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# System prepended metadata

title: Handling build-time dependency vulnerabilities

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# Handling build-time dependency vulnerabilities

## Problem statement

Building software comes with a need for handling and managing dependencies, including the management of fallout from any vulnerabilities found within those dependencies. This problem is only made worse by deep dependency trees that are common in many software ecosystems. In this regard, there are a number of issues to tackle, with the space of solutions for them being intertwined:

1. As a developer of a library, how do you advertise the discovery of a vulnerability to your dependents?
2. As a consumer of other libraries, how can you tell if one of your dependencies is affected by a vulnerability?
3. As a consumer of other libraries, how do you mitigate the effect of a vulnerability in a dependency? Does this change with how far up the dependency tree the issue is? How do you advertise the discovery of such vulnerabilities?

This document is intended as a high-level overview of policies for package maintainers who have responsabilities for libraries and/or dependent projects. For another take on the subject, see [this article](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Vulnerable_Dependency_Management_Cheat_Sheet.html).

## Mitigations

In the long run, the hope would be that the solutions to all of these issues will be standardized across all software ecosystems. Users and developers alike should find it facile to identify the issues in question. However, only some of these issues have a suitable answer currently, and in many cases the answer is ecosystem-dependent.

### Reporting vulnerabilities in your library

Reporting should generally be done in a standardized fashion to allow downstream users to identify issues automatically regardless of how far the library is on the dependency chain.

This is one of the few cases in which an industry-wide solution exists: issuing a [Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)](https://cve.mitre.org/) report, usually stored in an official database, such as the [National Vulnerability Database](https://nvd.nist.gov/).

Alternative databases and report formats exist, mostly on an ecosystem level - you can see a list of OpenSSF-endorsed alternatives for specific ecosystems [here](https://github.com/ossf/osv-schema). An aggregator for these alternatives can be found in [OSV](https://osv.dev/).

### Identifying vulnerabilities in your build-time dependencies

Checks for vulnerabilities in your project should happen automatically and continuously. 

Tooling around this issue typically piggybacks on a build system, such as [`npm-audit`](https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/v8/commands/npm-audit) or [`cargo-audit`](https://docs.rs/cargo-audit/latest/cargo_audit/index.html), however more generic solutions exist (e.g., the [Github Dependabot](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/supply-chain-security/managing-vulnerabilities-in-your-projects-dependencies/about-alerts-for-vulnerable-dependencies) alerts).

Results from such tools should be treated similarly to any other disclosed vulnerabilities related to the project.

### Mitigating and documenting vulnerabilites in dependency tree

Vulnerabilities reported by the tools mentioned in the previous section must be thoroughly investigated, with prompt disclosure of the issue to users. The outcome of this investigation should be made publicly available, however the policy driving this process should also be clearly documented. The policy should include:

- How detection of vulnerabilities among dependencies is achieved
- What the response is when such a vulnerability is found
- Where and how the response process is documented

This policy should be easily available for any client looking for security-related information. 

When it comes to actually mitigating the vulnerability, the exact course of action should be dictated by:

- The severity of the vulnerability and how relevant it is in the context of your project.
- Whether there are options for updating your dependency tree to a version of the library that is not subject to the vulnerability, or that avoids the vulnerable library.
- Whether there are other mitigation steps that users of your project can take to avoid the vulnerability, particularly when a patch is not available.

Mitigations should be aligned with the severity of the issue, and should be as comprehensive as possible.

When the possibility of updating your code depends on other, intermediate libraries being updated first, you should pursue these changes with the library maintainers and/or help fix the issue (if you can). The responsibility for ensuring a timely update does not, however, lie with you in these circumstances. If possible, alternative/temporary mitigations should be put in place.
