---
# System prepended metadata

title: '[2023-06-Llama] Presorting'

---

# [2023-06-Llama] Presorting 

**Contest repo:** https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama
**Findings repo:** https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings
**Judging by:** [Picodes](https://twitter.com/thePicodes) (Discord: `thepicodes`)
**Pre-sorting by:** [sorryNotsorry](https://twitter.com/0xSorryNotSorry) (Discord: `0xsorrynotsorry`)




# High Severity Primary Submissions (15)

## [[H-256]  User ETH will be stacked on Executor contract if the target script doesn't handle ETH.](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/256)
## [[H-247]  It is not possible to execute actions that require ETH (or other protocol token)](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/247)
## [[H-244]  Functions modified by `LlamaAccount.onlyLlama` can be called by contracts other than `LlamaCore`.](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/244)
## [[H-229]  llamaExecutor address can be set by anyone, giving further privilege to onlyLlama accessed functions(Sponsor confirmed in DM)](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/229)
## [[H-203]  In `LlamaRelativeQuorum`, the governance result might be incorrect as it counts the wrong approval/disapproval.](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/203)
## [[H-126]  Delegatecalls to contracts which have different storage layouts will cause unexpected behavor. Whitelisting of delegate-callable targets is required like LlamaCore.authorizeScript().](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/126)
## [[H-109]  Llama Core and Policy implementation not only minimal proxy should not be allowed to be authorized as scripts](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/109)
## [[H-104]  Role might be granted and revoked at the same block to manipulate the role supply and result in incorrect behavior of relative strategy](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/104)
## [[H-83]  The initial total supply of the role can be miscalculated in some cases](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/83)
## [[H-76]  Expired role holder still can vote](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/76)
## [[H-62]  Anyone can change approval/disapproval threshold for any action using LlamaRelativeQuorum strategy.](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/62)
## [[H-52]  Execution of actions will always revert when minDisapprovals set to Zero.](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/52)
## [[H-34]  cloneDeterministic can be frontrun to grief](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/34)
## [[H-31]  Llama could be accounting for policy holders whose role already expired](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/31)
## [[H-27]  [H-01] Guards can be bypassed by manipulating data input](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/27)


# Medium Severity Primary Submissions (35)

## [[M-296]  NATIVE TOKENS COULD GET STUCK INSIDE THE `LlamaCore` CONTRACT SINCE THERE IS NO WITHDRAWAL MECHANISM](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/296)
## [[M-287]  expirationPeriod in the strategy contracts is not checked when calling LlamaCore.execute](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/287)
## [[M-282]  Blacklisted Address Can Exploit the Exchange](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/282)
## [[M-262]  Gas griefing/thief in LlamaAccount execute()](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/262)
## [[M-259]  LlamaPolicyMetadata.tokenURI() name is missing escapeJSON](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/259)
## [[M-254]  `LlamaPolicyMetadata.contractURI()` can return corrupted JSON data](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/254)
## [[M-241]  Unsafe delegatecall functionality can break core protocol functionality](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/241)
## [[M-223]  User with disapproval role can gas grief the action executor](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/223)
## [[M-213]  Check for role expiration is not implemented during action creation/approval/disapproval.](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/213)
## [[M-209]  A policyholder could prevent revoking his expired role by frontrunning.](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/209)
## [[M-208]  In `LlamaCore`, the approval/disapproval logic by sig wouldn't work properly when the policyholder adds two or more off-chain signatures using one nonce.](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/208)
## [[M-207]  The action creators can't approve their actions in the same block.](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/207)
## [[M-206]  The `forceApproval/forceDisapproval` role holders might be unable to approve/disapprove if they were approved/disapproved with the normal `approval/disapproval` role already.](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/206)
## [[M-205]  In `LlamaCore.sol`, there is no option to remove the strategies.](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/205)
## [[M-198]  Potential selector collision in LlamaCore when calling the `receive` function](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/198)
## [[M-183]  In LlamaCore.executeAction() function, failed transfer with low level call could be overlooked](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/183)
## [[M-182]  Policy holders should have the option to revoke their roles if they want to](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/182)
## [[M-168]  Reverting on disapprovalPolicySupply == 0 if disapproving is disabled is unnecessary and can lead to DoS](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/168)
## [[M-151]  Cross-chain replay attacks are possible](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/151)
## [[M-147]  Sanity check for forced approval/disapproval roles.](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/147)
## [[M-140]  Executor is forced to create and assign disapproval role even though they choose to disable disapproval.](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/140)
## [[M-138]  Frontrunning of createAction by choosing different strategy according to his interests.](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/138)
## [[M-125]  LlamaAccount.execute with delegatecall=true allows to update the storage on the ERC1967 implementation slot](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/125)
## [[M-82]  LlamaAccount doesn't implement supportsInterface function which is needed according to EIP721, and EIP1155](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/82)
## [[M-80]  Users still can disapprove action after minExecutionTime has passed](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/80)
## [[M-77]  `executeAction` function doesn't check if script is authorized](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/77)
## [[M-64]  LlamaPolicy could be DOS by creating large amount of actions.](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/64)
## [[M-61]  No function to adjust `minApprovals/minDisapprovals` thresholds](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/61)
## [[M-59]  [M-03] Rounding up of minimum disapproval needed could affect disapproval process](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/59)
## [[M-55]  Signature cancelation can be front-run.](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/55)
## [[M-51]  Action states mismatch between LlamaCore and LlamaStrategy](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/51)
## [[M-41]  Inadequate Access Control](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/41)
## [[M-36]  Use safeTransferFrom Instead of transferFrom for ERC721](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/36)
## [[M-11]  [M-02] Any policy holders with same permissions can queue actions for other policy holders](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/11)
## [[M-10]  [M-01] Owner can be uncessarily DoSed from setting roles for policy holders](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-llama-findings/issues/10)