# Ez
###### tags: `KalmarCTF` `2023` `web`
>I couldn't solve it during the game, so I looked at the writeup. I'm sorry you couldn't solve this one.
this is Caddy File.
```
{
admin off
local_certs # Let's not spam Let's Encrypt
}
caddy.chal-kalmarc.tf {
redir https://www.caddy.chal-kalmarc.tf
}
#php.caddy.chal-kalmarc.tf {
# php_fastcgi localhost:9000
#}
flag.caddy.chal-kalmarc.tf {
respond 418
}
*.caddy.chal-kalmarc.tf {
encode zstd gzip
log {
output stderr
level DEBUG
}
# block accidental exposure of flags:
respond /flag.txt 403
tls /etc/ssl/certs/caddy.pem /etc/ssl/private/caddy.key {
on_demand
}
file_server {
root /srv/{host}/
}
}
```
```root /srv/{host}/``` meant that when request came to service, since hostname replace {host}, can allow access to /srv/hostname .
this come from the ["placeholder"](https://caddyserver.com/docs/conventions#placeholders) of caddy
Now let's see the challenge,
since php is disabled.
this means that traversing to the https://php.caddy.chal-kalmarc.tf/index.php will not call the php iinterpreter to evaluate the code.
according to writeup, it seem to following two cve's connected closely this challenge
* https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2927-hv3p-f3vp
* https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qpm3-vr34-h8w8
According to chat from kalmar ctf of channel on discord,
vuln can exist by [CVE-2022-29718](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2927-hv3p-f3vp)
there were [good forum](https://caddy.community/t/php-fastcgi-phishing-redirection/14542/15)

so i tried
```
GET /b/../flag.txt HTTP/2
Host: backups/php.caddy.chal-kalmarc.tf
```
i got flag!!