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Intro. [Recording date: December 20, 2016.] 介绍。[录制日期：2016年12月20日] Russ Roberts: I want to remind listeners to go to econtalk.org and in the upper left-hand corner you can vote for your favorite episodes of 2016 and share other feedback, which I really appreciate. Today's guest is the economist George Borjas,... Today we'll be discussing his latest book, We Wanted Workers: Unraveling the Immigration Narrative. George, welcome to EconTalk. Russ Roberts：我想提醒听众去econtalk.org，在左上角你可以为你最喜欢的2016集投票，并分享其他反馈，我真的很感激。今天的嘉宾是经济学家乔治·博尔哈斯，今天我们将讨论他的最新著作“我们想要的工人：解开移民叙事”。乔治，欢迎来到EconTalk。 George Borjas: Thank you so much, Russ. I don't know if you realize this but it's almost 40 years since the first time we ever met. 乔治·博尔哈斯：非常感谢你，拉斯。我不知道你是否意识到这一点，但自从我们第一次见面到现在已经将近40年了。 Russ Roberts: Yeah. I know. I do realize it. 罗伯茨：是的。我知道呀。我确实意识到了。 George Borjas: [?] cool. If somebody had told me that we'd be here today talking about this, 40 years ago, I would have said, 'Not in[?] your dreams.' But somehow we're here, okay? 乔治·博尔哈斯(George Borjas)：[？]凉爽的。如果40年前有人告诉我，我们今天会在这里谈论这件事，我会说，‘不是在你的梦里。’但不知何故我们在这里，好吗？ Russ Roberts: Yeah. I don't like to think about it because it's so long ago. The other part, of course, that's hard to imagine and couldn't have been imagined is that we'd be talking not via phone but via Skype; it would be recorded and it would be available to anyone around the world at zero direct cost--many good things in the last 40 years, at least for us. 罗伯茨：是的。我不喜欢去想这件事，因为那是很久以前的事了。当然，另一部分，很难想象，也无法想象的是，我们将不是通过电话而是通过Skype交谈；它将被记录下来，并且世界各地的任何人都可以零直接成本获得它-在过去的40年里，有很多好的东西，至少对我们来说是这样的。 George Borjas: I know. That's for sure. 乔治·博尔哈斯：我知道。当然。 Russ Roberts: So, let's start with the title of your book, which is clever: We Wanted Workers. Where does that title come from? 拉斯·罗伯茨：那么，让我们从你的书名开始，这很聪明：我们想要工人。这个头衔从何而来？ George Borjas: Okay. It comes from a quote, from a statement by Max Frisch, who was a Swiss novelist, essayist. And he was reflecting on the immigrants, on the guest workers really, that Europe tried to import during the 1950s and 1960s, particularly Germany but many other European countries as well. And those guest workers came in and they clearly contributed to the economic miracle. For example, the post-War Economic Miracle in Germany, right? But Max Frisch was looking at it from afar, and he basically said, looking at it in a more general sort of way, 'We wanted workers, but we got people instead.' And the reason that I think that's sort of one of the themes that I stress in the book is that even though I'm an economist, I tend to be a little dissatisfied with the very mechanical way in which economists view immigration. The typical--let me call it the 'economistic' way of looking at immigration looks at them as a bunch of robotic workers that you can basically move from place to place as the need arises. And that, I think, is sort of what Max Frisch is referring to when he said, 'We wanted workers.' And, it's true: Immigrants played a role. Okay? But the fact is that immigrants are human beings as well. And people make decisions. And people make decisions that are based on what is best for them. They are rational human beings, like you and I, right? And those decisions might or might not be precisely what they are receiving [?] in mind. And they may or may not increase the benefits; or they might actually create some harm on the way. The point is that, the fact that immigrants are something beyond workers, and that they play a role that is not just this robotic kind of role of moving from factory to factory, means that we have to look at the impact of immigration in a much broader framework. We have to take immigrant decision-making into account, in particular. And that, I think, was one of the things that motivated me. It's really one of the themes that motivated me as I was trying to write this book in an easy-to-explain way for a general reader: that we have to look as immigration not just--let me put it a different way. A lot of people make the analogy between immigration and trade. And in fact, immigration is like trade, to some extent. When we import a widget, a point that I make in the book, it's sort of like importing the raw labor creates a widget, only that we importing the raw labor would allow us to create the widget domestically, right? But the fact of the matter is that when widgets break down, we can throw them out. When immigrants break down or get sick or things happen, we have a responsibility. And that is one crucial way in which immigration is not like trade. And that's sort of the thematic content, what that statement is trying to capture in the book. 乔治·博尔哈斯：好的。它来自瑞士小说家，散文家Max Frisch的一句话。他在反思20世纪50年代和60年代欧洲试图进口的移民，实际上是客工，特别是德国，但也有许多其他欧洲国家。这些外来工人来了，他们显然为经济奇迹做出了贡献。比如德国战后的经济奇迹，对吧？但马克斯·弗里施从远处看着它，他基本上说，从更一般的角度来看，‘我们想要工人，但我们得到的是人。’我认为这是我在书中强调的主题之一的原因是，尽管我是一名经济学家，但我倾向于对经济学家看待移民的机械方式感到有点不满意。典型的-让我称之为“经济主义”看待移民的方式，把他们看作一群机器人工人，你基本上可以根据需要从一个地方移动到另一个地方。我认为，这就是Max Frisch在说“我们想要工人”时所指的。而且，这是真的：移民发挥了作用。好吧?但事实是移民也是人。人们做决定。人们做出的决定是基于对他们来说最好的。他们是理性的人，就像你和我一样，对吧？而这些决定可能是也可能不是他们所得到的[？]记在心里。而且它们可能会也可能不会增加好处；或者它们实际上可能会在途中造成一些伤害。问题是，移民不仅仅是工人，他们所扮演的角色不仅仅是从一个工厂搬到另一个工厂这样的机器人角色，这意味着我们必须在一个更广泛的框架内看待移民的影响。我们必须特别考虑移民的决策。我认为，这是激励我的事情之一。这确实是激励我写这本书的一个主题，因为我试图以一种对一般读者来说容易解释的方式写这本书：我们必须看起来像移民，而不仅仅是-让我换一种方式。很多人把移民和贸易做类比。事实上，移民在某种程度上就像贸易。当我们导入一个小部件时，我在书中提到的一点，就像输入原始劳动力创建了一个小部件，只是我们导入原始劳动力可以让我们在国内创建小部件，对吧？但事实是，当小部件发生故障时，我们可以将其丢弃。当移民崩溃或生病或事情发生时，我们有责任。这是移民与贸易不同的一个关键方面。这就是主题内容，这句话试图在书中捕捉到什么。 Russ Roberts: Yeah, well I think--we'll come back probably to that analogy between trade and immigration--which, of course, they are both related to open borders. If you have open borders, you can choose to have open borders for goods; you can choose to have open borders for capital; you can choose to have open borders for people. And the impact of those different cases have some similarities. And as you point out, they also have some differences. So, I think it's interesting how hard it is for people to think about those clearly, even s economist. Even myself. 罗伯茨：是的，我认为-我们可能会回到贸易和移民之间的类比-当然，它们都与开放边界有关。如果你有开放的边界，你可以选择开放商品的边界；你可以选择开放资本的边界；你可以选择开放人的边界。而且这些不同案例的影响有一些相似之处。正如你所指出的，它们也有一些不同之处。所以，我认为有趣的是，人们很难清楚地思考那些，甚至是经济学家。甚至是我自己。 5:40 Russ Roberts: Let's start with a standard argument you hear, that you attack in the book--correctly, I believe. People often say, 'Well, we have to have immigrants because if we don't, there will be no one to do the--certain types of jobs.' Americans, quote, 'Americans won't do these jobs'--whether it's mowing lawns, painting, basically construction, agricultural work in particular which--these are all areas that have a lot of immigration workers. What's wrong with that argument? Is that correct? 5：40 Russ Roberts：让我们从你听到的标准论点开始，你在书中攻击-我相信是正确的。人们经常说，‘嗯，我们必须有移民，因为如果我们不这样做，就没有人去做-某些类型的工作。’美国人，引用他的话，‘美国人不会做这些工作’-无论是修剪草坪，油漆，基本上是建筑，特别是农业工作-这些都是有很多移民工人的地区。这个论点有什么错？对吗？ George Borjas: Yeah, the usual [?], the immigrants do jobs [?] don't want to do. And the problem with that basic argument is that [?] ignores the role of markets. And the role of incentives. I think the correct statement is really, immigrants do jobs [?] don't want to do, at the going wage. The presence or absence of immigrants basically changes the market. And markets react to either, to people coming in or people going out. The way I start this in the book, as you know, is by describing--it's a little anecdote of the firm in Georgia back in 2006 where at the time the Bush Administration was trying to look serious about enforcing immigration policy regarding illegal immigration. And they actually conducted quite a few raids on firms that hired illegal immigrants at the time. And one of the raids happened to be on a firm called Crider in Geogia, a chicken processing plant. And the nice thing about this example is that, Crider did precisely what we would teach a profit-maximizing, rational firm to do. Crider basically woke up after Labor Day weekend finding that 3/4 of its workforce had been basically--had disappeared--because of the raid. And, you know, what does Crider to at that point? Well, they put an ad in the paper. And the ad they put in the paper is: Increased wages. We want workers at increased wages. You know, less supply; higher wages. So, to me, it's not surprising that markets respond in the way that common sense tells you they respond. What I always really found very puzzling about the immigration context and the supply-and-demand issue is that most of us have no trouble, you know, given our training we have no trouble saying supply and demand--it's a very nice, unifying tool through which to explain why prices go up and down. And somehow, that idea tends to disappear from a lot of people's minds--a lot of economists' minds--when it comes to immigration. And I always found it a little puzzling. I mean, I don't quite know why there's a resistance to accepting that prices will change when supply shifts. But in the case of immigration, you tend to see the resistance quite often. 乔治·博尔哈斯：是的，通常[？]，移民做工作[？]不想做。这个基本论点的问题是[？]忽视市场的作用。以及激励的作用。我认为正确的说法是移民做工作[？]不想做，按现在的工资。移民的存在或不存在基本上改变了市场。而市场对其中任何一种都会做出反应，无论是人进来还是人出去。我在书中的开篇方式，如你所知，是通过描述-这是2006年在佐治亚州的公司的一个小轶事，当时布什政府试图看起来很认真地执行关于非法移民的移民政策。他们实际上对当时雇佣非法移民的公司进行了相当多的突击搜查。其中一次突袭恰好发生在Geogia的一家名为Crider的公司，这是一家鸡肉加工厂。这个例子的好处是，Crider做的正是我们教一个利润最大化，理性的公司要做的事情。Crider基本上是在劳动节周末醒来后发现，由于这次突袭，其员工中有3/4基本上-已经消失了。而且，你知道，Crider在这一点上做了什么？他们在报纸上登了个广告。他们在报纸上刊登的广告是：增加工资。我们希望工人增加工资。你知道，更少的供应；更高的工资。因此，对我来说，市场以常识告诉你的方式做出反应并不令人惊讶。对于移民背景和供需问题，我一直感到非常困惑的是，我们大多数人都没有问题，你知道，鉴于我们的培训，我们可以毫不费力地说出供求-这是一个非常好的统一工具，通过它解释价格起伏的原因。不知何故，当涉及到移民问题时，这种想法往往会从很多人的脑海中消失-很多经济学家的脑海中。我总是觉得有点迷惑。我的意思是，我不太明白为什么接受价格会随着供应变化而变化的观点会有阻力。但在移民问题上，你往往会经常看到阻力。 Russ Roberts: Well, I'd be in that group, to some extent. So, let's get into that, because I think that's a central issue that we should talk about. First, on the Crider example, in Georgia, it's not surprising that overnight, finding that you are out of workers you are going to pay more. The more interesting question would be 6 months to a year and 2 years later. Was that just an emergency move on their part or was that a response to the fact that there was suddenly a smaller supply of workers of low-skilled workers to that particular area of the country, and we normally wouldn't expect the loss of 100 workers in a town or a city or a state or a country to have a big impact on wages? It's a small change. But that had a big change. It was observable, partly because it was--they had a very urgent short-run demand for workers. But the more general question I guess is the following. And I want to phrase it--it's hard to phrase, because I'm a big fan of supply and demand. Of course, the question is: Supply and demand of what? Labor, with a capital "L"? Low-skilled labor? High-skilled labor? Labor that has a particular kind of skill? Certainly all those kind of things are going to have impacts on how you use supply and demand and whether you use it carefully. I guess the question I would have is that, when we talk about labor, generally--if we said, for example, if we try to imagine the kind of experiment, which is the kind of experiment you do in your work: What if the United States had not liberalized immigration in the last 25 years? Which it has--the last 30 years, I guess--post 1990 is the key when it started to become more liberal, or is it a little before that. But I think post-1990 has been a relatively liberal era for open borders. Do you want to think about that as an L--a supply and demand for Labor? Or do you worry about the fact that it depends on what kind of workers they are; it depends on whether they are complementary or substitutes? Does it depend on what parts of the country they go to. It just seems like a little more complicated than just supply and demand for labor. 鲁斯·罗伯茨：嗯，在某种程度上，我也会在这个群体中。所以，让我们进入这一点，因为我认为这是我们应该讨论的一个中心问题。首先，关于Crider的例子，在佐治亚州，一夜之间，发现你失去了工人，你会支付更多的工资，这并不奇怪。更有趣的问题是6个月到1年和2年后。这只是他们的一个紧急行动，还是对一个事实的反应，即在这个国家的特定地区，突然有较少的低技能工人供应，我们通常不会预期一个城镇或一个城市或一个州或一个国家的100名工人的流失会对工资产生重大影响？这只是个小变化。但这发生了很大的变化。这是可以观察到的，部分原因是-他们对工人的短期需求非常迫切。但我想更普遍的问题是下面这个问题。我想表达它-这很难表达，因为我是供求的狂热粉丝。当然，问题是：供求什么？劳工，大写的“L”？低技术工人？高技能劳动力？有一种特殊技能的劳动？当然，所有这些事情都会影响到你如何利用供求关系，以及你是否谨慎地使用它。我想我会问的问题是，当我们谈到劳动力时，通常-如果我们说，例如，如果我们试图想象这种实验，就是你在工作中做的那种实验：如果美国在过去的25年里没有开放移民怎么办？它已经-我猜是过去30年-1990年后是它开始变得更加自由的关键，或者是在那之前一点点。但我认为1990年后是一个开放边界的相对自由的时代。你想把它想成一个L-劳动力的供求关系吗？还是你担心这取决于他们是什么样的工人，取决于他们是互补性的还是替代性的？这是不是取决于他们去了这个国家的哪些地方。它只是看起来比劳动力的供给和需求更复杂一点。 George Borjas: Oh, I completely agree, Russ. Okay? One of the things in my work over the last 10, 15, 20 years has been that you really have to match the skills of immigrants to the skills of natives, if you want to sort of detect an impact. And a lot of the literature has gone the wrong way, basically because, you know, the matching is not quite proper. I mean, I give you an example of this in some work that I've done on mathematicians, which I sort of talk a little bit about in the book. You know, the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, 1992 or so, right? And a bunch of mathematicians came to the United States. Now, from an outside perspective, you'd see the supply of mathematicians increasing, right? But it turned out that the mathematicians who came to the United States happened to specialize in particular topics. So, if you were to look at the average mathematician in the United States, what actually worked on very different kinds of topics, you would see actually very little impact. But if you look at the mathematicians in the United States who specialized in the topics that mathematicians in the Soviet Union had specialized in, then you detect a negative impact of supply and demand--the sort of the basic [?] would give you. So, you know, I am very appreciative of the fact that you really have to very carefully match who it is that the immigrants are going to hit first. Because, as you said, there's complementarities involved as well. For better or worse--and I think it's for worse, actually--much of the literature has focused way too much on trying to measure the own[?] impact--in other words, try to detect that when the group of a particular skill, the number of that group goes up, the weight might go down--in the short run. And again, I'm not doing [?] distinction--short run versus long run. In the short run, the theory is very clear about that. And in the theory it's also clear that in the long run, what's going to happen is capital will adjust and with constant return to[?] return to world, the average wage will return to what it was pre-immigration. But that doesn't mean that even in the long run there are not distributional impacts. Those groups that had a relatively larger supply shock in terms of more workers will tend to be a little worse off than those groups that had a smaller supply shock. So, all these things come into the picture when one tries to estimate the impact. And that is partly the reason why the literature is actually very confusing. Different people are trying to estimate different things. Short run, long run confusion enter into the picture. And again, from the point of theory, the short-run, long-run distinction is very clear. From the point of data, it's far less clear. Because we don't really know what the long run will be in a labor market hit by a supply shock. Will it be a day? Will it be a year? Ten years? We don't really know that. No one has really ever analyzed the dynamics of what happens to labor markets as a result of a supply shock. And then, we also have to deal into the skill issue, which means that: How do you find skill groups? Could be very problematic. Because, you know, at some point the [?] nature to defining a skill group. Like, for example, in my work I've defined it in terms of location and age, basically, in [?] of what I've done. In all, there is education and there is education, right? 乔治·博尔哈斯：哦，我完全同意，拉斯。好吧?在过去的10，15，20年里，我的工作中有一件事就是，你真的必须将移民的技能与当地人的技能相匹配，如果你想要检测到某种影响的话。很多文献走错了方向，基本上是因为，你知道，配对不太合适。我的意思是，我给你们举了一个例子，在我在数学家方面做的一些工作中，我在书中谈到了一点。你知道，苏联在20世纪90年代初，1992年左右解体了，对吧？一群数学家来到美国。现在，从外部的角度来看，你会看到数学家的供应在增加，对吗？但事实证明，来到美国的数学家碰巧是专门研究特定主题的。所以，如果你看一下美国的普通数学家，在非常不同的主题上，实际工作的是什么，你会看到实际上影响很小的东西。但是如果你看看美国的数学家，他们专门研究苏联数学家所擅长的课题，那么你就会发现供求的负面影响-那种基本的[？]会给你。所以，你知道，我非常欣赏这样一个事实，你真的必须非常小心地匹配移民首先袭击的人。因为，正如你所说，也有互补性。不管是好是坏-实际上，我认为这是更糟糕的-很多文献都太过关注于试图衡量自己[？]影响-换句话说，试图检测出当一组特定技能的人数增加时，体重可能会下降-在短期内。再说一遍，我没有做[？]区别-短期与长期。从短期来看，理论上对此非常清楚。而且在理论上也很清楚，从长远来看，将会发生的是资本将进行调整，并不断地返回到[？]回到世界，平均工资将恢复到移民前的水平。但这并不意味着即使从长远来看，也不会对分布产生影响。那些在更多工人方面有相对较大供应冲击的群体，往往会比那些供应冲击较小的群体境况略差一些。所以，当人们试图估计影响时，所有这些事情都会出现在画面中。这就是为什么这些文献实际上非常令人困惑的部分原因。不同的人试图估计不同的东西。短期，长期的混乱进入画面。再一次，从理论上讲，短期和长期的区别是非常明显的。从数据的角度来看，这远没有那么清楚。因为我们真的不知道长期受供应冲击的劳动力市场会是什么样子。会是一天吗？会是一年吗？十年？我们并不是很清楚。没有人真正分析过供应冲击对劳动力市场的影响。然后，我们还必须处理技能问题，这意味着：如何找到技能组？可能会有很大的问题。因为，你知道，在某个时候[？]定义技能组的性质。例如，在我的工作中，我根据地点和年龄对其进行了定义，基本上，在[？]我的所作所为。总而言之，有教育，对吧？ Russ Roberts: Yeah. It's a good place to start-- 罗伯茨：是的。这是一个很好的起点 George Borjas: Yeah, go ahead. 乔治·博尔哈斯：是的，去吧。 Russ Roberts: It's a good place to start. But obviously two people, each with, say, 4 years of education, a college degree, may have very different skills. And one may compete with one kind of worker but not at all with another type. So-- 罗伯茨：这是一个很好的起点。但很明显，两个人，每个人都有，比如说，4年的教育，大学学位，可能有非常不同的技能。一个人可以和一种工人竞争，但根本不能和另一种工人竞争。所以. George Borjas: Exactly. That's what I'm trying to point out. 乔治·博尔哈斯：没错。这就是我想指出的。 15:00 Russ Roberts: I want to take this--let's take this point more generally. Because I think it comes up a lot in lots of different areas of labor economics. It drives me crazy when people say, 'Seattle passed a living wage ordinance and employment in Seattle is doing fine.' Well, most people in Seattle are not going to be affected by the minimum wage. It's only going to be the people down toward the lower end of the skill distribution. And you have to look at those workers to see if there is any impact. Because otherwise, the overall impact is going to get lost in the noise of--particularly if there is growth in the Seattle area, which there is; it's doing very well. So it's hard to know whether there is any effect. But if you are trying to measure it, you certainly don't want to look at, say, employment of all workers. Because the theory doesn't expect that to change very much, if only a small proportion of workers are affected by the minimum wage. And I think, similarly, if more low-skilled workers come in to the United States, you and I are not going to be very affected on the wage side. We're going to be affected on the price side. It's going to be probably good for us, actually, because many of the things we buy might get cheaper as a result. But, if hundreds of thousands of economists came in from the Soviet Union, that could affect our wage. And certainly if it had happened 20 years ago, would it be affecting our wage today? As long as they could teach what we teach, roughly, research what we research, approximately. And--the basic point is undeniable, that certainly you have to be careful. One of the things that comes through in your book very clearly is how hard it is to make those kind of measurements, given that our data are imperfect--as you point out, we don't have, people don't walk around with a sign on them saying 'I'm a substitute for such-and-such kind of worker.' You have to, inevitably, make assumptions. You made one just a minute ago in passing. You mentioned the phrase 'constant returns' as a certain assumption about how capital and labor combine. And it may be a decent approximation. It may not be for a particular city or state or a time period when you are trying to measure the impact. 15：00 Russ Roberts：我想拿这个-让我们更广泛地讨论这一点。因为我认为它在劳动经济学的许多不同领域出现了很多。当人们说‘西雅图通过了最低生活工资条例，西雅图的就业情况很好’时，我简直要疯了。嗯，西雅图的大多数人都不会受到最低工资的影响。这只会是技能分布的低端人群。你必须看看这些工人，看看是否有任何影响。因为否则，整体的影响将会消失在噪音中-特别是如果西雅图地区有增长的话；它做得非常好。所以很难知道是否有任何影响。但如果你试图衡量它，你肯定不想看，比如说，所有工人的就业情况。因为理论认为，如果只有一小部分工人受到最低工资的影响，这种情况不会有很大变化。我认为，同样，如果更多低技术工人进入美国，你和我在工资方面不会受到很大影响。我们将在价格方面受到影响。实际上，这可能对我们有好处，因为我们买的很多东西可能会因此而变得更便宜。但是，如果成千上万的经济学家来自苏联，这可能会影响我们的工资。当然，如果它发生在20年前，它会影响我们今天的工资吗？只要他们能教我们教的东西，粗略地说，研究我们研究的东西，大概。而且-基本点是不可否认的，当然你必须小心。在你的书中非常清楚的一件事是，考虑到我们的数据不完美，做这样的测量是多么困难-正如你所指出的，我们没有，人们不会带着牌子到处走，上面写着‘我是某某工人的替代品’。你必须不可避免地做出假设。你刚刚在一分钟前做了一个路过。你提到“恒定回报”这个短语是关于资本和劳动力如何结合的某种假设。这可能是一个像样的近似值。它可能不适用于特定的城市或州，也不适用于您试图衡量影响的一段时间。 George Borjas: That's exactly right. Actually, there's two things I want to say to what you just said. One is the role of assumptions is huge. And we're not appreciate[?] that. We don't emphasize that enough when we discuss the labor market and immigration, sort of what the general findings are. And, like, this whole literature--a lot of people, and I sort of cite in the book some examples, claim that the data have shown that on average the immigration has no impact on the long-run wages. Right? And that is true--that is what the data show. What the discussion that is unusually emphasized is that that has been assumed by the constant returns assumption. The fact that on the average, the impact of immigration, on the average, is zero, has nothing to do with data. It's all been built in by the fact that the model underlying this analysis that assumes constant returns. And the other point you raised, which is, again, extremely relevant in this context, is the minimum wage example. You raised it in the context of, you know, you have to really match what is being affected by the minimum wage or not, right? I want to raise it in a different context, which is a lot of people make what I, what is intent of pure theory, completely contradictory arguments when it comes to immigration and when it comes to the minimum wage. Somehow, you see people have no qualms whatsoever saying immigration in the short run doesn't have an effect on wages. And at the same time they say that increasing the minimum wage has no effect on employment--in the short run. As you know, those two things are completely contradictory. In the context of the minimum wage they are basically claiming that the labor market, the labor demand curve is perfectly inelastic. In the context of immigration they are claiming that labor demand curve in the short run is perfectly elastic. You know, one of those things, and probably both are wrong. Labor demand curve should probably not in that, in either extreme. And it's really sort of--I've always been fascinated by the intellectual contradiction, in sort of claiming these two things simultaneously. 乔治·博尔哈斯：完全正确。实际上，对于你刚才说的话，我有两件事想说。一是假设的作用是巨大的。我们不感激[？]那，那个。当我们讨论劳动力市场和移民时，我们没有充分强调这一点，比如一般的调查结果是什么。而且，就像，整个文献-很多人，我在书中引用了一些例子，声称数据显示，平均而言，移民对长期工资没有影响。对吗？这是真的-这就是数据所显示的。不同寻常地强调的讨论是由恒定回报假设所假设的。平均而言，移民的影响平均为零，这一事实与数据无关。这一切都建立在这样的事实之上，即作为分析基础的模型假设了恒定的回报。你提出的另一点，也是与这方面极为相关的，就是最低工资的例子。你是在这样的背景下提出来的，你知道，你必须真正匹配最低工资所影响的是什么，对吗？我想在一个不同的背景下提出这个问题，那就是很多人做我，纯理论的意图，当涉及到移民和最低工资时，完全矛盾的论据。不知何故，你可以看到人们毫无顾虑地说移民在短期内不会对工资产生影响。同时，他们说提高最低工资在短期内对就业没有影响。如你所知，这两件事是完全矛盾的。在最低工资的背景下，他们基本上声称劳动力市场，劳动力需求曲线是完全没有弹性的。在移民的背景下，他们声称劳动力需求曲线在短期内是完全有弹性的。你知道，其中一件事，可能两者都错了。劳动力需求曲线可能不应该在那，在任何一个极端。这真的有点-我一直被智力上的矛盾所吸引，在某种程度上同时声称这两件事。 19:06 Russ Roberts: Well, here's the other question I have on this; and then we'll move to some other examples and try to summarize some of the empirical work and get to this--I think we'll want to re-emphasize this point about assumptions because I think it's very clear. So, workers aren't widgets. They are not the same. Importing workers is not the same as importing the goods that workers overseas might produce, partly because workers bring their cultural habits. And that's obviously an issue that you talk about in the book. But they also bring the fact that they want to buy things-- 19：06 Russ Roberts：好的，这是我对此有的另一个问题；然后我们将转到其他一些例子，尝试总结一些经验工作，并得出这个-我想我们会想要再次强调关于假设的这一点，因为我认为它非常清楚。所以，员工不是小工具。它们是不一样的。输入工人并不等同于进口海外工人可能生产的商品，部分原因是工人带来了他们的文化习惯。这显然是你在书中谈到的一个问题。但他们也带来了他们想买东西的事实- George Borjas: But-- 乔治·博尔哈斯：但是- Russ Roberts: So, which makes them not like a widget. So, in general, if you ask me, 'Is the increase in the U.S. population between, say, 1900 and 2000, has that been good or bad for workers?' We wouldn't want to use a supply-and-demand model, because supply-and-demand model--it's a technical term; it's a partial equilibrium. And partial equilibrium is probably not the right way to simply think about--it simplifies what's going on when we think about a growing population. So, that's the problem I have when I think about an increase, say, in immigration. To me, it's a lot like an increase in population. It's true you bring in adults rather than infants--usually. But obviously it's a little more complicated than just saying, 'Well, there's a supply shock.' I'm willing to accept the fact that in the short run, that can certainly be the case where workers with skills who are close to the workers who are coming in, that it's going to be hard on them. Of course, they already have jobs; their wages, a lot of them, their wages are not going to go down instantaneously with the opportunities to hire additional workers that come with foreign immigration. So, I'm not quite: Explain to me how the supply and demand framework should be used in, say, a case like population or immigration. And why it's different. It seems to me it's very different from the minimum wage. 罗斯·罗伯茨：所以，这让他们不像一个小工具。所以，一般来说，如果你问我，‘美国人口在1900年到2000年之间的增长对工人来说是好事还是坏事？’我们不想使用供需模型，因为供需模型-这是一个技术术语；它是一种局部均衡。而部分均衡可能不是简单思考的正确方式-它简化了当我们考虑不断增长的人口时所发生的事情。所以，当我考虑增加移民时，这就是我遇到的问题。对我来说，这很像人口的增加。没错，你带来的是成年人而不是婴儿-通常情况下。但显然，这要比简单地说‘嗯，供应受到冲击’要复杂一些。我愿意接受这样一个事实，在短期内，这肯定会是这样的情况，即拥有技能的工人与即将到来的工人关系密切，这对他们来说将是困难的。当然，他们已经有了工作；他们的工资，他们中的很多人，他们的工资不会随着外国移民而来的雇用额外工人的机会而瞬间下降。所以，我并不完全是：给我解释一下供需框架应该如何被用在，比如说，人口或移民这样的案例中。以及它为什么不同。在我看来，它与最低工资有很大的不同。 George Borjas: No, I agree with you, okay? In the long run, it's more of a group[?]. In the long run the real question is economic growth. What does having more people do to economic growth? Right? 乔治·博尔哈斯：不，我同意你，好吗？从长远来看，它更像是一个群体[？]。从长远来看，真正的问题是经济增长。更多的人对经济增长有什么影响？对吗？ Russ Roberts: Yep. 罗伯茨：是的。 George Borjas: And the question then becomes, what do you want to assume is the underlying technology? George Borjas：然后问题就变成了，你想假设基础技术是什么？ Russ Roberts: Say that again? What do you want--? 罗伯茨：再说一遍？你想要什么-？ George Borjas: The question becomes: What are you going to assume about the underlying technology. George Borjas：问题变成了：你打算对底层技术做什么假设。 Russ Roberts: Correct. 罗斯·罗伯茨：正确。 George Borjas: Okay? And if you assume constant returns, then not much will happen in terms of per capita income, in the long run. 乔治·博尔哈斯：好吗？如果你假设回报不变，那么从长远来看，人均收入不会有太大变化。 Russ Roberts: And therefore, how do you explain--that's probably not a good starting place. 拉斯·罗伯茨：因此，你怎么解释-这可能不是一个好的起点。 George Borjas: No, no, but therefore the question is: Do immigrants completely replicate what we have now? Or is the skill distribution of immigrants different from what we had originally? And then it will depend on factor proportions, I think. 乔治·博尔哈斯：不，但因此问题是：移民完全复制了我们现在所拥有的吗？还是移民的技能分布与我们原来的有所不同？然后它将取决于因素比例，我认为。 21:51 Russ Roberts: So, I'm going to disagree with--let me agree with half of that and then let me disagree with the other half. 21：51罗斯·罗伯茨：所以，我不同意-让我同意其中一半，然后让我不同意另一半。 George Borjas: Okay. 乔治·博尔哈斯：好的。 Russ Roberts: Even though it's maybe only one half there. It's certainly true--let's suppose we take a country like the United States at a point in time, and now we're going to increase the population via immigration, by 20%. A huge increase. Big, big increase. 罗伯茨：即使可能只有一半。这当然是真的-让我们假设我们在某个时间点上像美国这样的国家，现在我们将通过移民增加人口20%。一个巨大的增长。很大的增长。 George Borjas: Actually double it-- 乔治·博尔哈斯：实际上是双倍- Russ Roberts: Great. Let's double it. And I'm going to think of two or three different cases. In case Number 1, the skill set--and I'm ignoring the cultural side of this for now, obviously; we're only going to look at the economic impact, the financial/monetary impact on wages and markets. So, obviously, if everybody is the same--excuse me--if the distribution of the new people mimics, is almost exactly the same as the current distribution, we'll have doubled everything. We'll have doubled all the low-skilled workers, all the high-skilled workers. And it's the case-- 罗伯茨：太好了。让我们加倍。我会想到两三个不同的案例。在案例1中，技能集-显然，我暂时忽略了文化方面的影响；我们只会看看经济影响，金融/货币对工资和市场的影响。所以，很明显，如果每个人都是一样的-对不起-如果新人的分布模仿，几乎与当前的分布完全相同，我们将把所有的东西都翻了一番。我们将加倍所有的低技能工人，所有高技能工人。情况就是这样 George Borjas: And the long-run capital should double as well. 乔治·博尔哈斯：长期资本也应该翻一番。 Russ Roberts: Because? 罗斯·罗伯茨：因为？ George Borjas: Because--the, you know, in a global--yes, you have to say, now you have to say, well, the rate of return to capital will increase in the United States as a result of initial people coming in. Right? That will bring in initial capital somehow. 乔治·博尔哈斯：因为-你知道，在全球-是的，你必须说，现在你必须说，嗯，美国的资本回报率将会增加，因为最初的人进入美国。对吗？这将以某种方式带来初始资本。 Russ Roberts: Maybe from overseas. Maybe people will save more. 罗斯·罗伯茨：也许是从海外来的。也许人们会存更多钱。 George Borjas: Exactly-- 乔治·博尔哈斯：没错- Russ Roberts: Okay. So that's the case, and maybe we have another Grand U.S. next to the old U.S. So, it's twice as big; it's got twice as much capital. But we don't know if it has twice as much. But it has more capital and more labor. 罗斯·罗伯茨：好的。所以情况就是这样，也许我们在旧的美国旁边还有一个大美国。所以，它的规模是原来的两倍；它的资本是原来的两倍。但我们不知道它是否有两倍的数量。但它有更多的资本和劳动力。 George Borjas: Yeah. 乔治·博尔哈斯：是的。 Russ Roberts: Next question: The second case would be-- Russ Roberts：下一个问题：第二个案例是- George Borjas: But the point is, in that scenario, per capita income doesn't really change. George Borjas：但关键是，在这种情况下，人均收入并没有真正改变。 Russ Roberts: Well, we don't know that exactly. 鲁斯·罗伯茨：嗯，我们并不确切地知道这一点。 George Borjas: I think we do. 乔治·博尔哈斯：我想我们有。 Russ Roberts: I don't think we do. The reason I'd say that is that I actually think there's, via Adam Smith, the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market. 罗斯·罗伯茨：我不认为我们知道。我这么说的原因是，我实际上认为，通过亚当·斯密，劳动分工受到市场范围的限制。 George Borjas: Oh, but I am thinking of it, very specific production function here. 乔治·博尔哈斯：哦，但我正在考虑，这里非常具体的生产函数。 Russ Roberts: I know; and I don't think that way. I don't find that-- 罗斯·罗伯茨：我知道，我不这么想。我不觉得. George Borjas: But that goes back to the beginning of what I said: It all depends on what you assume about the [?] 乔治·博尔哈斯：但这可以追溯到我所说的开头：这一切都取决于你对[？]的假设。 Russ Roberts: That's fine. 罗斯·罗伯茨：那很好。 23:48 Russ Roberts: So let's leave that alone for the moment. Let's accept the fact that different assumptions about how people combine could affect the final conclusion. But it certainly wouldn't be the case--and you wouldn't argue the case--that in the long run all those extra workers would lower wages for the people who already live here. It could in the short run. It could because--for a lot of reasons. And it certainly could measure--well, anyway, that's Case One. Case Two: We double the population but every single person who comes is below the median or the average, one or the other, in their skill level. And Case Three is they are all above the median or the average of the skill level. And the question would be how different are those Case Two and Three from Case One? That is, obviously, they are different. They are not the same. 23：48罗斯·罗伯茨：所以我们暂时不谈这个问题。让我们接受这样一个事实：关于人们如何结合的不同假设可能会影响最终的结论。但肯定不会是这样的-你也不会争辩-从长远来看，所有这些额外的工人都会降低已经居住在这里的人的工资。短期内可能如此。可能是因为-原因很多。而且它当然可以测量-好吧，无论如何，这是第一种情况。案例二：我们的人口翻了一番，但每一个来的人都低于中位数或平均水平，一个人或另一个人的技能水平。情况三是他们都在中位数或平均水平以上的技能水平。问题是，第二和第三种情况与第一种情况有什么不同？那就是，很明显，他们是不同的。它们是不一样的。 George Borjas: Oh, definitely. 乔治·博尔哈斯：哦，当然。 Russ Roberts: So, you want to speculate about that for a minute? 罗斯·罗伯茨：那么，你想推测一下吗？ George Borjas: Well, I tell you: I think about it this way. In the first case it's very clear what will happen. You have a brand new United States next to the old United States. Everything doubles. I should say, per-capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product) doubles--I'm sorry, total GDP doubles; per capita GDP doesn't change. And when we just replicate ourselves, not much happens--with constant returns. When we don't replicate ourselves, what's going to happen is, capital will still adjust. Right? In the long term, capital should still adjust; but there will now be a different [?] proportion than what we had originally. And what I would think would happen in terms of a very simple-minded model of long-run growth, right--what I think will happen is that the group that encountered the highest supply increase will tend to have relatively lower wages than the group that encountered the least supply increase. So, for example, in the [?] you said, suppose a lot of the immigrants or most of the immigrants or all of the immigrants are low-skill. If you are a low-skilled worker in the United States, you are going to have relatively low wages. But the high-skilled workers--there are complementarities involved in this production technology, right? The high-skilled workers are going to be much better off. 乔治·博尔哈斯：好吧，我告诉你：我是这样想的。在第一种情况下，将会发生什么是非常清楚的。在旧的美国旁边，你有一个全新的美国。一切都加倍了。我应该说，人均GDP(国内生产总值)翻了一番-对不起，GDP总量翻了一番；人均GDP没有变化。而当我们只是复制自己的时候，并没有发生太多的事情-有恒定的回报。当我们不复制自己时，将会发生的是，资本仍然会调整。对吗？从长期来看，资本仍应调整；但现在将有一个不同的[？]比例比我们原来的要高。我认为在一个非常简单的长期增长模型中会发生什么，对吧-我认为会发生的是，遇到最高供应增加的群体往往会有相对较低的工资，比遇到最少的供应增加的群体更低。所以，例如，在[？]你说，假设很多移民或者大部分移民或者所有移民都是低技能的。如果你是美国的低技术工人，你的工资会相对较低。但是高技术工人，这个生产技术是有互补性的，对吧？高技能工人的生活将会变得更好。 Russ Roberts: Yep. And-- 罗伯茨：是的。而且- George Borjas: But look--that's actually raising an important point. Once you go away from this very simple-minded replicating ourselves model, you recognize immediately the distributional impacts. And that introduced the notion of tradeoffs into immigration discussions. You know, not everybody will be better off. It's true that the economic pie accruing to the original population will increase, but it doesn't increase equally for everybody. Right? 乔治·博尔哈斯：但是看-这实际上提出了一个重要的观点。一旦你离开这个非常简单的自我复制模型，你就会立即认识到分布的影响。这就把权衡的概念引入了移民问题的讨论中。你知道，不是每个人都会过得更好。诚然，原人口积累的经济蛋糕将会增加，但并不是每个人都会平等地增加。对吗？ Russ Roberts: Correct. But-- 罗斯·罗伯茨：正确。但是. George Borjas: [?] Hmmm? 乔治·博尔哈斯(George Borjas)：[？]嗯哼？ Russ Roberts: That's for sure. I agree with that 100%. But it seems to me that the simple short run story misses a key thing. So, I'm going to shift gears on you. 罗伯茨：这是肯定的。我百分之百同意。但在我看来，这个简单的短期故事漏掉了一个关键的东西。所以，我要改变对你的看法。 George Borjas: No, look. Before you leave this, I want to continue. The correct way of looking at this--I mean, I think both things matter, okay? 乔治·博尔哈斯：不，看。在你离开之前，我想继续。正确的看待这件事的方式-我的意思是，我认为这两件事都很重要，好吗？ Russ Roberts: And I agree with that. [?] not irrelevant. That will be clear from this next example. 罗斯·罗伯茨：我同意这一点。[？]不是无关紧要的。从下一个示例中可以清楚地看到这一点。 27:00 Russ Roberts: So, if I said to you--until recently, let's say, we didn't trade with China, either because they were so poor or because transportation costs were too high. Whatever the reason is, it doesn't matter for this example. And now suddenly we are trading a lot with China. Which is what happened between, roughly over the last 20 years, we increased our trade with China dramatically. I have no doubt that that was harder on people who made things that--who had the skills that were similar to the people in China than it was on me: there are Chinese professors who come here and Chinese academics and Chinese economists, but in general it's relatively small. And so I've benefited tremendously from increased trade with China because my clothes are less expensive. And so on. My toys, gadgets, etc. And clearly a lot of people haven't benefited this much. In fact, they may even have been hurt on net. It's true they also get to buy cheaper clothes, and cheaper gadgets, but they have, unfortunately, might not have a good job at all. 27：00 Russ Roberts：所以，如果我对你说-比方说，直到最近，我们没有与中国进行贸易，要么是因为他们太穷，要么是因为运输成本太高。无论原因是什么，对于本例来说都无关紧要。而现在，我们突然与中国进行了大量的贸易。这就是过去20年间发生的事情，我们与中国的贸易急剧增加。毫无疑问，这对那些制造东西的人来说更困难-他们的技能与中国人相似，而不是我：有中国教授来这里，有中国学者和中国经济学家，但总的来说，他们的规模相对较小。因此，我从与中国的贸易增长中获得了巨大的好处，因为我的衣服更便宜。诸若此类。我的玩具，小玩意儿等等，显然很多人并没有受益这么多。事实上，他们甚至可能在网上受到伤害。诚然，他们也可以买更便宜的衣服和更便宜的小玩意儿，但不幸的是，他们可能根本就没有一份好工作。 George Borjas: Or [?] 乔治·博尔哈斯：或者[？] Russ Roberts: Right--they might not have any job. Again--in the short run. And that short run might be fairly long. So, we don't want to say--the terms 'short run,' 'long run' are kind of shorthand ways of saying 'it's more complicated.' But we all understand, if we're thoughtful, what those complications are. Now, if you said to me, 'Therefore, there's distributional consequences of trade with China, I certainly agree 100%. But I would never suggest that trade with China and the United States is something akin to a wash for the wages or wellbeing or standard of living in the United States. I'd say, in the short run it's harder on people who have those skills, but because of the gains to all the rest of the folks, those people now have more purchasing power; and they are going to demand and create or produce more things--things are going to be created and produced using the opportunity now that things are cheaper coming in from China. And therefore, lower-skilled workers who were hurt initially, they may get benefits that are not see; and in addition, their children and grandchildren will live in a much better world potentially because we are using our resources more effectively. And I would think the same thing would be true of immigration. 罗伯茨：对-他们可能没有工作。再一次-在短期内。而且这种短期运行可能会相当长。所以，我们不想说-术语“短期”，“长期”是一种简略的说法，用来表示“它更复杂了”。但我们都明白，如果我们考虑周到，那些复杂的东西是什么。现在，如果你对我说，‘因此，与中国的贸易有分配的后果，我当然100%同意。但我绝不会说，与中国和美国的贸易类似于美国的工资、福利或生活水平的洗涤。我想说，在短期内，对那些拥有这些技能的人来说更困难，但是因为其他人的收益，这些人现在有更多的购买力；他们会要求创造或生产更多的东西-现在中国进口的东西更便宜了，所以创造和生产的东西就会利用这个机会来创造和生产出来的东西。因此，最初受到伤害的低技能工人，他们可能会得到看不到的好处；此外，他们的子孙后代将生活在一个更好的世界，因为我们正在更有效地利用我们的资源。我认为移民也是如此。 George Borjas: Look. Let me actually make two points about what you have said. I mean, I think it's a really nice thing to compare the analogy you made on trade with a similar example with immigration. First of all, suppose that instead of trade with China, we had gotten immigrants--and they [?] to be very low-skilled immigrants. Okay? 乔治·博尔哈斯：看。实际上，让我就你所说的话提出两点。我的意思是，我认为把你在贸易上的类比与类似的例子与移民进行比较是一件非常好的事情。首先，假设我们得到的不是与中国的贸易，而是移民-他们[？]是非常低技能的移民。好吧? Russ Roberts: Correct. 罗斯·罗伯茨：正确。 George Borjas: And that will mean the same thing you said about the people being hurt by the Chinese imports. Some people will be hurt by the low-skilled immigrants. And you and I would gain tremendously. We can buy all kinds of stuff cheaper; we can hire people to clean our house, fix our rooves, and stuff like that. And you can show from the simple economic model that both in the case of trade you had in mind, and the case of immigration that I'm putting forth as an analogy, the economic pie accruing to [?] has increased. The pie increased and the plate[?] shifted. It changed. 乔治·博尔哈斯：这意味着和你说过的关于中国进口产品伤害人民的话是一样的。一些人会受到低技能移民的伤害。你和我会得到巨大的收获。我们可以买到更便宜的东西；我们可以雇人打扫我们的房子，修理我们的树根，诸如此类的东西。你可以从简单的经济模型中看出，无论是在你心中的贸易案例中，还是在我作为类比提出的移民案例中，经济蛋糕都累积到[？]增加了。馅饼增加了，盘子[？]转移了。它变了。 Russ Roberts: The way the pie is divided. 罗斯·罗伯茨：馅饼的分配方式。 George Borjas: [?] And then the question is: How much weight should we put to the fact[?]--and this is a value question now--how much weight should we put to the fact[?] that many people perhaps are much worse off right now than they would have been otherwise? You made an implicit judgment: You said that in the long run, my children, grandchildren, so on, were much better off and they have more [?]. 乔治·博尔哈斯(George Borjas)：[？]然后问题是：我们应该对事实给予多大的重视[？]-这现在是一个价值问题-我们应该对事实给予多大的重视[？]很多人现在的境况可能比他们本来要糟糕得多？你做了一个含蓄的判断：你说从长远来看，我的孩子，孙子，等等，都好得多，他们有更多[？]。 Russ Roberts: Oh, but not just mine. My point was much broader than that. My point is that the children and grandchildren of the low-skilled workers who are hurt in the current world by Chinese trade, they are going to inherit a better world because we've grown the pie. 罗斯·罗伯茨：哦，但不只是我的。我的观点远不止于此。我的观点是，在当前世界上被中国贸易伤害的低技能工人的子孙，他们将继承一个更好的世界，因为我们已经把蛋糕种大了。 George Borjas: Well, what's a better world if you've tried[?] this and don't have a job? And can barely afford--you know. See, that's where you and I depart. I'm not willing to go into the next step. Because I don't know what a better world would be. 乔治·博尔哈斯：好吧，如果你试过了，什么是更好的世界[？]这个就没有工作了吗？几乎买不起-你知道的。看，那就是你和我离开的地方。我不愿意进入下一步。因为我不知道一个更好的世界会是什么样子。 Russ Roberts: But that means you are telling me that when we decide to open our borders to Chinese goods, we should not. We should be very wary of the fact that American workers--and by the way, this is also true of innovation. 罗伯茨：但这意味着你在告诉我，当我们决定向中国商品开放边境时，我们不应该这样做。我们应该非常警惕这样一个事实，美国工人-顺便说一句，创新也是如此。 George Borjas: Right--[?] make analogy. 乔治·博尔哈斯：对-[？]打个比方。 Russ Roberts: It's not just trade. If we have technological improvement that makes some people's skills obsolete, and they are not going to have a job, their children and grandchildren are going to live in a much better world--which is the history of the last hundred years of the United States. 罗斯·罗伯茨：这不仅仅是贸易。如果我们有技术进步，使一些人的技能过时，他们不会有工作，他们的子孙后代将生活在一个更好的世界-这就是美国最后一百年的历史。 George Borjas: Okay. You show me evidence that in fact the children and grandchildren of people who [?] trade are way better off than they would have been otherwise, I'm willing to buy into that. I mean, to me that sounds like an ideological argument more than a factual argument. And let me tell you another thing that you raise in your question. As you say, yes, there will be an increase in the economic pie. But this is where the distinction between workers and people comes in very, very nicely, okay? In the case of trade, the increase in the economic pie accruing to natives happens, and it's there: no doubt about it. In the case of immigration, it's not so clear. Because suppose [?] who came in have been low-skilled. Well, they are going to have impacts--forget all the other stuff that might go on. Just look at the Welfare State impact. The Welfare State impact is not trivial. And it may well be that the expenditures that they trigger on the Welfare State could easily offset the gains that accrue from them being like widgets in a sense, right? And that's why it is entirely possible for globalization[?] from trade to actually increase the economic pie, and globalization through immigration to not increase the economic pie at all. 乔治·博尔哈斯：好的。你给我看的证据实际上是那些[？]人的子孙后代交易比其他情况要好得多，我愿意买入这一点。我的意思是，对我来说，这听起来更像是意识形态的论点而不是事实的论点。让我告诉你在你的问题中提出的另一件事。正如你所说，是的，经济蛋糕将会增加。但这就是工人和人之间的区别非常好的地方，好吗？就贸易而言，当地人积累的经济蛋糕的增长发生了，而且它就在那里：这是毋庸置疑的。在移民问题上，就不那么清楚了。因为假设[？]那些进来的人都是低技能的。嗯，它们会有影响-忘掉所有其他可能会发生的事情。看看福利国家的影响吧。福利国家的影响不是微不足道的。而且很有可能它们在福利国家上引发的支出可以很容易地抵消它们在某种意义上像小工具所产生的收益，对吧？这就是为什么全球化是完全可能的[？]从贸易到实际增加经济馅饼，以及通过移民全球化根本不增加经济馅饼。 Russ Roberts: So, that is relevant. That's a relevant point. But let me just answer your charge that I made an ideological claim. I'm going to make the argument that I made a logical claim, through the logic of economics. And I'll give you some evidence. My evidence would be the following. In 1900 the average standard of living in the United States was a fraction of what it is now. It's probably something between 10 and 30 times higher. Of course, it's very difficult, it's impossible to measure precisely, because so many products, we try to figure out the purchasing power of--income today versus income in 1900, those products were simply not available in 1900. There's no elegant or precise way to deal with that reality. Put that to the side. No one disputes that our material wellbeing today dwarfs what it was 100 years ago. Now, what happened over those 100 years is that we had an immense amount of creative destruction. And it came from 3 different sources. We had tremendous technological change. We had a huge increase in globalization of goods and capital. We had a huge increase in immigration and mobility. And we also had population change. So, hundreds of millions--maybe--well, I'll leave it at hundreds of millions--hundreds of millions of jobs were destroyed over that century. Over the last 100 years. And new jobs were created. Now, you can argue that it's certainly the case that many of the individuals who were hurt by those three changes of immigration, technology, and trade were harmed, at the time. But I think it would be hard to argue that their children and grandchildren were harmed. They live much better material lives through the process of creative destruction--through the process of growth. You can argue it wasn't worth it. But my claim would be that a farmer living in 1900, when 40% of the workers were on the farm--today it's 2% in the United States--that farmer's children and grandchildren are much better off even though the changes that caused that to happen were very tough on farmers in the meanwhile. They couldn't cover their mortgage; their prices went down because of competition and increased innovation in agriculture and economies of scale. And small farmers in particular went bankrupt. And they had a tough time. And their children had suffered through the fact that their parents didn't have a job; their farm was out of business; etc. Their farm was bankrupt. But I think overall, it's been a pretty good run? You going to disagree with that? 罗斯·罗伯茨：所以，这是相关的。这是一个相关的问题。但让我来回答你关于我提出意识形态主张的指控。我将通过经济学的逻辑来论证我提出了一个合乎逻辑的主张。我会给你一些证据。我的证据如下。在1900年，美国的平均生活水平只是现在的一小部分。可能是高出10到30倍的东西。当然，这是非常困难的，不可能精确测量，因为有这么多产品，我们试图计算出购买力-今天的收入与1900年的收入相比，那些产品在1900年根本就没有。没有优雅或精确的方法来处理这个现实。把那个放一边。没有人质疑，我们今天的物质福利使100年前相形见绌。现在，在这100年里发生的事情是，我们经历了大量的创造性破坏。它来自三个不同的来源。我们有巨大的技术变革。我们在货物和资本的全球化方面有了巨大的增长。我们在移民和流动性方面有了巨大的增长。我们的人口也发生了变化。所以，数亿-也许-好吧，我把它留在亿万-在那个世纪里，数亿个工作岗位被摧毁了。在过去的100年里。创造了新的就业机会。现在，你可以争辩说，在当时，许多受到移民、技术和贸易三大变化伤害的个人肯定是受到伤害的。但我认为很难辩称他们的子孙受到了伤害。他们在创造性破坏的过程中过着更好的物质生活-通过成长的过程。你可以辩称这不值得。但我的主张是，一个生活在1900年的农民，当时40%的工人在农场-今天在美国是2%-农民的子孙后代的生活要好得多，尽管导致这种情况发生的变化对农民来说是非常艰难的。他们无法支付抵押贷款；由于竞争和农业创新和规模经济的增加，他们的价格下降了。尤其是小农场主破产了。他们度过了一段艰难的时期。他们的孩子经历了他们的父母没有工作的事实；他们的农场破产了；等等。他们的农场破产了。但我认为总的来说，这是一个相当好的运行？你不同意吗？ George Borjas: No, not at all. I actually make the argument myself sometimes. Okay? 乔治·博尔哈斯：不，一点也不。其实有时候我自己也会这么说。好吧? Russ Roberts: I'm glad to hear it. 罗斯·罗伯茨：我很高兴听到这个消息。 George Borjas: So, I actually agree with you. But the point that--look. There's a lot of things going on over the last century. 乔治·博尔哈斯：所以，我实际上同意你的观点。但重点是-听着。上个世纪发生了很多事情。 Russ Roberts: Fair enough. 罗斯·罗伯茨：很公平。 George Borjas: So, to--so who knows? It's very hard to disentangle these facts. What I think is something that we economists have been guilty of is the following: When we teach trade and immigration in class, we always point out the models create these benefits and costs. Right? Even though the pie might increase. 乔治·博尔哈斯：所以，所以谁知道呢？要弄清楚这些事实是很难的。我认为我们经济学家所犯的错误是：当我们在课堂上教授贸易和移民时，我们总是指出模型创造了这些好处和成本。对吗？即使馅饼可能会增加。 Russ Roberts: Yep. 罗伯茨：是的。 George Borjas: When you talk about trade and immigration in the public debate, public policy--especially with trade--you don't hear much about the cost. George Borjas：当你在公共辩论中谈论贸易和移民时，公共政策-特别是贸易政策-你不会听到太多关于成本的信息。 Russ Roberts: Yeah, and I agree with you there. That's disgusting. It's dishonest. 罗伯茨：是的，我同意你的看法。那真讨厌。这是不诚实的。 George Borjas: And that's been a very destructive part of what we've done as a profession, I think. Because some people do get hurt. And people getting hurt, getting left behind and [?] more has consequences. Social consequences; political consequences. And, you know, we are in a world now who might be living through those consequences. 乔治·博尔哈斯：我认为，这是我们作为职业所做的非常具有破坏性的一部分。因为有些人确实会受伤。人们受到伤害，被甩在后面[？]越多就会有后果。社会后果；政治后果而且，你知道，我们现在生活在一个可能正在经历这些后果的世界。 Russ Roberts: I agree with that. Actually, I agree with it very strongly. I think it's incredibly depressing how advocates for and against both sides of these issues and don't admit to various costs and benefits, depending on which side you are on. [?] a free lunch. 罗斯·罗伯茨：我同意这一点。事实上，我非常同意。我认为，倡导者如何支持和反对这些问题的双方，并且不承认各种成本和利益，这取决于你站在哪一边，这是令人难以置信的令人沮丧的。[？]免费午餐。 George Borjas: That was the--thank you for saying that. That was one of the things I wanted to get into my book: There are tradeoffs in everything, right? 乔治·博尔哈斯：这就是-谢谢你这么说。这是我想写进我的书的事情之一：每件事都有权衡，对吧？ Russ Roberts: Yup. I totally agree. 罗斯·罗伯茨：是的。我完全同意。 George Borjas: And you know that immigration is one of those things. 乔治·博尔哈斯：你知道移民就是其中之一。 Russ Roberts: I'm willing--even though I'm more of an open-borders guy than you are, George, I certainly agree with that in your book. It made me think about more than I have. Which I really appreciate. And it also reminded me of something I'm very much in agreement with, which is the tendency for advocates to cherry-pick data on both sides of this debate and avoid those costs. I [?] 100%. 罗斯·罗伯茨：我愿意-尽管我比你更喜欢开放边界，乔治，我当然同意你书中的这一点。它让我想的比我想的还多。我真的很感激。它也让我想起了一些我非常赞同的事情，那就是倡导者倾向于在这场辩论的双方都挑选数据并避免这些成本。我[？]100%。 37:09 Russ Roberts: So, let's talk a little bit about the measurement of those costs. What would you argue is the best estimate, at least in the short run--and the short run could be long-- 37：09 Russ Roberts：那么，让我们来谈谈这些成本的计量。你认为最好的估计是什么，至少在短期内-而短期可能是长期的- George Borjas: right-- 乔治·博尔哈斯：对- Russ Roberts: of the harm to native American, low-skilled--native workers of low skills? That is, high school dropouts-- Russ Roberts：对美洲原住民，低技能-低技能的原住民工人的伤害？也就是说，高中辍学- George Borjas: right-- 乔治·博尔哈斯：对- Russ Roberts: high school graduates from the recent increase in immigration? And by the way, the other thing that drives me crazy is everyone just assumes that everything is linear--so if we made it twice as big, the effect would be the same. Or if we do it now versus 50 years ago, it doesn't matter. And of course, you point out many times in the book very well that you have to be careful about historical context, the types of workers, the countries they come from. Those are all relevant. So, talk about what we know about the impact on low-skilled workers in America when immigrants come in. 罗斯·罗伯茨：最近移民增加带来的高中毕业生？顺便说一句，另一件让我抓狂的事情是每个人都假设一切都是线性的-所以如果我们把它放大一倍，效果将是一样的。或者，如果我们现在这样做，而不是50年前，这并不重要。当然，你在书中多次指出，你必须小心历史背景，工人类型，他们来自哪个国家。这些都是相关的。所以，谈谈我们所知道的移民进入时对美国低技能工人的影响。 George Borjas: Look, the number I carry in my head is that what we've seen in the last 20, 30 years has basically been something on the order of like a 20, 25% increase of supply on the bottom end of the skill distribution. I think the best available number is that that has basically increased--has lowered the wage at the bottom of the skill distribution by something between 3 and 5%. Which is not a huge amount. I mean, it's not a huge impact, by any means. But it's not zero. 乔治·博尔哈斯：听着，我脑子里的数字是，我们在过去20，30年里看到的基本上是在技能分布的最低端增加了20-25%的供应量的一些东西。我认为最好的数字是基本上增加了-降低了技能分布底层的工资在3%到5%之间。这不是一个很大的数目。我的意思是，无论如何这都不是一个巨大的影响。但它不是零。 Russ Roberts: Agreed. 罗斯·罗伯茨：同意。 George Borjas: And, you know: The question is: How much attention should one put when one thinks about immigration on that particular loss? And that's really much more of a value question than it is an economic question. I mean, what I'm trying to resolve in the book is to sort of point out to people that, yes, you can cherry-pick data, and you can do this and you can do that. But overall, there is some evidence that the people who are most affected, once they[?] find things properly, people who are most affected by immigrants will, just like you, are going to be hurt a little bit. But I think one thing that I don't do enough in the book and that people don't do enough generally, is sort of--it comes back to something that we talked about earlier: those who [?] come along with complementarities. And we've not really put much attention on measuring the gain that you and I get as a result of [?] immigration. And those gains could be substantial. And that truly is what the debate should be about. 乔治·博尔哈斯：而且，你知道：问题是：当人们考虑移民这个特定损失时，应该给予多大的关注？这真的更像是一个价值问题，而不是一个经济问题。我的意思是，我试图在这本书中解决的是向人们指出，是的，你可以挑选数据，你可以这样做，你可以那样做。但总体而言，有一些证据表明，受影响最大的人，一旦他们[？]找到合适的东西，那些受移民影响最大的人，就像你一样，会受到一点伤害。但我认为有一件事我在书中做得不够，人们通常也做得不够，有点-这又回到了我们之前谈到的一些事情：那些[？]随之而来的是互补性。而且我们并没有真正把注意力放在衡量你和我因[？]而获得的收益上。移民局。而这些收益可能是巨大的。这就是这场辩论的真正意义所在。 Russ Roberts: Well, your point about the--let's say it's 5%--it does remind me that low-skilled workers in America, the last 25 years, have been very challenging, for three reasons. And we've mentioned them all. One is the increase in immigration of low-skilled workers. The second is technology, the increase in artificial intelligence, etc. And the third, of course, is trade. Russ Roberts：好吧，你关于-假设是5%-的观点确实提醒了我，过去25年来，美国的低技能工人一直都很有挑战性，原因有三。我们都提到过。一个是低技术工人移民的增加。第二个是技术，人工智能的增加等等，第三个当然是贸易。 George Borjas: Right. 乔治·博尔哈斯：对。 Russ Roberts: All three of those--trade with countries who have a lot of low-skilled workers. Russ Roberts：所有这三个-与拥有大量低技能工人的国家进行贸易。 George Borjas: Right. They [?] 乔治·博尔哈斯：对。他们[？] Russ Roberts: Yeah. So, this explains why there are a lot of folks in certain parts of the country who aren't doing very well. And it's a serious issue. So, let me--let's not debate whether 5% is small or large. I wouldn't debate it. It's small to some; large to many. But if you are one of those workers, it's large, I assume. If you are poor, 5% is not a trivial amount. Potentially. It seems to me the right policy response to that is not to keep out low-skilled workers. It's not to reduce innovation. It's not to keep out products from countries with low-skilled workers. It's to try to improve the skill-set of the workers who are here. To try to encourage them to finish high school. It seems to me a very strange policy idea to say, 'You have to keep out workers from, say, Mexico or Latin America, because they compete with American dropouts; and they get hurt.' Shouldn't we just try to improve our school system and our culture to get people to graduate high school? 罗伯茨：是的。所以，这就解释了为什么在这个国家的某些地方有很多人做得不是很好。这是一个严重的问题。所以，让我-让我们不要争论5%是小还是大。我不会争论的。对一些人来说是小的，对很多人来说是大的。但如果你是这些工人中的一员，我想它会很大。如果你很穷，5%可不是个小数目。潜在的。在我看来，对此的正确政策反应是不把低技能工人拒之门外。这不是为了减少创新。这并不是为了阻止来自低技能工人的国家的产品。这是为了努力提高在这里工作的工人的技能。鼓励他们完成高中学业。在我看来，这似乎是一个非常奇怪的政策想法，‘你必须把工人挡在外面，比如说墨西哥或拉丁美洲，因为他们与美国辍学生竞争；他们会受到伤害。’难道我们不应该试着改善我们的学校系统和我们的文化，让人们高中毕业吗？ George Borjas: Uh, okay. That's actually a great point. And my usual answer to that is two-fold. One is: Who pays for that? Because, you know, providing education for many, many more people is not--you know, there's not a free lunch, right? Somebody pays for that. And I don't know what the estimates of that would be, but I would like to know before you make a decision as to what the right thing to do would be. What would be the cost of doing that? Right? 乔治·博尔哈斯：嗯，好的。这实际上是一个很好的观点。我通常的回答是两个方面。其中一个问题是：谁为此买单？因为，你知道，为更多的人提供教育不是-你知道，没有免费的午餐，对吧？有人会为此付出代价的。我不知道估计会是多少，但我想知道在你做出决定之前，正确的做法是什么。这样做的成本是多少？对吗？ Russ Roberts: Yep. 罗伯茨：是的。 George Borjas: And then the second thing that's always puzzled me about this, and I've never really thought it through completely because I haven't had the time to sort of sit down and work out a model, is sort of related to what you said. A lot of people say, 'Look, it's true that, or it may be true that the bottom end has gotten hammered because of immigration and so on. But one good thing about all this is I think can encourage them to go back to school and get more education. Right?' And there's some kind of an upgrade, a skill-upgrade they call it, or something along those lines. And one way to look at it is that way. Another way to look at it is the following: These people decided, before this supply shock, that the optimal thing they should do was to get x schooling and no more. And now, there's a shock out their own control that they now have to revisit that mathematization[?] problem. And they have to incur the cost of moving away from whatever they have picked before to some other equilibrium. Right? Is that an optimal way to run a--is that an optimal thing that's come out of immigration policy, to force people who had already pre-decided they didn't want to do certain things, to make them do them? And I don't see anybody discuss this very clearly. And, you know, in the abstract, we can all say, 'Of course, we can just get everybody--let's make everybody go to college. Let's do that.' But a lot of people don't want to do that. And how do you compensate those people who don't want to do that, through the fact that you are not changing the environment in a way that they have to do something that they don't want to do? George Borjas：然后第二件事一直困扰着我，我从来没有真正想过它，因为我没有时间坐下来想出一个模型，这与你所说的有关。很多人说，‘看，这是真的，或者可能是因为移民等原因，底层受到了打击。但所有这一切的一个好处是，我认为可以鼓励他们回到学校接受更多的教育。对吗？’。而且有某种升级，他们称之为技能升级，或者其他类似的东西。一种看待它的方式就是这样。另一种看待它的方式是：在这场供应危机之前，这些人决定，他们应该做的最好的事情就是接受x教育，而不是更多。现在，他们自己的控制能力受到了冲击，他们现在不得不重新审视数学化[？]有问题。而且他们必须承担从他们以前选择的任何东西转移到其他均衡的成本。对吗？这是一种最佳的运行方式吗-这是来自移民政策的最佳方式吗，迫使那些已经预先决定他们不想做某些事情的人，让他们去做这些事情？我没有看到任何人非常清楚地讨论这件事。而且，你知道，抽象地说，我们都可以说，‘当然，我们可以让每个人-让我们让每个人都上大学。让我们这样做。’但很多人不想这么做。你如何补偿那些不想这么做的人，通过你不是在改变环境，让他们不得不做他们不想做的事情这一事实呢？ Russ Roberts: Yeah. I think, instead of saying 'Force,' I would say, 'Incentivize.' But it's the same point. Right? Do we want to incentivize people to go to college, say, who don't want to go now. Etc. I think the key point in answering that--and we don't know the answer precisely at all, but the key point would be it's not just that they are going to be incentivized to go to college. It will be, or to say, in high school, say, in graduating, the key point is that with more workers and more people, presumably there's more--and if there is economic growth as a result and more capital coming in, the opportunities and the return to finishing high school and going on to college will be higher than they were before. Just as you mentioned--before, that those new workers will be complementary to, say, our skills. Of course, the question is how much and how big. 罗伯茨：是的。我认为，与其说“力”，我会说“激励”。但都是一样的。对吗？我们想激励人们去上大学吗，比如说，现在不想去的人。等。我认为回答这个问题的关键-我们根本不知道确切的答案，但关键的一点是，不仅仅是他们将被激励去上大学。在高中，或者说，在毕业时，关键的一点是，随着更多的工人和更多的人，想必会有更多-如果有经济增长的结果和更多的资本流入，那么完成高中学业并继续上大学的机会和回报将会比以前更高。就像你之前提到的，那些新的工人将会补充，比如说，我们的技能。当然，问题是有多少，有多大。 44:12 Russ Roberts: George, talk for a minute about your personal story. Because it's very interesting. And I think listeners will probably guess that you were an immigrant. And that your experience affected your interest in this topic. Again, I think--that's a small part of the book, but it's a very interesting part. And, talk about that for a little bit. 罗伯茨：乔治，谈谈你的个人故事。因为它很有趣。我想听众可能会猜到你是个移民。你的经历影响了你对这个话题的兴趣。再一次，我认为-这只是书中的一小部分，但它是非常有趣的部分。然后，谈一谈这一点。 George Borjas: Okay; thank you so much. I tell you: I was born in Cuba. And my family used to own a small clothing factory. They manufactured men's pants. And, like I say in the book, I'm actually one of those rare economists that spent a lot of time at a factory with capital and labor. The manufacturing product that was sold in the marketplace. So, I've actually seen that firsthand. Okay? So, the factory was confiscated very soon after Castro took over. And basically, you know, my father was very ill from my childhood; and there were rumors that Castro was going to ship out all the children to the countryside and re-educate them or something. My family wanted to get me out of the country, no matter what it involved. But my father basically got sicker over that period, and eventually passed away. And that always disrupted these plans. My mother and I were eventually able to migrate--overseas--just a week before the Missile Crisis closed the border with Cuba. So I was very, very lucky in being one of those last rights[?]. Many years go by, and some--I'm an immigration, obviously; I'm kind of predisposed to immigration topics. And I'm at Columbia U., a grad student at Columbia--this a few years before we met at, you know, in Chicago, right? And Barry Chiswick comes by; and here's a paper; and that paper is about assimilation. That paper is actually, now, you look back on it, and it's sort of the foundation of immigration economics in the modern era. The paper that sparked the whole field. And his claim was--his finding was--that if you look at immigrants who just arrived in the United States and compared them to immigrants who had been here a long time, the immigrants who just arrived earn a lot less than those who have been here a long time. And then he proceeded to interpret that finding as a proof of economic assimilation. The longer you are here, the more you learn whatever it is you have to learn--the language, the American way of life, whatever. Right? The American way in the labor market. And you improve your human capital in some sense. In that seminar I asked the question that clearly came from my own background; and it happened to be because I knew that the human flow was composed of two distinct[?] waves--those who came, like myself, before 1962, and those who came many years later. There were many, many rumors or observations in the Cuban community that those who came before 1962 were the entrepreneurs, the highly skilled; those who came years later were not. So, I said, 'You know, couldn't it be that the reason you are finding that the more recent immigrants do worse than the earlier ones, not be the result of assimilation but just be the fact that the groups are just different kinds of people? Like, in the Cuban [?] I had in mind? George Borjas：好的，非常感谢。我告诉你：我出生在古巴。我们家曾经拥有一家小服装厂。他们制造男人的裤子。而且，就像我在书中说的，我实际上是少数几个在工厂里花很多时间与资本和劳动力在一起的经济学家之一。在市场上销售的制造产品。所以，我真的亲眼目睹了这一点。好吧?所以，卡斯特罗接手后不久，工厂就被没收了。基本上，你知道，我父亲从我小时候就病得很厉害；有传言说卡斯特罗将把所有的孩子都送到乡下，并对他们进行再教育之类的事情。我的家人想让我离开这个国家，不管涉及到什么。但我父亲在那段时间里病得更重了，最后去世了。这总是打乱了这些计划。我的母亲和我最终能够移民-海外-就在导弹危机关闭古巴边境的一周前。所以我非常幸运地成为最后的权利之一[？]。很多年过去了，有些-很明显，我是移民；我有点倾向于移民话题。我在哥伦比亚大学，哥伦比亚大学的研究生-这是我们在芝加哥相遇的几年前，对吧？Barry Chiswick走过来；这是一篇论文，这篇论文是关于同化的。这篇论文实际上是，现在，你回想起来，它是现代移民经济学的基础。引发了整个领域的论文。他的主张是-他的发现是-如果你看一下刚刚到达美国的移民，并将他们与在这里呆了很长时间的移民进行比较，刚到的移民的收入比那些已经在这里呆了很长时间的移民挣得少得多。然后他将这一发现解释为经济同化的证据。你在这里呆的时间越长，你学到的东西就越多-语言，美国人的生活方式，无论什么。对吗？美国人在劳动力市场的方式。在某种意义上，你改善了你的人力资本。在那次研讨会上，我问了一个明显来自我自己背景的问题；它碰巧是因为我知道人流是由两个截然不同的[？]组成的。波浪-那些像我一样在1962年之前来到这里的人，以及那些在很多年之后来到这里的人。古巴社会有很多谣言或观察，1962年以前来的人是企业家，高技能的人；而那些几年后来的人则不是。所以，我说，‘你知道，这不可能是你发现较新移民比早期移民表现更差的原因，不是同化的结果，而只是因为这些群体只是不同类型的人？就像，在古巴[？]我想的那样？“。 Russ Roberts: [?] 罗伯茨：[？] George Borjas: Exactly. And that was really this--this was the mid-1970s. That was the birth of my first paper on immigration, which was published in 1985. So, I moved to California. And this idea that I asked [?] about, kept floating in my head, as California was literally changing dramatically over in that period. This is the early 1980s. This is when you and I had met; and I moved to California: the early 1980s. And you can basically see California changing. Before 1980, California was not a particularly heavy immigrant state. And I get there; and overnight, you can sort of see the town changing. Okay? And I said to myself, 'This looks really interesting.' And it was again [?] change. And I want to study this, out of curiosity. And a question that kept cropping up in my mind was that I had asked at a seminar: How, exactly, would you measure assimilation when you have different "ways" of people being different? And that's what I said in the study; that was really my answer to immigration. And that's the way I got involved. 乔治·博尔哈斯：没错。这真的是-这是20世纪70年代中期。那就是我第一篇关于移民的论文的诞生，这篇论文发表于1985年。所以我搬到了加州。我问的这个想法[？]大约，一直漂浮在我的脑海里，因为加州在那段时间里发生了戏剧性的变化。这是20世纪80年代初。这是你和我相遇的时候，我搬到了加利福尼亚：1980年代初。你基本上可以看到加州的变化。1980年前，加州并不是一个特别沉重的移民州。我到了那里；一夜之间，你可以看到城镇的变化。好吧?我对自己说，‘这看起来真的很有趣。’然后又是[？]变化。出于好奇，我想研究这个。我脑海中不断浮现的一个问题是，我在一次研讨会上问过：确切地说，当你有不同的人不同的“方式”时，你会如何衡量同化？这就是我在研究中所说的；这就是我对移民的回答。这就是我参与进来的方式。 48:37 Russ Roberts: And how much do you think we know now? And there are many, many examples in the book trying to measure this; but try to summarize them. What do we know now about people's ability to assimilate? Whatever that means--there's cultural and economics and assimilation. But let's stick to the economic side, again--the idea that the wages of the children and grandchildren become closer to the wages of the natives. 罗斯·罗伯茨：你认为我们现在知道多少？书中有很多的例子试图衡量这一点，但试着总结一下。我们现在对人们的同化能力了解多少？不管这意味着什么-这里有文化和经济，还有同化。但是，让我们再一次坚持经济方面的观点-子女和孙子的工资变得更接近当地人的工资。 George Borjas: Right. Well, there's two kinds of estimation we are talking about. One is what happens if you are an immigrant, lifetime, and the other is what happens to the children and grandchildren. Right? 乔治·博尔哈斯：对。嗯，我们谈论的是两种估计。一个是如果你是一个移民会发生什么，终生，另一个是发生在孩子和孙子身上的事情。对吗？ Russ Roberts: Yep. 罗伯茨：是的。 George Borjas: The whole Chiswick paper was really what happened to some of the immigrants, lifetime. And we know a lot more about that now than we did when Chiswick began--obviously. What we know is that the groups of immigrants who came in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, 1970s--you know, assimilated quite well in terms of, they experienced a lot of wage growth. The groups that came in the beginning of the 20th century and the groups that came of the end of the 20th century, did not experience as much wage growth. It's sort of a curious finding. Because if you look at the 20th century in the United States, it's basically book-ended by two mass migrations. And what we tend to find is that they [?] came into mass migrations don't tend to progress as fast as those who came in a period of less immigration. Okay? So that's actually very interesting, sort of topic for future discussion. And we don't quite know why it happened. But it's interesting. George Borjas：整个Chiswick的论文实际上就是发生在一些移民身上的事情，终生。显然，我们现在对这一点的了解比奇西克开始时要多得多。我们所知道的是，20世纪40年代，50年代，60年代，70年代的移民群体-你知道，他们很好地同化了，他们经历了大量的工资增长。在20世纪初出现的群体和在20世纪末出现的群体，没有经历那么多的工资增长。这是一种奇怪的发现。因为如果你看看20世纪的美国，它基本上是由两次大规模移民结束的。我们倾向于发现他们[？]进入大规模移民的过程往往不会像那些在移民较少的时期到来的人那样快。好吧?所以这实际上是非常有趣的，未来讨论的话题。我们也不是很清楚为什么会发生。但这很有趣。 Russ Roberts: Could be a supply effect. Could be something different. Could be there was a big recession in 2008-- 罗斯·罗伯茨：可能是供应效应。可能是不同的东西。2008年可能出现大衰退- George Borjas: Exactly-- 乔治·博尔哈斯：没错- Russ Roberts: that set everybody back. We don't-- 罗斯·罗伯茨：这让每个人都后退了。我们不. George Borjas: We don't know. I'm being completely honest. We don't know, but it's just a very interesting pattern. The second thing, which is what happens to the children and grandchildren. And again, the only experience we have here is what happened in the 20th century. So, what we get, we have data for, is we can track the people who came in the early 1900s, look at their children, look at their grandchildren over the century. Right? And what we see is that they are [?]. The children improve over time. And ethnic inequality--in other words, the difference between Group X and Group Y narrows down a lot. And that's what you would expect from the melting pot working. Now, you didn't raise this point, but I make this point in the book: Which is the following: A lot of people look at that 20th century experience and say, 'Look, you know, even though we are having, perhaps we are having some problems today with the new immigrants--they are not doing so well, whatever--it all worked out in the 20th century and therefore you can just extrapolate into the future, and it will work out fine. And this is one of the points I want to make in the book, which sort of came up in our conversation before. You know, conditions on the ground matter a lot. You cannot use things that happen at one place at one time, regarding immigration, and imagine that it will happen in another place at another time. Because, again, immigrants are not just robotic workers. And they example I'd like to give of the 20th century is that--sort of a few examples--is the following. One is: Look, when immigrants in 1900 came in, they went into the manufacturing sector. It's not too much of an exaggeration that the Ellis Island immigrants built up the manufacturing sector of the United States to a large extent. Now, the important thing about that is that those jobs eventually became unionized. And were very high-paying jobs. And those union jobs were, you know, were, you know, [?] transferred within the family. So if your father--one number that I always find incredible is that in 1915 or so, almost 3/4 of the Ford Motor Company workers were foreign born. Well, just imagine if you were a Ford employee and became unionized, got a great-paying job. Your children got that job. Your grandchildren. And that was really the middle class in the 20th century for many immigration families. 乔治·博尔哈斯：我们不知道。我完全是实话实说。我们不知道，但这只是一个非常有趣的模式。第二件事，就是发生在孩子和孙子身上的事情。同样，我们这里唯一的经验是20世纪发生的事情。所以，我们得到的，我们有数据的是，我们可以追踪在20世纪初来到这里的人，看看他们的孩子，看看他们的孙子孙女。对吗？我们看到的是它们是[？]。孩子们随着时间的推移而进步。种族不平等-换句话说，X组和Y组之间的差异缩小了很多。这就是你所期待的熔炉的工作。现在，你没有提出这一点，但我在书中指出了这一点：很多人看着20世纪的经验说，‘看，你知道，即使我们今天和新移民有一些问题-他们做得不是很好，不管怎样-这一切都是在20世纪解决的，因此你可以外推到未来，它会很好的解决的。这是我想在书中提出的观点之一，这在我们之前的对话中提到过。你知道，地面条件很重要。你不能使用发生在一个地方，在一个时间，关于移民的事情，并想象它将在另一个时间发生在另一个地方。因为，再一次，移民不仅仅是机器人工人。我想举的20世纪的例子是-有几个例子-如下一个是：你看，当1900年移民进来时，他们进入了制造业。毫不夸张地说，埃利斯岛移民在很大程度上建立了美国的制造业。现在，重要的是这些工作最终变成了工会。而且是非常高薪的工作。而那些工会工作是，你知道的，[？]在家庭内部转移。所以如果你的父亲-我总是觉得难以置信的一个数字是，在1915年左右，福特汽车公司几乎3/4的工人是在国外出生的。嗯，想象一下如果你是福特公司的员工，加入了工会，得到了一份高薪的工作。你的孩子得到了那份工作。你的孙子孙女。对于许多移民家庭来说，这真的是20世纪的中产阶级。 Russ Roberts: Yeah. That's a fantastic example. Of course, it was harder for other people's children or grandchildren to get those jobs, because the union wanted to keep them out and were eager to keep the gains very narrow. So they-- 罗伯茨：是的。这是一个很好的例子。当然，其他人的子女或孙子更难获得这些工作，因为工会希望将他们拒之门外，并渴望将收益保持在非常有限的范围内。所以他们 George Borjas: Exactly-- 乔治·博尔哈斯：没错- Russ Roberts: I just want to emphasize that. 罗斯·罗伯茨：我只想强调这一点。 George Borjas: But nevertheless the fact that the immigrants were so over-represented in the manufacturing sector clearly helped them. 乔治·博尔哈斯：但尽管如此，移民在制造业中代表人数过多的事实显然对他们有所帮助。 Russ Roberts: Yeah. 罗伯茨：是的。 George Borjas: And the question is: What is it now--what conditions today will lead to that kind of assimilation path in the next hundred years? I don't know. Another issue is, there were two wars. And the Germans were, in particular, highly discriminated against in WWI. And those[?] states passed legislation making it illegal to speak German in public. Making it illegal to actually speak German in public schools. And that was in effect an assimilation, right? Again, we don't want to have another World War, but how do you produce those underlying conditions? And that's one of the reasons--I think there's something you've actually talked about before in some of your work, is that--there is, the incentive to assimilate culturally doesn't really exist any more. The [?] kind of assimilation doesn't really exist any more. George Borjas：问题是：现在是什么情况-今天什么样的条件会导致未来一百年的那种同化道路？我不知道。另一个问题是，有两场战争。尤其是德国人在第一次世界大战中受到了高度歧视。而那些[？]各州通过立法，规定在公共场合讲德语是非法的。规定在公立学校说德语是非法的。这实际上是一种同化，对吗？再说一遍，我们不想再发生一场世界大战，但是你是如何产生这些潜在的条件的呢？这就是其中一个原因-我认为你以前在你的一些工作中实际上已经谈到了一些事情，就是-有，文化同化的动机已经不再存在了。[？]某种同化已经不再存在了。 Russ Roberts: It's true. 罗伯茨：这是真的。 George Borjas: You know, I give the example in the book of the [?] California, [?] out a memo prohibiting people from using the world melting pot because it's a micro-aggression. Just imagine what doing that means in terms of, you know, future assimilation. It's not really clear, right? 乔治·博尔哈斯：你知道，我在书中给出了一个例子[？]加利福尼亚[？]写出一份备忘录，禁止人们使用世界大熔炉，因为这是一种微观侵略。想象一下这样做对未来的同化意味着什么。不是很清楚，对吧？ Russ Roberts: Well, the example you also give in the book--which I think is fantastic and relevant, is, through most of a large part of American history, immigrants were eager to learn the language. But, of course it's hard to learn a new language when you are an adult. But the children, at least, would learn the new language. And the parents would often do their best to speak the native language at home to encourage their kids. In fact, my wife's grandparents came here from Germany in 1939, escaping the Nazis; and they never spoke German again. So, think about how crazy--think about that house: A husband and wife, not speaking their native language because they are so horrified and traumatized by the Holocaust; so of course their children spoke English much better than they would have otherwise. Of course, they didn't know German. That was--there was a cost to that, of course. But in today's world, we make it, for reasons that I'm not going to try to explain, we make it easier for people to not learn English. We have wonderful private and public accommodation of people where English is not their native language. Obviously Spanish being the second language. And there's something good about that; and there's something not so good. Russ Roberts：嗯，你在书中也举了一个例子-我认为这是很棒的和相关的，是，在美国历史的大部分时间里，移民都渴望学习这种语言。但是，当然，当你是成年人的时候，学习一门新的语言是困难的。但至少孩子们会学习新的语言。而且父母经常会尽最大努力在家里说母语来鼓励他们的孩子。事实上，我妻子的祖父母1939年从德国来到这里，逃离纳粹；他们再也不会说德语了。所以，想想有多疯狂-想想那栋房子：一对丈夫和妻子，他们不会说他们的母语，因为他们被大屠杀吓坏了，受到了创伤；所以他们的孩子当然会说英语比他们本来会说的好得多。当然，他们不懂德语。当然，这是有代价的。但在今天的世界里，我们做到了，因为我不打算解释的原因，我们让人们更容易不学习英语。我们为那些英语不是他们母语的人提供了极好的私人和公共住宿。显然西班牙语是第二语言。这其中有好的一面，也有不太好的一面。 George Borjas: Right. And look: the other point that you can make is that there are now gains to be had by making sure you retain the ethnic identity. In terms of all kinds of programs that try to divide people by ethnic groups and reward people and penalize people accordingly. And that also affects assimilation. So, I think that a usual--we all have a tendency to do this. And we all look at data; and we always look at data from the past. And we assume the world is linear and we can just extrapolate from where we are now using the data from the past. Right? It's not so clear you can do this in this context. And that's one of the warnings, the warnings that I give in the book. 乔治·博尔哈斯：对。看：你可以提出的另一点是，通过确保你保留种族认同，现在可以获得好处。就各种试图按种族划分人并相应地奖赏和惩罚人的节目而言。这也会影响同化。所以，我认为通常-我们都有这样做的倾向。我们都看数据；我们总是看过去的数据。我们假设世界是线性的，我们可以利用过去的数据，从我们现在的位置进行推断。对吗？在这种情况下你能做到这一点还不是很清楚。这是其中一个警告，我在书中给出的警告。 56:01 Russ Roberts: Yup. Yeah, and I agree with that. So, let me make a philosophical observation and see where you stand on this. So, I'm going to give you my summary of what we know about this and why I come down as I do. And I'm going to be as honest as I can be. So, I concede that immigration is hard on low-skilled workers. I think the effects are relatively small, but I concede that, for them, small is not really the right word. It might be large to them, because 5% of a poor person might be more significant than it might be to me. And I get that. I also believe that over the longer period of time it leads to growth, and better use of resources; and that's going to enhance the opportunities of their children and grandchildren. Especially if we get rid of things like mandated second-language signs, etc. I think we should be encouraging people to learn English and use English; and I hope culturally we'll move toward a more assimilatory--I think it's okay to say, melting pot. I would like to see that. But I understand I don't have control over that. So, I think the economic effects are relatively small. For me, and others, but especially for me. So I concede that. They are bigger for people who are not like me. But for their children and grandchildren, I think that they'll be okay with it; and I think they care about their children and grandchildren. And I see a huge benefit to the people who come here. So, as somebody who is not an nth generation American--just like you, I'm not as new as you are-- 56：01罗斯·罗伯茨：是的。是的，我同意这一点。所以，让我做一个哲学上的观察，看看你在这个问题上的立场。所以，我会给你们我的总结，关于我们对此的了解，以及为什么我会这样做。我会尽我所能的诚实。所以，我承认移民对低技术工人来说很难。我认为影响相对较小，但我承认，对他们来说，小并不是真正正确的字眼。这对他们来说可能很大，因为5%的穷人可能比我更重要。我明白这一点。我也相信，随着时间的推移，它会带来增长，并更好地利用资源；这将增加他们子孙后代的机会。尤其是如果我们摆脱了强制的第二语言标志等。我认为我们应该鼓励人们学习和使用英语；我希望在文化上我们会走向更加同化-我认为可以这么说，大熔炉。我想看看。但我知道我无法控制。所以我认为经济影响比较小。对我和其他人，但特别是对我。所以我承认。它们对于不像我的人来说更大。但对于他们的子孙后代，我认为他们不会介意；我认为他们关心自己的子孙后代。我看到了来到这里的人们的巨大好处。所以，作为一个不是第n代美国人的人-就像你一样，我不像你那样新- George Borjas: Right. 乔治·博尔哈斯：对。 Russ Roberts: but I have--my 4 grandparents, 1 was born in Poland and 3 were born in the United States. I think--they all came in the 1880s part. And I concede the part that I have an emotional reaction to this issue, partly because if those people hadn't come here they would have been killed in the Holocaust. And they would have been really poor, either way. And I'm really glad that we got--that my ancestors came here. That I got to be born here instead of in Poland, or somewhere else. And I'd like to see that opportunity available to other people. So, I see it as a wonderful thing for the people who come here--mostly. I see it as mostly a good thing for the people who are here. And for me the only issue is the cultural issue--is that for a net negative or a net positive, to have diverse people coming here who may not share all the cultural values of America. And there I do worry about the melting pot and assimilation. But that's where I stand. Where do you stand? And does your personal story play a role in your willingness or eagerness to let--or antagonism to people coming here? 罗伯茨：但是我有-我的4个祖父母，1个出生在波兰，3个出生在美国。我认为-它们都是在19世纪80年代出现的。我承认我对这个问题有一种情感上的反应，部分原因是如果那些人没有来这里，他们就会在大屠杀中被杀害。不管怎样，他们都会很穷。我真的很高兴我们有-我的祖先来到这里。我必须出生在这里，而不是波兰，或者其他地方。我希望其他人也能得到这样的机会。所以，我认为这对于来这里的人来说是一件很棒的事情-大多数情况下。我认为这对在座的人来说基本上是一件好事。对我来说，唯一的问题是文化问题-对于一个净负面或一个净正面来说，让不同的人来到这里，他们可能不会分享美国的所有文化价值观。在那里，我确实担心熔炉和同化。但这就是我的立场。你的立场是什么？你的个人经历在你愿意或渴望让-或对抗来这里的人的意愿或渴望中起作用吗？ George Borjas: You know, we are not that far away, believe it or not. I mean, I think I will--in the little summary you just gave at the very end of what you just said, you sort of didn't really talk about the people being hurt by it so much. And the question is how much wage we put on that. You know, one of the things at the end of the book that I have is I sort of say to myself, 'What would I do if I had control over immigration policy?' Right? And even though there is an impact on the low-skilled labor market, I don't come out at the end and say, 'Let's just stop all low-skilled immigration.' In fact I say we shouldn't do that. We should actually--there is something quite--in the way you put it, there is something quite historic about the United States giving the opportunity to many low-skilled people from all over the world to come to this country and live, you know, much better lives. Right? And I don't want it--I would never want to throw that away. That's part of what the United States is about. But what I think we've made the mistake on, is ignoring the fact that the long run is far away. And there is a need, right now, to address the dislocations suffered by people at that low end. And unfortunately, both in the case of trade and immigration, we've tended to be models[?] people. We tend to look forward and say, 'Look, in the long term, the economic pie will go up. Your children might be fine.' Whatever. Right. But that's 20, 30 years down the line. What do we do with the people who are being hurt today? So, I'm not that far away from you. What I would actually argue, that we cannot just dismiss the short-run impact. So willingly. I think we have to take--we have to think of immigration--if we are going to do these kinds of things, we have to think of immigration policy in a broader way. And that broader way is not just how many immigrants to admit and which immigrants to admit, but what to do about the people who are being hurt by it now. And once we address that, then how much more in your ballpark? 乔治·博尔哈斯：你知道，我们并不是那么遥远，信不信由你。我的意思是，我想我会的-在你刚刚说的话的最后一小段总结中，你并没有真正谈到人们被它伤害得如此之深。问题是我们在这上面放了多少工资。你知道，在这本书的末尾，我对自己说，‘如果我能控制移民政策，我会怎么做？’对吗？尽管这会对低技能劳动力市场产生影响，但我不会在最后站出来说，‘让我们停止所有低技能的移民。’事实上我说我们不应该那样做。实际上，我们应该-有一些相当-用你的话说，美国让来自世界各地的许多低技能的人有机会来到这个国家，过上，你知道的，更好的生活，这是非常具有历史意义的事情。对吗？我不想要它-我永远不会想把它扔掉。这是美国的一部分。但我认为我们犯了一个错误，就是忽略了一个事实，那就是长期的发展还很遥远。现在，我们需要解决低端人群所遭受的脱臼问题。不幸的是，在贸易和移民问题上，我们都倾向于成为模范[？]人民。我们倾向于向前看，并说，‘看，从长远来看，经济蛋糕会上升。你的孩子可能会很好。’管他呢。右（边），正确的。但那是20，30年后的事了。我们如何处理今天受到伤害的人？所以，我离你不远。我实际上要说的是，我们不能仅仅忽视短期影响。如此心甘情愿。我认为我们必须-我们必须考虑移民-如果我们要做这些事情，我们必须从更广泛的角度考虑移民政策。而更广泛的方式不仅仅是要接纳多少移民，要接纳哪些移民，而是如何对待现在正受到伤害的人。一旦我们解决了这个问题，那么在你的估计中又有多少呢？ 1:00:42 Russ Roberts: I think we have to deal with cultural issue, too. 1：00：42罗斯·罗伯茨：我认为我们也必须处理文化问题。 George Borjas: Yeah; all of that [?] book. I mean, the cultural issue--look at Europe right now. Right? The cultural issue is at the core of all this. And is something--we wanted workers; we got people, instead. And that's what encapsulates what's really at stake here. 乔治·博尔哈斯(George Borjas)：是的，所有这些[？]书。我的意思是，文化问题-看看现在的欧洲。对吗？文化问题是这一切的核心。而且是-我们想要工人；相反，我们有人。这就是这里真正危急关头的概括。 Russ Roberts: You have any thoughts on what we might do to--I mean, I would argue that Europe's problems are much worse than the United States's, because, for whatever reason--historical or policy-wise--workers here in the United States are much more likely to assimilate. Their children and grandchildren are, I think, as well. We can debate how fast that is relative to the past. I agree with you that it probably isn't the same. But we seem to be doing a better job--better than Europe is. Is that just good luck? Is it other things that we might do as a nation, though, to make that easier? 拉斯·罗伯茨：你对我们可能会做什么有什么想法-我的意思是，我认为欧洲的问题比美国的要糟糕得多，因为，无论出于什么原因-历史上或政策上的-美国的工人更有可能被同化。我想，他们的子孙也是。我们可以讨论相对于过去的速度有多快。我同意你的看法，这可能是不一样的。但我们似乎做得更好-比欧洲更好。那只是好运吗？然而，作为一个国家，我们还可以做其他事情来让这一切变得更容易吗？ George Borjas: Well, look, we've done a lot better job than Europe has in the past. And we did a lot better job than Europe did in the past by basically keeping our hands off the whole assimilation process. We let the process work. The government really--you know, we've had immigration policy, but unlike many European countries we've never had an assimilation policy. We've never penalized it. We've never--you know, apart from a special case like Germany and things like that, right, we've never really done--the government never really has been that much involved in the process of assimilating immigrants and their children. Right? And, the question becomes, in today's world: Is that hands-off approach something that's wise? Or should we begin to rethink that? And I actually don't have an answer for that. I don't really know what the correct approach is. 乔治·博尔哈斯：嗯，看，我们比欧洲过去做得更好。我们做得比欧洲过去做得好多了，基本上我们的手不在整个同化过程中。我们让这个过程运作。政府真的-你知道，我们有移民政策，但不像许多欧洲国家，我们从来没有同化政策。我们从来没有惩罚过它。我们从来没有-你知道，除了像德国这样的特殊情况和类似的事情，对吧，我们从来没有真正做过-政府从来没有真正参与过移民和他们的孩子的同化过程。对吗？而且，在当今世界，问题变成了：这种放手的方法是明智的吗？或者我们应该开始重新考虑这个问题？对此我实际上没有答案。我真的不知道正确的方法是什么。 Russ Roberts: But I think there are things the government does that reduces the incentive to assimilate? Right? They mandate certain things. 罗斯·罗伯茨：但我认为政府所做的一些事情降低了同化的动机？对吗？他们要求某些事情。 George Borjas: Oh, I agree. I think, I think, from the point of view of the country, assimilation is a great thing. I think taking actions and putting in policies that retard assimilation or that encourage ethnic identity to remain generation-after-generation is not a good thing in the long term. Okay? But, you know, I wish I had a magic wand to sort of pass by and return to--you know, one great example of this is that if you think--if you think of the [?] grandparents, and you think about the public school system in New York City back in 1900, 1910, 1920--you know, their goal was to make these immigrant kids Americans. Okay? 乔治·博尔哈斯：哦，我同意。我认为，从国家的角度来看，同化是一件伟大的事情。我认为，从长远来看，采取行动并实施延缓同化或鼓励一代又一代人保持种族认同的政策并不是一件好事。好吧?但是，你知道，我希望我有一根魔杖可以经过并返回-你知道，一个很好的例子是，如果你想-如果你想到[？]祖父母，你想想1900年，1910年，1920年纽约市的公立学校系统-你知道，他们的目标是让这些移民孩子成为美国人。好吧? Russ Roberts: Yeah. 罗伯茨：是的。 George Borjas: They learn the language and they were going to come out as American kids. Right? 乔治·博尔哈斯：他们学习这种语言，他们打算作为美国孩子出柜。对吗？ Russ Roberts: Yup. 罗斯·罗伯茨：是的。 George Borjas: You say that today in a school, and you get fired. And that's a problem. That's a problem we want to address. 乔治·博尔哈斯：你今天在学校里这么说，你就会被解雇。这是个问题。这是我们想要解决的问题。 Russ Roberts: And those kids desperately wanted to be American. 罗斯·罗伯茨：那些孩子非常想成为美国人。 George Borjas: Exactly. 乔治·博尔哈斯：没错。 Russ Roberts: They were eager to leave behind their customs and traditions. Often. 罗斯·罗伯茨：他们渴望离开他们的习俗和传统。常常。 George Borjas: Yup. 乔治·博尔哈斯：是的。 Russ Roberts: It's been a fascinating ride, when you think about the ethnic pride that we have now, and the negatives about that in terms of seeing us each separate versus part of the same thing-- 拉斯·罗伯茨：这是一次令人着迷的旅程，当你想到我们现在拥有的民族自豪感，以及在看到我们各自独立与部分相同的事物方面的负面影响时- George Borjas: I know[?]-- 乔治·博尔哈斯：我知道[？]- Russ Roberts: There's a tradeoff there that's unavoidable. 罗斯·罗伯茨：这里有一个不可避免的权衡。 George Borjas: Right. 乔治·博尔哈斯：对。 Russ Roberts: And certainly maybe we've reached a tipping point where people don't want to be "American". They want to be something American--whatever it is. 罗斯·罗伯茨：当然，也许我们已经到达了一个临界点，人们不想成为“美国人”。他们想成为美国人-不管是什么。 George Borjas: And I think if you are from[?] California, say if you are saying 'melting pot,' you've done, you've conducted a micro-aggression. 乔治·博尔哈斯：我想如果你来自[？]加州，如果你说的是“熔炉”，你已经做了，你已经进行了微观侵略。 Russ Roberts: Yeah, that's a fascinating--how that came to be, of course, is unknowable. It's an emergent phenomenon. But that's how I think you would--you would argue, I assume, that that's a reality we have to accept. 拉斯·罗伯茨：是的，这是一个令人着迷的-当然，这是如何形成的，是不可知的。这是一种突然出现的现象。但这就是我认为你会-你会争辩，我想，这是我们必须接受的现实。 George Borjas: That's right. 乔治·博尔哈斯：没错。 Russ Roberts: We can't change that easily. And we need to take that into account when we think about-- 罗斯·罗伯茨：我们不能那么容易改变。我们需要考虑到这一点，当我们考虑- George Borjas: And the important thing for policy is you really have to take that into account before you let in too many people, for example. Like Germany did. You know. It's not something you can ignore. George Borjas：对于政策来说，重要的一点是，在你让太多人进来之前，你真的必须考虑到这一点。就像德国那样。你知道。这不是你可以忽略的事情。