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# System prepended metadata

title: 'MEV.Day Agenda [WIP]'

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# MEV.Day Agenda [WIP]

You are invited to co-curate the set of MEV challenges in 2022 for our upcoming MEV.Day agenda in Amsterdam, a sequel to our virtual event MEV.wtf in 2021. 

### Tentative event plan
**Date:** Friday, Apr 22, 2022
**Time:** 10am-6pm CET
**Interested in attending the event in-person:** *to-be-updated*
**Watch live stream:** *to-be-updated*
**Format:** [mev.wtf](https://hackmd.io/ivUzk3piQEG8ALzCGbxlag) irl sequel
**Brought to you by:** Flashbots MEV Fellowship x Ethereum Foundation
**Co-organizers:** Cowswap, Shutter Network, *to-be-updated*
**For researchers:** [MEV Fellowship grants](https://github.com/flashbots/mev-research/blob/main/grants.md)

# Agenda V2: From MEV Dystopia to MEV Utopia
## Chapter 1: 2022 MEV state of the affairs
1. A brief (revisionist) history of MEV
2. MEV activities across L1s, side chains and roll-ups
3. Cross-domain MEV
4. MEV is a superset of ordering: OOF, POOF, POOP
5. Live performance of MEV parody: BoheMEV RhapsodETH 
## Chapter 2: Dual Challenges of MEV
1. Decentralize the MEV game
2. 



# Agenda V1: 2022 - towards MEV decentralization

*MEV is a centralizing force across stateful blockchains. How do we prevent blockchains from falling into the MEV dystopia? How do we decentralize the MEV game?*

## Chapter 1: 2022 MEV state of the affairs
0. Live performance: BoheMEV RhapsodETH 
1. A brief (revisionist) history of MEV (15min)
2. MEV activities across L1s, side chains and roll-ups (15min)
3. Cross-domain MEV
4. MEV is a superset of ordering: OOF, POOF, POOP

## Chapter 2: from MEV Dystopia to MEV Utopia
1. The threat of MEV centralization
2. An anatomy of the blockchain transaction supply chain
3. Flashbots: Decentralize the MEV Game
4. MEV ecosystem actors fireside chat

## Chapter 3: MEV-aware protocol design challenges
### L1s
1. Ethereum: proposer builder separation (PBS)
2. Cosmos: ABCI++ and app chain MEV mitigation
3. Avalanche: TBC
4. L1 round table: Consensus layer design and MEV
    - Is there such thing as an universal MEV solution? 
    - What is the design space for base layer protocol designers? How is it different in Ethereum vs. other EVM chains vs non- EVM chains?
        - How is the feasibility of MEV solutions affected by features of the consensus layer (eg. PoW vs PoS, SSLE, finality/reverts...) 
        - How do we design consensus mechanisms that are maximally friendly to MEV mitigation? What specific properties do they need to have?
### L2s
5. Optimism: TBC
6. Arbitrum: Fair Sequencing as MEV Mitigations
7. Celestial: TBC
8. Starkware: TBC
9. L2 round table
    - How does MEV play a role in decentralizing sequencers?
    - Fair ordering as a viable solution and limitations
### Bridges
10. Bridges round table

## Chapter 4: MEV-aware application design challenges

0. L1 MEV resistance tools to give to app layer
    - Enable an intra-block batching for smart contracts.
        - Certain applications can batch classes of txs to them. (They don't need to have an intra-block order)
            - If Uniswap receives 5 trades in one block, it should be able to batch them together as one trade against their AMM.
            - Compound could choose between several liquidation attempts, to choose the one thats best for users.
            - Helps lower PGA pressure and front-running for applications that remove intra-block ordering.
    - Enable cross-block batching. (Same as before, but expand over fixed number of blocks)
    - Mempool / flash bots layer mitigation strategies
        - Can have default mempools 'classify' certain MEV / undesirable tx orders, and force a higher fee for them.
        - E.g. if you classify an on-chain arbitrage, or a sandwitch, charge these txs higher gas fees, to lower their viability.
1. Batch Auction Deep Dive: 
    - How can batch auctions minimize the available MEV? 
    -  What is the MEV surface of batch auctions? 
    - How can solvers game the “fair criteria” of the auction and extract money from users? 
    - What can be done to prevent that?lo
2. Can innovations in AMM design such as TWAMM reduce MEV incentives?



# V0 Agenda Brainstorming

### How to contribute?
1. Please write down the fundamental questions in the MEV space that interest you the most, or in your honest opinion the most important MEV questions for the year of 2022. 
2. Please specify recommended format + challengers for your questions (challengers == speakers and/or panelists). You can make suggestions and comments on existing questions.
3. Please feel free to comment on any of the questions recommended by other curators.
4. If you have other suggestions on the structure of the Agenda content, i.e. section breakdown, how to group the questions and organize the contents for legibility, please feel free to comment on the bottom.

Please contribute by Monday, March 14 EOD, so we can have time to iterate our agenda and update our speaker invite. We will select from the list of questions for our MEV.day agenda, and the remaining one may be used as puzzle problems to select audience. We will recognize you in our agenda by default, however, if you prefer to contribute anonymously, please let us know, we will respect your preference.

*Note: while this link is publicly viewable, we are still on v0 of the agenda draft, not yet ready for public comments. We would appreciate if you can keep this link to yourself, and sharing ONLY with researchers and developers in the MEV space who in your discretion would be great addition to help curate the agenda.*

### References👇
- [mev.wtf](https://hackmd.io/ivUzk3piQEG8ALzCGbxlag)
- [reorg.wtf](https://hackmd.io/cEw2Z-QcR1yvQ8wAeQZdnQ)
- [defi.wtf](https://github.com/carboclan/pm/issues/69)

### Your questions here👇
* Can the honesty assumption of fair ordering withstand the growing amount of MEV incentives to break it?
    * Recommended format:
        * [name=Alex]: definitely not a panel (see my comment for why)
    * Recommended challengers:
        * [name=Alex]: Mahimna Kelkar, Steven Goldfeder
    * Other curator's comments: 
        * [name=Alex]: it's a great question but unless there's a result to present, I fear we will just be arguing in the void.
            * also worth noting this question could be augmented to talk about ordering protocols more generally!

* Is a chain with less MEV ultimately more decentralized?
    * Recommended format:
    * Recommended challengers:
    * Other curator's comments: 
        * maybe have a followup question on is a chain with less MEV extraction friction but more MEV in total better than a chain with more MEV extraction friction but less MEV in total
        * [name=Alex]: also a great question, but again without any research results i feel this will be arguing in the void. This could be the title of a section though- 
            * I like its spiciness

* What is the design space for base layer protocol designers? How is it different in Ethereum vs. other EVM chains vs non- EVM chains?
    * Recommended format:
        * [name=Alex]: Talk (this would be super educational imo)
    * Recommended challengers: 
        * [name=Alex]: Justin Drake, Dankrad Feist, Vitalik Buterin
    * Other curator's comments: 
        * can accompany this with a brainstorming session on MEV conservation theory
        * [name=Alex]: this is very broad and could take many forms eg. Justin's cryptography & mev talk is arguably that.


* Does every chain needs Flashbots like MEV auction?
    * Recommended format: 
        * Panel
    * Recommended challengers: 
        * Flashbots, Jito Labs(buffalu)
    * Other curator's comments: 
        * seems like current set of challengers only have people who are for MEV auctions, we could add other voices to spice things up (e.g., from LINK or AVAX)

* What does cross-chain MEV auction look like? What are the design considerations?
    * Recommended format:
    * Recommended challengers:
    * Other curator's comments:
        * this feels more workshoppy and also I'm not aware of any public results that could make a talk - I'd take it out personally.


* Is it possible to disrupt the market equilibrium of the "endgame"? 
    * Recommended format: Panel
    * Recommended challengers: Vitalik, Phil Daian, Zaki Manian, Hasu
    * Other curator's comments:
        * Not specific enough, suggest to sharpen the question and relate it to MEV.

* Batch Auction Deep Dive: How can batch auctions minimize the available MEV? What is the MEV surface of batch auctions? How can solvers game the “fair criteria” of the auction and extract money from users? What can be done to prevent that?
    * Recommended format: Presentation by Cowswap or other batch auctions experts; maybe panel with Tarun

* The other side of the mirror - A history of HFT and orderflow in Tradfi, and what it could mean for Defi
    * Recommended format: Presentation, followed by a panel

* MEV-aware L2 design space
    * Recommended format:
    * Recommended challengers: 
    * Other curator's comments:
        * Suggest to break this question down to a survey talk + a panel
        * would it be a good idea to invite all the L2s we have been in contact with and have them discuss their concerns? e.g., Scroll/EF's concern on proposers having zero cost to also run a builder program
        * [name=Alex]: I think this is the same question as protocol design and would be more curious to have a panel where L2s talk about the problem they're facing / the research problems they need help with)

* [Proposer/Builder Separation](https://notes.ethereum.org/@vbuterin/pbs_censorship_resistance) is years away from deployment on the Ethereum mainnet. How do we avoid cementing a bad MEV equilibrium/monopoly until then? 
    * Recommended format: 
        * Panel
    * Recommended challengers: 
        * Francesco (EF research on crList), Vitalik (if available), FB-engineer (thegostep?), Tim Beiko (can moderate if needed)
    * Other curator's comments:
        * [name=Alex]: this is a cool topic for a panel! Aside from Steph, am not sure I think the current panellists are best suited.


* PBS protocols will need additional mechanisms to prevent censoring. How can we ensure that the cost of these systems is affordable to users who are censored? Are these two desires fundementally at odds?
    * Recommended format: 
        * Discussion
    * Recommended challengers: 
        * Francesco
        * Dankrad (distributed building)
    * Other curator's comments:

* Can enforcing the order of transactions (in consensus protocols) prevent MEV?
    * Recommended format:
    * Recommended challengers: 
    * Other curator's comments:
        * this should be a talk
        * [name=Alex]: this is the same as q1, agree it should def be a talk if anything.

* 5 years from now, how do you think will the ecosystem handle MEV?
    * Recommended format: 
        * Panel
    * Recommended challengers: 
    * Other curator's comments:

* Case studies of MEV on other chains
    * Recommended format: 
        * Talks
    * Recommended challengers: 
        * Gengmo for Solana, Jolene (?) for Avalanche, Dev/Sunny for Cosmos
    * Other curator's comments:

* If you could wish for one scientific result/breakthrough tomorrow, what would it be (in the context of MEV)?
    * Recommended format: 
        * Panel
    * Recommended challengers: 
    * Other curator's comments:

* Can innovations in AMM design such as TWAMM reduce MEV incentives?
    * Recommended format:
        * Panel/Talk


### Discussion space for general comments/questions:
* Shall we adopt the same framework from last year's MEV.wtf (see below bullets) or adopt a more reasonable/relevant framework👇
    * The Evolution of MEV
    * Framing the MEV problem
    * Protocol level response to MEV
        * MEV minimization techniques
        * MEV democratization approaches
        * The state and future of MEV
    * Application level response to MEV
        * MEV and DeFi
        * MEV mitigations
        * MEV redistribution
        * Hybrid model of MEV minimization & democratization
* What do you think is the most important thesis in the MEV space for 2022 that should drive our MEV Day agenda? What has changed since last year?