---
# System prepended metadata

title: tricklocracy

---



# "tricklocracy"

A flexible system that includes a system of checks and balances can create long standing and successful governing operations.

'trickle' refers to the gradual emission of funds to this sytem. A specific round of 'trickle' cannot and should not be undone.

3 branches:
- Executive: A committee (multisig) of N risk managers that own the fast admin of the protocol deploy.
- Congressional: Futarchy voting for approving expenditures from a select budget
- Judicial: token-weighted voting that selects the risk committee. otherwise, locked stake required for submitting proposals: program upgrades, slow admin functions, and expenditures.

## Some implications of above
- executive commitee must operate within 'laws of program'. in case of issues:
1. pausing specific or all operations in the protocol is permitted
2. slowing/delaying the trickle
- changing laws (protocol code) requires judicial's token weighted vote on program deploy
- a portion of spending is dictated via futarchy congress


## What keeps incentives aligned?
Risk committee can be rewarded with locked protocol tokens that can be clawed back or delayed in vesting. They must operate within the 'laws of the program'.

Successful proposals reward the proposer with additional native token. Failed incur some very small cost. Program upgrade proposals have amplified success/punishments. Successful proposals should go through variable time lock where risk committee can choose to delay further.



### example

- executive: initial 5/7  multisig of doxxed members
- judicial: very high quorum requirement for program updates (any dissent increases duration)
- congressional: 5% of token supply trickled in futarchy program