## Qualifying information
**Technical Initiative**
Securing Software Repositories Working Group
**Lifecycle Phase**
Graduated
**Funding amount**
$150,000
## Problem Statement
Most Central Artifact Repositories — critical infrastructure for the OSS ecosystem — have never undergone dedicated, in-scope security audits tailored to their role in dependency resolution. As a result, vulnerabilities in these public services may persist undetected, exposing developers and build systems to supply chain risk.
## Who does this affect?
This affects nearly all open source consumers and maintainers — from individual developers to large corporations — who rely on artifact repositories like PyPI, Maven Central, npm, RubyGems, Docker, and the Gradle Plugin Portal in CI/CD workflows. A vulnerability in a single repository can have downstream consequences for thousands of projects and organizations.
## Have there been previous attempts to resolve the problem?
Yes. The original [Great Artifact Repository Audit](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1EzYfM5-S5I27fC8_YE-bN-nm-J8Q1tG6aC_MKYpUvH0/edit) proposal was drafted by Jonathan Leitschuh and the OpenSSF Securing Software Repositories WG in May of 2023. Since then, several ecosystems have undergone security audits — including [PyPI](https://blog.pypi.org/posts/2023-11-14-1-pypi-completes-first-security-audit/), [RubyGems](https://blog.rubygems.org/2024/12/11/security-audit.html), [Composer](https://blog.packagist.com/composer-2-7-7/), and [Homebrew](https://brew.sh/2024/07/30/homebrew-security-audit/) — funded by OpenSSF Alpha Omega and the Open Technology Fund. These efforts demonstrate both the feasibility and value of such audits. However, they’ve largely been ad hoc: scoped independently, coordinated informally, and lacking shared follow-up processes.
This initiative seeks to build on those successes by providing coordination capacity to explore how recurring audits might be supported — and to help define consistent, ecosystem-agnostic expectations around scope, remediation, and public disclosure. The goal is not to standardize implementation, but to reduce fragmentation and raise the overall security baseline across all packaging ecosystems.
## Why should it be tackled now and by this TI?
The Securing Software Repositories WG is well positioned to lead this effort, having already coordinated several audits and maintained the [Repository Security Capabilities Tracker](https://github.com/ossf/wg-securing-software-repos/pull/88). Community momentum and funder interest are strong. Several organizations have already expressed interest in supporting funding artifact ecosystem audits. Without dedicated coordination, further audits may be delayed, under-scoped, or left incomplete. This funding will provide the capacity to help move Gradle toward an audit-ready state and engage other ecosystems for audits.
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## Proposed work and other work considered
### What is required to make the funding initiative happen?
- A full-time technical coordinator (Jonathan Leitschuh) with deep experience in OSS security audits, vulnerability disclosure, and cross-ecosystem engagement
- Continued support from the Securing Software Repositories WG
- Partnership with OpenSSF staff to scope and support audits
- Budget flexibility to:
- Engage security firms, legal counsel, or technical writers
- Build and maintain a lightweight public-facing website
- Travel to and promote this work at key security and OSS conferences
### What is going to be needed to deliver this funding initiative?
- Engagement with the Gradle Plugin Portal team to identify and prioritize pre-audit work
- Partner and funder coordination (e.g., OSTIF, Alpha-Omega, major ecosystem consumers)
- Creation of reusable templates for audit scopes and disclosure coordination
- Public tracking of work via a dedicated site and OpenSSF WG channels
- Stakeholder re-engagement in at least four additional packaging ecosystem. Including, but not limited to:
- Maven Central (Java, Groovy, Scala)
- Nuget (.Net)
- Conan (C & C++)
- Docker (Containers)
- Golang (Go)
- Crates.io (Rust)
- Packagist (PHP)
- CocoaPods (Swift)
### Are there tools or tech that still need to be produced?
Yes. A lightweight project website will:
- Host completed and upcoming audit reports
- Provide transparency into project priorities and scope
- Track milestones, blog updates, and community participation
---
## Requirements and cost context
The requested funds will support:
- **6 months of full-time coordination** ($150,000)
- **Website setup** ($5k–$10k): To promote transparency and encourage cross-ecosystem alignment
- **Conference travel/outreach** ($5k–$10k): To advocate for artifact repository security at relevant events
- **Discretionary support** (as needed): Legal review, copy editing, or design support for audit deliverables
---
## Responsible parties
**Responsible**
Jonathan Leitschuh ([GitHub @JLLeitschuh](https://github.com/JLLeitschuh))
**Accountable**
Jonathan Leitschuh
**Backup plan**
If unavailable, the Securing Software Repositories WG will nominate a temporary coordinator and coordinate with OpenSSF staff to maintain momentum.
**License**
- Documentation: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
- Code/templates: Apache License 2.0
- [x] I agree to follow the OpenSSF's [Code of Conduct](https://openssf.org/community/code-of-conduct/)
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## Milestones and approximate timeline
**April–May 2025**
- Kick off initiative with Securing Repos WG and OpenSSF staff (ongoing)
- Re-engage Gradle Plugin Portal maintainers (ongoing)
- Launch project website with scope, vision, and past audit summaries
- Publish draft audit/disclosure templates
- Begin outreach to four additional ecosystems for potential audits
**June–July 2025**
- Support Gradle’s audit-readiness work (vulnerability remediation, infra hardening)
- Coordinate funder interest and ecosystem partner support
- Publish update: "Laying the Groundwork for the Gradle Audit"
- Begin scoping audit with a minimum of two identified ecosystems
**August–September 2025**
- Finalize audit scope and partner coordination (security firm, funder, Gradle)
- Expand roadmap and ecosystem engagement tracking on the website
- Support identified ecosystems audit-readiness work (vulnerability remediation, infra hardening)
- Deliver recap report and roadmap for audit sustainability and repeatability of this work
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