<style> /* basic design */ .reveal h1, .reveal h2, .reveal h3, .reveal h4, .reveal h5, .reveal h6, .reveal section, .reveal table, .reveal li, .reveal blockquote, .reveal th, .reveal td, .reveal p { font-family: 'Meiryo UI', 'Source Sans Pro', Helvetica, sans-serif, 'Helvetica Neue', 'Helvetica', 'Arial', 'Hiragino Sans', 'ヒラギノ角ゴシック', YuGothic, 'Yu Gothic'; text-align: left; line-height: 1.6; letter-spacing: normal; text-shadow: none; word-wrap: break-word; color: #444; } .reveal h1, .reveal h2, .reveal h3, .reveal h4, .reveal h5, .reveal h6 {font-weight: bold;} .reveal h1, .reveal h2, .reveal h3 {color: #008080;} /* #2980b9 */ .reveal th {background: #DDD;} .reveal section img {background:none; border:none; box-shadow:none; max-width: 95%; max-height: 95%;} .reveal blockquote {width: 90%; padding: 0.5vw 3.0vw;} .reveal table {margin: 1.0vw auto;} .reveal code {line-height: 1.2;} .reveal p, .reveal li {padding: 0vw; margin: 0vw;} .reveal .box {margin: -0.5vw 1.5vw 2.0vw -1.5vw; padding: 0.5vw 1.5vw 0.5vw 1.5vw; background: #EEE; border-radius: 1.5vw;} /* table design */ .reveal table {background: #f5f5f5;} .reveal th {background: #444; color: #fff;} .reveal td {position: relative; transition: all 300ms;} .reveal tbody:hover td { color: transparent; text-shadow: 0 0 3px #aaa;} .reveal tbody:hover tr:hover td {color: #444; text-shadow: 0 1px 0 #fff;} /* blockquote design */ .reveal blockquote { width: 90%; padding: 0.5vw 0 0.5vw 6.0vw; font-style: italic; background: #f5f5f5; } .reveal blockquote:before{ position: absolute; top: 0.1vw; left: 1vw; content: "\f10d"; font-family: FontAwesome; color: #2980b9; font-size: 3.0vw; } /* font size */ .reveal h1 {font-size: 5.0vw;} .reveal h2 {font-size: 4.0vw;} .reveal h3 {font-size: 2.8vw;} .reveal h4 {font-size: 2.6vw;} .reveal h5 {font-size: 2.4vw;} .reveal h6 {font-size: 2.2vw;} .reveal section, .reveal table, .reveal li, .reveal blockquote, .reveal th, .reveal td, .reveal p {font-size: 2.2vw;} .reveal code {font-size: 1.6vw;} /* new color */ .red {color: #EE6557;} .blue {color: #16A6B6;} /* split slide */ #right {left: -18.33%; text-align: left; float: left; width: 50%; z-index: -10;} #left {left: 31.25%; text-align: left; float: left; width: 50%; z-index: -10;} /* figure alignment */ img[alt$=">"] {float: right;} img[alt$="<"] {float: left;} img[alt$="><"] { display: block; max-width: 100%; height: auto; margin: auto; float: none!important; </style> <style> /* specific design */ .reveal h2 { padding: 0 1.5vw; margin: 0.0vw 0 2.0vw -2.0vw; border-left: solid 1.2vw #008080; /* #2980b9 */ /* border-bottom: solid 0.8vw #d7d7d7; */ } </style> <br><br> # Computational Functionalsim <br> Criticisms on Materialism #### Mar 18th 2020 ### Shunsuke Kamiya --- ## The slides are NOT POWERPOINTS <i class="fa fa-file-text"></i> **HackMD** offers a splendid framework for taking notes, making documents, and even **making presentation slides**. #### One can very easily make presentations using markdown. Writing codes and equations are quite easy as well. $$ \int_{-\infty}^{\infty}\exp(-ax^2)dx = \sqrt{\frac{\pi}{a}} $$ <br> ```julia fprintf("the world") ``` --- ## Contents #### MIND Chap 2.-3. <div id="left"> * Quick review * Behaviorism * Token identity theory * Functionalism * Computational functionalism * some jargons </div> <div id="right"> * Criticisms against functionalism 1. Absent qualia 2. Spectrum inversion 3. Nagel - What is it like to be a bat? 4. Jackson - What Mary didn't know 5. Block - Chinese Nation 6. Kripke - Rigid Designators 7. Searle - Chinese Room 8. Conceivability of zombies 9. Intentionality </div> --- # Quick review --- ### Behaviorism * Mental states = behavior <br> ### Token identitiy theory * Mental states = to a token of brain state. <br> ### Functionalism * Mental states = states with certain functions * functions = causal relations of stimuli, behavior, or other mental states <br> --- # Computer functionalism --- <br> <div style="text-align:center"> <font color="teal";size = 11pt><b>Mind = Program</b> <br> <b>Brain = Hardware</b> </font> </div> <br> * Based on work in philosophy, cognitive psychology, linguistics, computer science, and artificial intelligence * The brain is a digital computer and “mind” is a digital computer programme/set of programmes. * It seemed that at along last we had the solution to the problems that had bothered Descartes, and indeed to problems that go back 2,500 years to the early Greek philosophers. --- | Term | Explanation | Example | | :---- | :---------- | :------ | |**Algorithm** |Method for solving a problem by going through a precise series of steps | addition, Euclidean algorithm |**Turing machine**|A device that carries out calculation using only two types of symbols and under simple rules | - |**Church's thesis**| Any definition of 'computability' indicates the same class of functions|-| |**Turing test**|Test for machine intelligence, see if machine can dialogue naturally|Doraemon, Terminator| --- | Term | Explanation | Example | | :---- | :-------- | :-------- | |**Levels of decription** | To what extent structure levels are micro/macro |C++, python, JAVA and MATLAB: all high-level languages | |**Multiple realizability** | Structures with same higher LOD can be implemented in different physical things | You and I can separately implement Euclidian algorithm in your/my laptops |**Recursive Decomposition** | Complex tasks can be broken down into simple tasks by repeated application | Multiplication of high-digit numbers translated into 01 manipulation| <!-- --- ## Turing machine * A device that carries out calculation using only 0 and 1 under simple rules * **Universal Turing machine**: TM that can emulate any kind of problems solved on TM --> --- ## Church's thesis #### There are some definitions about a problem being 'computable' * general recursive functions (by Godel) * functions computable with $\lambda$ calculus (Church) * functions computable with Turing machine (Turing) These three formally defined classes of computable functions coincide (Church and Turing) --- # Criticisms aginst materialism --- ## 1. Abscent qualia <br> 2. Inverted spectrum * **Summary**: 1. Functionalism leaves out qualia 2. Functionalism cannot tell difference in inner experienc * **Materialists’ answer** * Fine. Representational difference brings about a difference in our causal interactions. * Inverted qualia is impossible as there cannot be any isomorphic map in colors --- ## 2. Inverted spectrum In terms of cognitive science, spectrum inversion seems not possible <div align = "center"> <img align = "center" height=200 src= "https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-inverted/figure5.gif"> </div> e.g. 180&deg; hue inversion would be behaviorablly detectable; <div align = "center"> <img align = "center" height=200 src= "https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-inverted/figure4.gif"> </div> <!-- However, Palmer (1999) suggested that there **exist** some inversion functions which is **behaviorally undetectable**.--> --- ## 2-1. Block - Inverted Earth Counterargument against representationalism **Inverted Earth** is an earth-like planet where 1. colors of all objects are inverted 2. names of colors are also inverted e.g. The sky is really yellow, but people call it "blue". One night while you are sleeping, you are kidnapped to Inverted Earth with **color-inverting lenses** impoanted in your eyes. * Your experience when you look at objects on Inverted Earth is phenomenologically the same as your experience on Earth * After 50 years on IE, after you have become sufficiently embedded in language and physical environment of IE, your intentional contents will come to match those of people in IE. &rarr; intentional objects change &rarr; representationalism is false --- ## 3. Nagel - What is it like to be a bat?<br>4. Jackson - What Mary didn't know * **Summary**: Even a perfect knowledge of 3rd person functional/materialistic phenomena leave something out, namely, the 1st person experience * **Materialists’ answer**: knowing only an aspect and not knowing another does not entail two aspects are not indentical * Sam knows water is wet, but not H20 is wet &rarr; It doesn’t hold that water is not H20 * Mary knows neuronal process X is caused by red objects, but not this type of red experiecne - red "qualia" - is caused by red objects. &rarr; it doesn't hold that process X is not red "qualia" * **Searle’s reply**: the point is not correct * even with complete 3rd person knowledge, there exists real 1st person phenomena --- ## 5. Block’s Chinese Nation * **Summary**: If all Chinese people acted very systemically like neurons, does it bring about qualia? Seemingly unlikely. * **Materialist answer**: Chinese nation *CAN CAUSE* qualia. Only seemingly impossible b/c neurons are so small * e.g. When you think it really hard; Chinese nation cries when sad, or talks like we do --- ## 6. Kripke's Rigid designators * **Summary**: Mental state and physical state are not **necessarily** identical * A rigid designator is defined as an expression that always refers to the same object in any possible state of affairs. * Identity statements – “P is Q” * P & Q are rigid: necessarily true * Otherwise: not necessarily true * If P refers to mental state rigidly and Q brain state rigidly, “P is Q” should be necessarily true * e.g. C-fibre stimulation is pain: not true, b/c it is easily imaginable that a pain exists without C-fibre stimulation --- ## 7. Searle's Chinese room * **Summary**: Computation is not real understanding, and programs are not state of mind * Symbol manipulation itself is not knowing nor understanding <br> * Then what is knowing/understanding?? Searle suggests one has to tell symbols (syntax) from meanings (semantics) <br> * **Materialists’ answer**: system as a whole understands Chinese * **Searle’s reply**: wrong. There is no way getting from the syntax to the semantics for the person in the room or the whole room itself --- ## 7. Searle's Chinese room Axiom 1: Computer programs are syntax Axiom 2: Mental states have semantic contents Axiom 3: Syntax does not consist semantics, nor is not sufficient &darr; Conclusion 1: Programs do not consist mind, nor are not sufficient Searle does not imply we are never able to create strong AI's, but **only making programs that work as we do is not enough** to say we make synthesized consciousness. <br> --- ## 7. Searle's Chinese room #### Robot reply We think of adding sensing & motor devices to the input & output channels of a computer * In order to make a robot that makes word-world connections &rarr; robot has correct word-word/word-world connections &rarr; it **understands** meanings --- ## 8. Conceivability of Zombies * **Summary**: It is *conceivable* that there exists a zombie without qualia * **Materialists’ answer**: Zombies are inconceivable <br> * e.g. Zagnets (Dennett) * **Searle’s reply**: wrong, one cannot say zombie’s inconceivability by only stating that 3rd person structures and 1st person experience are different phenomena <br> * Consciousness is epiphenomenal? (= not doing any work) * **Searle’s reply**: wrong e.g. cars movement is logically possible without gasoline combustion Conceivability – what is the definition? (SK) --- ## 9. The aspectual shape of intentionality * **Summary**: Causal accounts of intentionality, given by functionalists, cannot explain differences in aspectual shape * whatever water causes, H2O causes * Functionalists' account cannot explain the two aspects - "water" and "H2O" --- ## References * MIND by Searle, J. * Elements of Mind by Crane, T * Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy * 心の哲学 by Nishiwaki, Y.