implementation and enforcement. By addressing structural barriers to trade and making the commitments fully enforceable, the Phase One agreement will expand United States exports to China. As part of this agreement, the PRC committed over the next 2 years to increase imports of United States goods and services by no less than $200 billion in four broad categories: manufactured goods, agriculture, energy, and services. This agreement marks critical progress toward a more balanced trade relationship and a more level playing field for American workers and companies.

2020年1月，美國和中國簽署了一項經貿協議的第一階段，該協議要求對中國的經貿體制進行結構性改革和其他變化，解決了美國長期以來的擔憂。該協議禁止中國強迫或迫使外國公司轉讓其技術，作為在中國開展業務的條件；在所有關鍵領域加強對中國知識產權的保護和執法；通過解決政策障礙，在中國為美國的農業和金融服務創造新的市場機會；並解決了長期不公平的貨幣慣例。該協議還建立了強有力的爭議解決機制，以確保迅速有效地實施和執行。通過解決貿易方面的結構性障礙並充分履行承諾，第一階段協議將擴大美國對中國的出口。作為該協議的一部分，中國承諾在未來兩年內將美國商品和服務的進口增加至少2000億美元，涉及四大類：製成品，農業，能源和服務。該協議標誌著朝著更加平衡的貿易關係和為美國工人和公司提供更公平競爭環境的重要進展。

Domestically, the Administration is taking steps to strengthen the United States economy and promote economic sectors of the future, such as 5G technology, through tax reforms and a robust deregulatory agenda. The President’s “Executive Order on Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence” is an example of a United States Government initiative to promote investment and collaboration to ensure the United States continues to lead in innovation and setting standards for a growing industry.

在國內，政府正在採取措施，通過稅制改革和強有力的放鬆管制議程，來加強美國經濟並促進未來的經濟部門，例如5G技術。總統的「維持美國在人工智能領域的領導力的行政命令」是美國政府為促進投資與合作以確保美國繼續在創新和為成長中的行業製定標準方面所採取的舉措的一個例子。

Together with other likeminded nations, the United States promotes an economic vision based on principles of sovereignty, free markets, and sustainable development. Alongside the European Union and Japan, the United States is engaged in a robust trilateral process to develop disciplines for state-owned enterprises, industrial subsidies, and forced technology transfers. We will also continue to work with our allies and partners to ensure that discriminatory industrial standards do not become global standards. As the world’s most valuable consumer market, largest source of foreign direct investment, and leading wellspring of global technological innovation, the United States engages extensively with allies and partners to evaluate shared challenges and coordinate effective responses to ensure continued peace and prosperity. We work closely with United States companies to build their competitiveness at home and abroad while fostering sustainable development through programs such as Prosper Africa, America Crece in Latin America and the Caribbean, and Enhancing Development and Growth through Energy in the Indo-Pacific region.

美國與其他志趣相投的國家一道，在主權，自由市場和可持續發展原則的基礎上倡導經濟遠景。除歐盟和日本外，美國還參與了強有力的三邊程序，以發展國有企業，工業補貼和強制性技術轉讓的紀律。我們還將繼續與盟國和合作夥伴合作，以確保歧視性的工業標準不會成為全球標準。作為世界上最有價值的消費市場，最大的外國直接投資來源以及全球技術創新的領先源泉，美國與盟國和合作夥伴廣泛接觸，以評估共同面臨的挑戰並協調有效對策，以確保持續的和平與繁榮。我們與美國公司緊密合作，以建立其在國內外的競爭力，同時通過諸如繁榮非洲，拉丁美洲和加勒比地區的美國Crece以及印度太平洋地區的能源促進發展與增長等計劃來促進可持續發展。

##### 3. Preserve Peace through Strength

3.通過力量維護和平

The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) prioritizes long-term competition with China and emphasizes modernization and partnerships to counter the PLA’s technological advancements, force development, and growing international presence and assertiveness. As described in the Nuclear Posture Review, the Administration is prioritizing the modernization of the nuclear triad, including the development of supplementary capabilities designed to deter Beijing from using its weapons of mass destruction or conducting other strategic attacks. Meanwhile, the United States continues to urge China’s leaders to come to the table and begin arms control and strategic risk reduction discussions as a nuclear power with a modern and growing nuclear arsenal and the world’s largest collection of intermediate range delivery systems. The United States believes it is in the interest of all nations to improve Beijing’s transparency, prevent miscalculations, and avoid costly arms buildups.

2018年國防戰略（NDS）將與中國的長期競爭放在首位，並強調現代化和夥伴關係，以應對解放軍的技術進步，部隊發展以及日益增長的國際影響力和自信。如《核態勢評估》所述，政府正在優先考慮核三合會的現代化，包括發展補充能力，以阻止北京使用其大規模殺傷性武器或進行其他戰略攻擊。同時，美國繼續敦促中國領導人出席會議，並開始討論軍備控制和減少戰略風險的討論，將其作為擁有現代，不斷發展的核武庫和世界上最大的中程交付系統集合的核電。美國認為，提高北京的透明度，防止錯誤計算並避免代價高昂的軍備積累符合所有國家的利益。

The Department of Defense is moving quickly to deploy hypersonic platforms, increasing investments in cyber and space capabilities, and developing more lethal fires based on resilient, adaptive, and cost-effective platforms. Together, these capabilities are intended to deter and counter Beijing’s growing ambitions and the PLA’s drive toward technological parity and superiority.

國防部正在迅速採取行動，以部署高超音速平台，增加對網絡和太空功能的投資，並基於彈性，適應性強且具有成本效益的平台開發更多致命的火力。這些能力加在一起，旨在阻止和抵制北京的雄心壯志以及解放軍向技術均等和優勢邁進的動力。

As part of our worldwide freedom of navigation operations program, the United States is pushing back on Beijing’s hegemonic assertions and excessive claims. The United States military will continue to exercise the right to navigate and operate wherever international law allows, including in the South China Sea. We are speaking up for regional allies and partners, and providing security assistance to help them build capacity to withstand Beijing’s attempts to use its military, paramilitary, and law enforcement forces to coerce and prevail in disputes. In 2018, the United States military withdrew the invitation for the PLA to participate in the biennial Rim of the Pacific exercise due to Beijing’s deployment of advanced missile systems onto manmade features in the South China Sea.

作為我們全球航行自由行動計劃的一部分，美國正在迴避北京的霸權主張和過多要求。美國軍方將繼續在國際法允許的範圍內，包括在南中國海，行使航行和操作的權利。我們正在為地區盟友和合作夥伴代言，並提供安全援助，以幫助他們建立能力，抵禦北京使用其軍事，準軍事和執法部隊的努力，在爭端中取得成功並取得勝利。由於北京將先進的導彈系統部署到南中國海的人造特徵上，2018年，美國軍方撤回了邀請解放軍參加兩年一次的太平洋沿岸演習的邀請。

Stronger alliances and partnerships are a cornerstone of the NDS. The United States is building partner capacity and deepening interoperability to develop a combat-credible forward operating presence, fully integrated with allies and partners to deter and deny PRC aggression. The Administration’s Conventional Arms Transfer policy aims to promote United States arms sales and accelerate the transformation of partner military capabilities in a strategic and complementary manner. In June 2019, the Department of Defense released its first Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, articulating the Department’s implementation of the NDS and our whole-of-government strategy for the Indo-Pacific region.

加強聯盟和夥伴關係是NDS的基石。美國正在建立合作夥伴能力並加深互操作性，以發展具有戰鬥力的前線作戰存在，並與盟國和合作夥伴充分融合，以製止和否認中國的侵略。政府的常規武器轉讓政策旨在以戰略和互補的方式促進美國的武器銷售並加速合作夥伴軍事能力的轉變。 2019年6月，美國國防部發布了第一份《印度-太平洋戰略報告》，闡明了國防部對NDS的實施以及我們針對印度-太平洋地區的整個政府戰略。

The United States will continue to maintain strong unofficial relations with Taiwan in accordance with our “One China” policy, based on the Taiwan Relations Act and the three United States-PRC Joint Communiques. The United States maintains that any resolution of cross-Strait differences must be peaceful and according to the will of the people on both sides, without resorting to threat or coercion. Beijing’s failure to honor its commitments under the communiques, as demonstrated by its massive military buildup, compels the United States to continue to assist the Taiwan military in maintaining a credible self-defense, which deters aggression and helps to ensure peace and stability in the region. In a 1982 memorandum, President Ronald Reagan insisted “that the quantity and quality of the arms provided Taiwan be conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC.” In 2019, the United States approved more than $10 billion of arms sales to Taiwan.

美國將根據《台灣關係法》和美國與中國的三個聯合公報，根據我們的「一個中國」政策繼續與台灣保持牢固的非正式關係。美國認為，任何兩岸分歧的解決都必須是和平的，並且要符合雙方人民的意願，而不能訴諸威脅或脅迫。北京未能履行其在公報上的承諾，這體現在其大規模的軍事建設上，這迫使美國繼續協助台灣軍方維持可靠的自衛，這可以阻止侵略並有助於確保該地區的和平與穩定。 。裡根總統在1982年的備忘錄中堅稱「向台灣提供的武器的數量和質量完全取決於中國的威脅。」 2019年，美國批准向台灣出售超過100億美元的武器。

The United States remains committed to maintaining a constructive, results-oriented relationship with the PRC. The United States conducts defense contacts and exchanges with the PRC to communicate strategic intent; prevent and manage crises; reduce the risks of miscalculation and misunderstanding that could escalate into conflict; and cooperate in areas of shared interest. The United States military engages with the PLA to develop effective crisis communication mechanisms, including responsive channels for de-escalation in unplanned scenarios.

美國仍然致力於與中國保持建設性的，注重結果的關係。美國與中國進行國防接觸和交流，以傳達戰略意圖；預防和處理危機；減少可能會升級為衝突的錯誤計算和誤解的風險；在共同利益的領域進行合作。美國軍方與解放軍合作，建立有效的危機溝通機制，包括在非計劃情況下降級的響應渠道。

##### 4. Advance American Influence

4.增強美國的影響力

For the past seven decades, the free and open international order has provided the stability to allow sovereign, independent states to flourish and contribute to unprecedented global economic growth. As a large, developed country and a major beneficiary of this order, the PRC should help guarantee freedom and openness for other nations around the globe. When Beijing instead promotes or abets authoritarianism, self-censorship, corruption, mercantilist economics, and intolerance of ethnic and religious diversity, the UnitedStates leads international efforts to resist and counter these malign activities.

在過去的七十年中，自由和開放的國際秩序為允許主權獨立國家繁榮發展並為前所未有的全球經濟增長做出貢獻提供了穩定。作為這個發達的大國和主要受益者，中國應幫助保障全球其他國家的自由和開放。當北京反而促進或教author威權主義，自我檢查，腐敗，重商主義經濟學以及對種族和宗教多樣性的不容忍之時，美國將領導國際努力來抵制和打擊這些惡性活動。

In 2018 and 2019, the Secretary of State hosted the first two gatherings of the Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom. Along with the President’s unprecedented Global Call to Protect Religious Freedom during the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2019, these events brought together global leaders to address religious persecution around the world. During both ministerials, the United States and partner countries released joint statements calling on the PRC government to respect the rights of Uighur and other Turkic Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, Christians, and Falun Gong adherents, all of whom face repression and persecution in China. In February 2020, the Department of State launched the first ever International Religious Freedom Alliance with 25 likeminded partners to defend the right of every person to worship without fear. The President met with Chinese dissidents and survivors on the margins of the 2019 Ministerial, and he shared the stage during UNGA with victims of religious persecution from China. The United States also continues to support human rights defenders and independent civil society working in or on China.

在2018年和2019年，國務卿主持了促進宗教自由部長級會議的頭兩次聚會。伴隨著總統在2019年9月聯合國大會（UNGA）召開的前所未有的全球保護宗教自由呼籲，這些活動將全球領導人召集在一起，以解決世界各地的宗教迫害問題。在兩次部長級會議期間，美國和夥伴國家發表了聯合聲明，呼籲中國政府尊重維吾爾族和其他突厥穆斯林，藏傳佛教徒，基督教徒和法輪功信徒的權利，這些人在中國都面臨壓迫和迫害。 2020年2月，美國國務院與25個志趣相投的伙伴發起了第一個國際宗教自由聯盟，以捍衛每個人無懼恐懼的禮拜權利。總統在2019年部長級會議期間會見了中國持不同政見者和倖存者，他在聯大期間與來自中國的宗教迫害受害者分享了舞台。美國還繼續支持在中國或在中國開展工作的人權捍衛者和獨立的民間社會。

In October 2019 at the United Nations in New York, the United States joined likeminded nations in condemning Beijing’s ongoing human rights violations and other repressive policies in Xinjiang that threaten international peace and security. The latter event followed United States Government actions to stop United States exports to select Chinese government agencies and surveillance technology companies complicit in the Xinjiang human rights abuses and to deny United States visas for Chinese officials, and their family members, responsible for violating Beijing’s international human rights commitments. The United States has also begun actions to block imports of Chinese goods produced using forced labor in Xinjiang.

2019年10月，在紐約聯合國舉行的會議上，美國加入了志趣相投的國家，譴責北京持續不斷的侵犯人權行為以及新疆其他威脅國際和平與安全的鎮壓政策。在後者事件之後，美國政府採取行動，阻止美國出口商品，以選擇參與侵犯新疆人權的中國政府機構和監視技術公司，並拒絕向中國官員及其家屬提供美國簽證，因為中國官員及其家屬違反了北京的國際人權法權利承諾。美國還開始採取行動，禁止在新疆進口使用強迫勞動生產的中國商品。

The United States will continue to take a principled stand against the use of our technology to support China’s military and its technology-enabled authoritarianism, working in conjunction with likeminded allies and partners. In doing so, we will implement policies that keep pace with rapid technological change and PRC efforts to blend civil and military uses and compel companies to support China’s security and intelligence services.

美國將繼續採取原則立場，與志同道合的盟友和合作夥伴一道反對使用我們的技術來支持中國軍方及其以技術為基礎的威權主義。在此過程中，我們將執行與技術日新月異的政策，並配合中國努力將民用和軍用融合在一起，並迫使公司支持中國的安全和情報服務。

These efforts demonstrate United States commitment to the fundamental values and norms that have served as the foundation of the international system since the end of the Second World War. While the United States has no desire to interfere in the PRC’s internal affairs, Washington will continue to be candid when Beijing strays from its international commitments and responsible behavior, especially when United States interests are at stake. For example, the UnitedStates has significant interests in the future of Hong Kong. Approximately 85,000 United States citizens and more than 1,300 United States businesses reside in Hong Kong. The President, the Vice President, and the Secretary of State have repeatedly called on Beijing to honor the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and preserve Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy, rule of law, and democratic freedoms, which enable Hong Kong to remain a successful hub of international business and finance.

這些努力表明，美國對自第二次世界大戰以來一直作為國際體系基礎的基本價值觀和規範的承諾。儘管美國不希望干涉中國的內政，但當北京偏離其國際承諾和負責任的行為時，尤其是在美國利益受到威脅時，華盛頓將繼續坦率。例如，美國對香港的未來具有重大利益。香港約有85,000名美國公民和1,300多家美國企業。總統，副總統和國務卿一再呼籲北京遵守1984年《中英聯合聲明》，維護香港的高度自治，法治和民主自由，這使香港保持了主權。成功的國際商業和金融中心。

The United States is expanding its role as an Indo-Pacific nation that promotes free enterprise and democratic governance. In November 2019, the United States, Japan, and Australia launched the Blue Dot Network to promote transparently-financed, high quality infrastructure through private sector led development around the world, which will add to the nearly 1 trillion dollars of United States direct investment in the Indo-Pacific region alone. At the same time, the Department of State issued a detailed progress report on the implementation of our whole-of-government strategy for the Indo-Pacific region: A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision.

美國正在擴大其作為促進自由企業和民主治理的印度太平洋國家的作用。 2019年11月，美國，日本和澳大利亞啟動了藍點網絡，以通過私營部門帶動的全球發展來促進透明資助的高質量基礎設施建設，這將增加美國在該領域的直接投資近1萬億美元。僅印度太平洋地區。與此同時，美國國務院發布了一份詳細的進度報告，介紹了我們在印度太平洋地區的整個政府戰略的實施情況：自由和開放的印度太平洋：推進共同願景。

#### Conclusion

結論

The Administration’s approach to the PRC reflects a fundamental reevaluation of how the United States understands and responds to the leaders of the world’s most populous country and second largest national economy. The United States recognizes the long-term strategic competition between our two systems. Through a whole-of-government approach and guided by a return to principled realism, as articulated by the NSS, the United States Government will continue to protect American interests and advance American influence. At the same time, we remain open to constructive, results-oriented engagement and cooperation from China where our interests align. We continue to engage with PRC leaders in a respectful yet clear-eyed manner, challenging Beijing to uphold its commitments.

政府對中國的態度反映了對美國如何理解和回應這個世界上人口最多的國家和第二大經濟體領導人的基本看法。美國認識到我們兩個系統之間的長期戰略競爭。美國政府將通過整個政府的方針，如國家安全戰略所闡明的，回到有原則的現實主義的指導下，繼續保護美國利益，增強美國的影響力。同時，我們仍然願意與中國保持一致，進行建設性的，注重結果的參與與合作。我們將繼續以尊重而又清晰的態度與中國領導人接觸，向北京挑戰，以兌現其承諾。