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Intro. [Recording date: July 18, 2018.]

介绍。[录制日期：2018年7月18日]

Russ Roberts: My guest is Alberto Alesina.... Our topic for today is a recent paper that you wrote with Armando Miano and Stefanie Stantcheva. And the title of the paper is "Immigration and Redistribution." And the paper looks at attitudes and knowledge that people have of immigrants, and then their attitudes toward redistribution generally. What was your goal in writing this paper?

罗斯·罗伯茨：我的客人是Alberto Alesina.。我们今天的主题是你最近和Armando Miano和Stefan ie Stantcheva一起写的一篇论文。论文的标题是“移民和再分配”本文着眼于人们对移民的态度和知识，以及他们对再分配的总体态度。你写这篇论文的目的是什么？

Alberto Alesina: Well, this paper is part of a broad research project that I've been following the last several years about, given the growth of inequality in some places, what are the preference for people about the distribution? What leads them to be in favor or against redistribution? And one main theme in my research but also in that of others is that the generosity, both private generosity, say, the nation or public general, that they see it via the welfare state, travels[?] much better amongst people who are similar, of the same race, the same religion, the same culture. But it doesn't travel as well across ethnic groups, race, and so on. So, we thought that, the burst of immigration, that is, meaning in the United States and Europe, particularly in Europe in terms of burst, but also the big discussion about immigration, we thought that putting together [?] the distribution and diversity with immigration sounded interesting.

Alberto Alesina：嗯，这篇论文是我过去几年一直关注的一个广泛研究项目的一部分，考虑到一些地方不平等的增长，人们对分布的偏好是什么？是什么导致他们赞成或反对再分配？我的研究以及其他研究的一个主要主题是，慷慨，无论是私人的慷慨，比如说国家或公共的一般，他们通过福利国家看到的慷慨，旅行[？]在相似的，相同的种族，相同的宗教，相同的文化中更好。但它不会在种族、种族等不同种族之间传播。所以我们认为，移民的激增，就是意味着在美国和欧洲，特别是在欧洲的爆发方面，也是关于移民的大讨论，我们认为把[？]移民的分布和多样性听起来很有趣。

Russ Roberts: Yeah; well it's an extremely interesting paper. And I learned a great deal that I was--mostly depressed to learn about. But, we'll see. There may be some cheerier things later on in our conversation. But, the basic idea--talk about the data set. You are looking across--how many countries, is it?

罗伯茨：是的，这是一篇非常有趣的论文。我学到了很多我曾经-大部分都是沮丧的学习。但是，我们走着瞧。稍后在我们的谈话中可能会有一些令人愉快的事情。但是，基本的想法-谈论数据集。你在看-有多少个国家，是吗？

Alberto Alesina: Six countries: The United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, France, and Germany. We picked these six countries because, well, first of all, they are important countries, of course. The U.S. is the U.S. And the European countries are countries that have been particularly at the center of the debate about the immigration. Sweden, for example, has had a very large flow of immigrants, and there's a very large share of immigrants in their population. So, we thought that was a good group of countries, and go beyond 6 was getting a bit expensive, because these surveys are a bit expensive to make.

Alberto Alesina：六个国家：美国，英国，瑞典，意大利，法国和德国。我们选择这六个国家是因为，嗯，首先，他们当然是重要的国家。美国是美国，欧洲国家是关于移民的争论的中心国家。例如，瑞典有非常大的移民流动，而且移民在他们的人口中占很大比例。所以，我们认为这是一组很好的国家，超过6个国家会变得有点昂贵，因为这些调查的成本有点高。

Russ Roberts: And you surveyed a fairly large number of people in each country. Thousands, right? About 4000 in each country?

罗斯·罗伯茨：你在每个国家调查了相当多的人。成千上万，对吧？每个国家大约4000？

Alberto Alesina: Yes. It's about 23,000 total. The number of countries--it is roughly equal across countries. There are actually slightly less in Sweden: for [?] one, Sweden was actually much more expensive for some reason, and Swedish people replied in a way which was so consistent we [?] with so little variance within them that we felt somehow we could stop the survey after--

Alberto Alesina：是的。总共大约23，000个。国家的数量-国家之间的数量大致相等。实际上在瑞典略有减少：为[？]第一，由于某种原因，瑞典实际上要贵得多，瑞典人的回复方式是如此一致，我们[？]由于它们之间的差异如此之小，以至于我们觉得我们可以在-之后停止调查-

Russ Roberts: 5 or 10 people--

拉斯·罗伯茨：5或10个人-

Alberto Alesina: a couple of thousand. Five or ten, yeah.

Alberto Alesina：两千人。五个或十个，是的。

Russ Roberts: Well, it's a smaller country, too, than some of the others.

鲁斯·罗伯茨：嗯，它也是一个比其他一些国家小的国家。

Alberto Alesina: It's a smaller country.

Alberto Alesina：这是一个较小的国家。

Russ Roberts: So, you surveyed six, in 6 countries. And, the first thing you look at is attitudes towards immigration. And these are all surveys of native-born people in each country.

Russ Roberts：那么，你调查了6个国家的6个。而且，你看到的第一件事是对移民的态度。这些都是对每个国家土生土长的人的调查。

Alberto Alesina: Yes. All native-born. The first question is: Are you native-born? If you are not, you cannot take the survey.

Alberto Alesina：是的。都是土生土长的。第一个问题是：你是土生土长的吗？如果你不是，你就不能参加调查。

Russ Roberts: And you are looking at native-born, and we start with attitudes towards immigrants--excuse me, not attitudes. Just simple knowledge about the characteristics of immigrants. And, to me--this is a huge, important point, although not as huge as I thought it was going in--you are only and very carefully and very explicitly talking about legal--legal immigrants.

Russ Roberts：你看到的是土生土长的人，我们从对待移民的态度开始-对不起，不是态度。只是对移民特征的简单了解。而且，对我来说-这是一个巨大的，重要的一点，尽管不像我想象的那么重要-你只是非常谨慎，非常明确地谈论合法的-合法的移民。

Alberto Alesina: Yes. We wanted to focus on the legal immigrant, because--not because illegal immigrants are not important, but because we wanted to focus on taking away from our consideration issues having to do with illegal immigrant, that committing a crime by being in the country and therefore--we wanted to consider people who are legal but who are not your countrymen.

Alberto Alesina：是的。我们想把重点放在合法移民上，因为-不是因为非法移民不重要，而是因为我们想把我们考虑的问题从与非法移民有关的问题中解脱出来，即在这个国家犯罪，因此-我们想考虑那些合法但不是你的同胞的人。

Russ Roberts: And a definition of an immigrant, a legal immigrant, is someone who is there legally who--?

拉斯·罗伯茨：还有移民的定义，合法移民，在那里合法的人是谁-？

Alberto Alesina: Who is not born in the country of the respondent. Which, by the way, is the official definition of immigrant by the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development].

Alberto Alesina：谁不是在被告方的国家出生的？顺便说一下，这是经合组织(经济合作与发展组织)对移民的官方定义。

6:05
Russ Roberts: Right. So that's how I would have defined it. So that's all good. The underlying question, of course--and we will maybe touch on this in the conversation--is: People may be told--and you tell them more than once that you're talking about legal immigrants. But, their attitudes and assessments may be colored by their lumping illegals and legals together. Obviously. It's one challenge. However, what I was surprised to discover was how small the estimates are of illegal immigration--relative to not illegal immigration--the proportion of the native population, of the country's population, that is legal versus illegal. So, talk about those numbers, because they are quite small in your--but even in the United States they are smaller than I would have thought.

6：05 Russ Roberts：好的。所以这就是我对它的定义。所以一切都很好。当然，潜在的问题-我们可能会在谈话中涉及到这一点-是：人们可能会被告知-你不止一次地告诉他们，你正在谈论的是合法移民。但是，他们的态度和评估可能会被他们把非法移民和合法移民混为一谈。很明显。这是一个挑战。然而，我惊讶地发现，非法移民的估计是如此之小-相对于非法移民-本地人口的比例，国家人口的比例，这是合法与非法的对比。所以，谈论这些数字，因为它们在你的国家是非常小的-但即使在美国，它们也比我想象的要小。

Alberto Alesina: Well, in the United States, I wouldn't say that they had a [?] more--

Alberto Alesina：嗯，在美国，我不会说他们有一个[？]更多

Russ Roberts: They're smaller than I might have thought. That's all.

罗斯·罗伯茨：它们比我想象的要小。就这样。

Alberto Alesina: Well, I don't know what you thought. But the number of legal immigrants is about 10%; and the number of illegal immigrants is about 3, 3.5%. I wouldn't say that's small. I am actually surprised by how big it was. But maybe we have different priors.

Alberto Alesina：嗯，我不知道你怎么想的。但是合法移民的数量约为10%，而非法移民的数量约为3，3.5%。我不会说那很小。事实上，我对它的大小感到惊讶。但也许我们有不同的前科。

Russ Roberts: Yeah.

罗伯茨：是的。

Alberto Alesina: For the other countries--I don't remember the actual number and I can't find them quickly. But they are not--they are very small. So they are really not something that--

Alberto Alesina：对于其他国家-我不记得实际的数字，而且我不能很快找到它们。但它们不是-它们非常小。所以他们真的不是-

Russ Roberts: Well, my memory from the paper is that in Europe, it's under 1%. In the 5 countries.

罗斯·罗伯茨：嗯，我在报纸上的记忆是，在欧洲，它不到1%。在这5个国家。

Alberto Alesina: Yeah. Under 1%. But, although there is a more subtle problem: That, there are, the number is very small, but sometimes there may legally be those that people see in the most upsetting ways. Say, they are sleeping in the park, in the middle of the city. And a mother going there with their children, they see an immigrant, who is most likely legal, that is sleeping in the garden where she usually walks with her children, and she starts thinking that, you know, there are 10,000, I mean 10% of people are illegal immigrants. That is not true; but again, maybe the legal immigrant, especially visible or a train station in Europe, is the typical example. And these people may be particularly visible and particularly affecting people's perceptions. But, the best--not much we can do other than emphasizing very often in the question that we are talking about, legal.

Alberto Alesina：是的。低于1%。但是，虽然还有一个更微妙的问题：有，数量很少，但有时在法律上可能会有那些人们看到最令人不安的方式。比如说，他们睡在城市中心的公园里。一位母亲带着孩子去那里，他们看到一个移民，很可能是合法的，睡在她通常和孩子们散步的花园里，她开始想，你知道，有1万人，我的意思是10%的人是非法移民。这不是真的；但再一次，也许合法移民，特别是在欧洲可见的或火车站，就是典型的例子。这些人可能特别明显，特别影响人们的感知。但是，最好的-除了经常在我们谈论的问题中强调法律之外，我们能做的并不多。

Russ Roberts: Yeah. I think the fancy political science word or psychology word is "salience." So, an illegal population could be more salient--more at the front of people's minds; more people want to be more aware. The other advantage, of course, legal, is that you can measure--that we know things about them, at least we think we do, in terms of government data. So, we have some say of at least assessing the accuracy of people's perceptions--

罗伯茨：是的。我认为奇特的政治学词汇或心理学词汇是“显着性”。因此，非法人口可能更加突出-更多地在人们思想的前面；更多的人想要更多地意识到这一点。其他的优势，当然，合法的，是你可以测量-我们知道关于他们的事情，至少我们认为我们知道，就政府数据而言。所以，我们至少可以评估人们感知的准确性-

Alberto Alesina: Actually, not. I mean, to be honest, I was surprised--it was surprising to me: Often when you have--well, of course, you have data on numbers and some[?]. But when you have data about their income and education and what they do and whatever, those are--they are not administrative[?] data; they are survey data taken on immigrant. And sometimes those surveys, they don't quite distinguish between legal and illegal. So, it's actually harder than you think to get the data that we use in the paper distinguishing carefully between legal and illegal, because some sources are not very clear on what they do. So, I think one of the sort of minor, or for some research not so minor, part of the paper is tied, probably had the best data, at least for this country, that distinguish information about illegal versus legal.

Alberto Alesina：实际上，不是。我的意思是，老实说，我很惊讶-这让我很惊讶：通常当你有-当然，你有关于数字和一些[？]的数据。但是当你有关于他们的收入和教育以及他们做什么的数据时，这些都是-他们不是行政[？]数据；他们是对移民采取的调查数据。有时候这些调查并不能很好地区分合法和非法。所以，要获得我们在论文中仔细区分合法和非法的数据比你想象的要难得多，因为有些来源并不是很清楚他们做了些什么。所以，我认为其中一个次要的，或者对于一些不那么次要的研究来说，论文的一部分是捆绑的，可能有最好的数据，至少对这个国家来说，区分关于非法和合法的信息。

10:09
Russ Roberts: Well, I guess the other question is, is that even, in my looking very crudely at various data on income and wages, I've often found it somewhat uneven. The sources that are more reliable don't necessarily make a distinction between legal and illegal. And, as you point out, some of the surveys are just--their overall quality might not be as high as some of the data we might use on, say, the unemployment rate or that are at the national level.

10：09 Russ Roberts：嗯，我想另一个问题是，即使在我非常粗略地查看各种收入和工资数据时，我也经常发现它有点不平衡。更可靠的来源并不一定区分合法和非法。而且，正如你所指出的，有些调查只是-它们的整体质量可能没有我们可能使用的一些数据高，比如失业率，或者是国家层面的数据。

Alberto Alesina: Of course.

Alberto Alesina：当然。

Russ Roberts: So, it came up in passing--I asked listeners to think about what you think the proportion of, say, the U.S. population is--about three quarters of our listeners to EconTalk are in the United States, at least, according to our crude survey at the end of the year. The rest of them are scattered in 64 or so, 65, 66 different countries. And it's interesting to think about what you as the listener would think is the population that is foreign born in your country. In the United States, Alberto, as you just said, it's about 10%. I wonder how well our listeners would have done on that. What's the range in the 6 countries, for foreign born?

Russ Roberts：所以，它是顺带提出来的-我让听众想想你认为美国人口的比例是多少-根据我们在年底的粗略调查，我们的EconTalk大约四分之三的听众在美国，至少根据我们在年底的粗略调查。其余的人分散在64个左右，65，66个不同的国家。有趣的是，想想你作为听众会认为是外国出生在你的国家的人口。在美国，阿尔贝托，就像你刚才说的，大约是百分之十。我想知道我们的听众在这方面会做得有多好。在这6个国家中，外国出生的范围是多少？

Alberto Alesina: By the way, before I answer your question, I must say, when I was writing this paper, oftentime when I was going out for dinner often with colleagues or friends, but we're all alike--kind of highly--

Alberto Alesina：顺便说一下，在回答你的问题之前，我必须说，当我写这篇论文的时候，我经常和同事或朋友出去吃饭，但我们都很相似-有点高度-

Russ Roberts: educated. Yeah.

罗斯·罗伯茨：受过教育。嗯。

Alberto Alesina: educated. And I asked them your question, and every single one overestimated the number of immigrants. Not as much as the average in our sample. But, the range of answers that I was getting was about 15% rather than 10%. Anyway, going back to your question, there is, of course, a variance in answers, which we report in some online appendix of the paper. But the median--the distribution of the answer is not enormous, and the median and the average is actually around 30%, as we report in the paper. So, there are people who have crazy answers. By the way, we do all of our work excluding answers which are clearly crazy--like, you know, 100%, or zero. And we also exclude analysis people that have taken too little time in filling out the survey, because we can follow how much time they do: so people that take an unreasonable small amount of time, we exclude their answers, even though at the end of the day it doesn't make any difference. So, a large fraction of the respondents give an answer between 25 and 35, and the average answer is about 30.

Alberto Alesina：受过教育。我问了他们你的问题，每个人都高估了移民的数量。没有我们样本中的平均值多。但是，我得到的答案范围大约是15%，而不是10%。无论如何，回到你的问题，当然，答案是不同的，我们在论文的一些在线附录中报道了这一点。但是中位数-答案的分布不是很大，中位数和平均数实际上大约是30%，正如我们在论文中所报道的。所以，有些人有疯狂的答案。顺便说一句，我们做的所有工作都不包括那些明显疯狂的答案-比如，你知道，100%，或者是零。而且我们也排除了那些在填写调查中花费的时间太少的分析人员，因为我们可以跟踪他们花了多少时间：所以那些花费了不合理的少量时间的人，我们排除了他们的答案，即使在一天结束的时候，这并没有任何区别。因此，很大一部分受访者的答案在25到35之间，平均答案约为30。

Russ Roberts: That's for the United States or across all 6 countries?

罗斯·罗伯茨：这是为美国还是在所有6个国家？

Alberto Alesina: That's for the United States. For the other countries--France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom--they mistake along the same order of magnitude. The number of immigrants in the other country is not that far from that of the United States--a little higher, a little lower. And people respond in the same order of magnitude like the United States. The only country that is actually more accurate are the Swedes, who have more immigrants, but they are actually more accurate. Because there, the number of immigrants in Sweden is close to 18%, and their average answer is around 27.

Alberto Alesina：这是为了美国。对于其他国家-法国、德国、意大利和英国-他们犯了同样大的错误。另一个国家的移民人数与美国的不远-稍高一点，稍低一点。和美国一样，人们的反应也是以同样的数量级来进行的。唯一一个更准确的国家是瑞典人，他们有更多的移民，但他们实际上更准确。因为在那里，瑞典的移民数量接近18%，他们的平均答案大约是27。

Russ Roberts: And that's not close; but it's not as way off as--

罗斯·罗伯茨：这不是很接近，但也没有那么远-

Alberto Alesina: It's not close, but it's about half of the mistake of the other countries. To be honest, when we started this survey, this project, then we asked the question, we were pretty sure that it would have been overestimated because of the salience of the immigration, because everybody today is reading about immigration, and all of that. We were quite shocked by the size of the misperception, I must say.

Alberto Alesina：这不是很接近，但这大约是其他国家错误的一半。老实说，当我们开始这个调查，这个项目，然后我们提出这个问题时，我们非常肯定它会被高估，因为移民的重要性，因为今天每个人都在阅读关于移民的文章，所有这些。我必须说，我们对这种误解的规模感到非常震惊。

Russ Roberts: Of course, you didn't--you were looking at immigration. I've done many surveys of--one of my favorite statistics: the proportion of the American workforce that earns the minimum wage or less. I've done it with lawyers; I've done it with law professors; I've done it with first-rate journalists. And, the median answer in those groups has always been about 20%. Actually, at the time I was doing those surveys, it was about 2. So it was off by an order of magnitude, an extraordinary misreading. So, it could be that on numerous--it has nothing to do with salience; it's just that people are very uninformed about a wide range of economic data, about the economy as a whole. But, what I thought was one of the more important things you find, of course, is that: that mis-estimate, that overestimate, across countries is not that different by various other characteristics of the respondents. By the various characteristics of the respondents. Correct?

罗斯·罗伯茨：当然，你没有-你在看移民。我做了很多调查-我最喜欢的统计数据之一：美国劳动力中赚取最低工资或更低工资的比例。我和律师一起做过；我和法学教授做过；我和一流的记者一起做过。而且，在这些群体中，答案的中位数一直都在20%左右。实际上，在我做这些调查的时候，大约是2。所以它偏离了一个数量级，一个不寻常的误读。所以，它可能在很多方面-它与显著性无关；只是人们对范围广泛的经济数据，对整个经济非常不了解。但是，我认为你发现的更重要的事情之一，当然是：错误估计，高估，在不同的国家之间，被调查者的各种其他特征并没有太大的不同。被调查者的各种特征。对，是这样?

Alberto Alesina: That is quite correct. And it was actually more surprising than we thought. The only characteristics that distinguishes people in terms of what they expect about the number of immigrants--not so much the characteristics of immigrants; we'll get to it perhaps later--but on the size or the number of immigrants, not very much makes a difference in terms of the characteristics of the respondents. Neither in the United States nor in other countries. The only thing that seemed to matter--which, I find it actually interesting--is whether the respondent works in a sector which has over-representation of immigrants. And we defined that looking at the statistic of how many immigrants work in different sectors. We come out with a list of sectors that are high or low in terms of immigrants working in that sector. And, native respondents who work in sectors with more immigrants, they tend to overestimate more than their fellow natives about the number of immigrants. And other than that, no other characteristic mattered.

Alberto Alesina：这是非常正确的。它实际上比我们想象的更令人惊讶。区别人们的唯一特征就是他们对移民数量的预期-并不是移民的特征；我们也许稍后会讲到-但在移民的规模或数量上，受访者的特征并没有太大的区别。既不在美国也不在其他国家。唯一看似重要的事情-我发现这实际上很有趣-是被调查者是否在一个移民人数过多的部门工作。我们定义了看有多少移民在不同部门工作的统计数据。我们列出了在该部门工作的移民人数高低的部门列表。而且，在移民较多的部门工作的本地受访者，他们往往会高估移民的数量，而不是他们的同胞。除此之外，其他特征都不重要。

Russ Roberts: And the other characteristics you have are income; you have--

罗斯·罗伯茨：你的其他特征是收入；你有-

Alberto Alesina: income, gender, education, and, in the United States where we had more data and more information, where the respondent lived. But these characteristics--income, gender, education--whether they know an immigrant or not, incidentally, we ask--matter for other answers but not for the number of immigrants.

Alberto Alesina：收入，性别，教育，在我们有更多数据和信息的美国，受访者居住的地方。但是这些特征-收入，性别，教育-不管他们是否认识移民，顺便说一句，我们要问的是-其他问题的答案，而不是移民的数量。

Russ Roberts: Which again is somewhat--it's not that surprising that people are making some crude estimate. It's not a number that's at people's fingertips. It's just interesting that they systematic--that they overestimate it rather than just be wildly inaccurate, which can of course be the other possibility.

Russ Roberts：这也是有点-人们做出一些粗略的估计并不令人惊讶。这不是一个人们指尖就能得到的数字。有趣的是，他们系统化了-他们高估了它，而不是非常不准确，当然这可能是另一种可能性。

18:05
Russ Roberts: Did you have party or ideological identification?

18：05罗斯·罗伯茨：你有没有政党或意识形态的认同？

Alberto Alesina: Yes, yes, yes. I was about to mention that. Part of the ideology--on this point we ask two types of questions. In this paper, we used only one answer; but we are planning to write, continue to work and write, use the other part of the question. One question was simply whether you classify yourself as right-wing or left-wing; and we used the appropriate word for the appropriate country. So, in the United States, liberal and conservative; in other countries we used the appropriate word in the language which is common for that country. But then we also asked them which party you vote for in the latest election; and we didn't use those answers yet. We may do it in another paper, because some really striking result about [?] voters and voters for populist parties in Europe; but we may get to that later. Not later in this interview because I haven't written the paper yet; but later in my career.

Alberto Alesina：是的，是的。我正要说这个。意识形态的一部分-关于这一点，我们提出两种类型的问题。在本文中，我们只使用了一个答案；但我们正在计划写，继续工作和写，使用问题的另一部分。一个简单的问题是，你是把自己归类为右翼还是左翼；我们使用了适当的词来表示适当的国家。因此，在美国，自由和保守；在其他国家，我们在语言中使用了适当的词语，这在该国是很常见的。但我们也问他们，在最近的选举中，你投给了哪个政党；我们还没有使用这些答案。我们可以在另一篇论文中做这件事，因为关于[？]的一些非常惊人的结果。选民和欧洲民粹主义政党的选民；但我们可能稍后会谈到这一点。不是在这次面试的后期，因为我还没有写论文；而是在我职业生涯的后期。

Russ Roberts: Or next interview.

罗斯·罗伯茨：或者下次采访。

Alberto Alesina: The left-wing makes--the left/right makes a lot of difference in just about everything except on the misperception of the number of the immigrants. Both right-wing and left-wing responders misperceive about the same level the number of the immigrants. They misperceive other things. The right-wing thinks that the immigrants are poorer, more reliant on welfare, less educated, lazier than the left-winger. And they have a bigger misperception--in fact, everybody has, but for the right-wing it's bigger--of where the immigrant comes from. Namely, there is another general misperception is that, in all countries, natives think the immigrant comes from problematic countries or problematic religion. For example, they vastly overestimate the number of Muslim immigrants; and they vastly underestimate the number of Christian immigrants.

Alberto Alesina：左翼-左翼/右翼几乎在所有方面都有很大的不同，除了对移民数量的误解。右翼和左翼的应答者对移民数量的理解都是错误的。他们误解了其他事情。右翼人士认为移民比左翼人士更穷，更依赖福利，受教育程度更低，更懒惰。他们有一个更大的误解-事实上，每个人都有，但对于右翼来说，误解更大-关于移民来自哪里。也就是说，另一个普遍的误解是，在所有国家，当地人认为移民来自有问题的国家或有问题的宗教。例如，他们极大地高估了穆斯林移民的数量；他们极大地低估了基督教移民的数量。

Russ Roberts: And that's true in all countries, according to, you are saying, across--before you correct for left/right, they over overestimate the Muslim population, underestimate the Christian--

Russ Roberts：这在所有国家都是真的，根据你所说的-在你纠正左/右之前，他们高估了穆斯林人口，低估了基督徒-

Alberto Alesina: Right. So, everybody in every country overestimates the number of, say, Muslims and underestimate the number of Christians, with the exception of France. They don't overestimate the number of Muslims; and in fact, there are lots of Muslim immigrants in France. In the other countries, they all overestimate the number of Muslims and underestimate the number of Christians. But, the right-winger, they overestimate more than the left-winger--

Alberto Alesina：对。所以，每个国家的每个人都高估了穆斯林的数量，而低估了基督徒的数量，除了法国。他们没有高估穆斯林的数量；事实上，法国有很多穆斯林移民。在其他国家，他们都高估了穆斯林的数量，低估了基督徒的数量。但是，右翼，他们高估了比左翼-

Russ Roberts: Got it. Correct.

罗斯·罗伯茨：知道了。对，是这样。

21:15
Russ Roberts: So, that's the next question. Is there anything else to add about--so people systematically, across ideology and across other characteristics overestimate the proportion of their fellow country-people that are immigrants. Let's talk then about other characteristics. You mention a left/right; but how accurate do people generally do on income, sources of countries for immigration? Are they accurate at all or do they overestimate systematically?

21：15 Russ Roberts：那么，这就是下一个问题。还有什么要补充的吗-所以人们系统地，跨越意识形态和其他特征，高估了他们的同胞国家-移民的比例。那就让我们谈谈其他特征吧。你提到了一个左/右；但是人们通常在收入，移民国家的来源上做得有多准确？他们到底是准确还是系统地高估了？

Alberto Alesina: They tend to overestimate the origin of immigrants. I gave you the example of Islam and Christian, but there are also overestimation about North Africa and Latin America--of course, that changes depending on, if you are in the United States, of course, the key issue is Latin America; and if you are in Europe, it's North Africa. So, when you talk about regions, it becomes a bit more complicated. But, the general point is that, in every country, people tend to overestimate the immigrants that are salient and problematic for that country. As opposed to, say, immigrants from Western Europe or more similar countries to the natives.

Alberto Alesina：他们倾向于高估移民的起源。我给你举了伊斯兰教和基督教的例子，但也有对北非和拉丁美洲的高估-当然，这取决于，如果你在美国，当然，关键问题是拉丁美洲；如果你在欧洲，那就是北非。所以，当你谈到区域的时候，事情就变得有点复杂了。但是，一般的观点是，在每个国家，人们倾向于高估移民，这些移民对那个国家来说是突出的和有问题的。与之相反的是，比如说，来自西欧或更多类似国家的移民。

Russ Roberts: This is similar--by the way, I just want to mention this because I want to make clear what we're talking about. When NAFTA was passed in the United States--NAFTA of course stands for the North American Free Trade Agreement--all of the controversy was about Mexico. There are three countries: the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Canada was just not on the table as a worry, either because it isn't a worry--whatever that means--or because people are more likely to be worried about people who are "more different" than they are--however you might define that. And, to be honest--I'm going to reveal some of my biases or priors right now--I do think people demonize or scare people about, you know, people who are different from them--who don't have the same skin color, don't have the same religion. And, I think the news media, going back to my recent monologue on the topic, is prone to exaggerate and intensify the feelings people have about the other--people who are not like us, in whatever dimensions people are particularly worried about. And people, I think, like to read and watch and consume information that often increases their paranoia or xenophobia or anxiety, and for whatever reason don't seem so interested in being comforted by information that's more accurate, sometimes, about the situation.

Russ Roberts：这是类似的-顺便说一句，我只是想提到这一点，因为我想弄清楚我们在讨论什么。当NAFTA在美国通过时-NAFTA当然是北美自由贸易协定的缩写-所有的争议都是关于墨西哥的。有三个国家：美国，墨西哥和加拿大。加拿大只是没有作为一个担忧出现在桌面上，要么是因为它不是一个担忧-不管这意味着什么-或者是因为人们更有可能担心那些比他们“更不同”的人-无论你如何定义这一点。而且，老实说-我现在要揭示我的一些偏见或前科-我确实认为人们妖魔化或吓唬人们，你知道，那些与他们不同的人-他们的肤色不一样，宗教信仰也不一样。而且，我认为新闻媒体，回到我最近关于这个话题的独白，很容易夸大和强化人们对另一个人的感觉-那些和我们不一样的人，不管人们特别担心什么。我认为，人们喜欢阅读、观看和消费经常会增加他们的偏执、仇外心理或焦虑的信息，无论出于什么原因，他们似乎对更准确的信息不感兴趣，有时，关于情况的信息。

Alberto Alesina: I couldn't agree more. You said it wonderfully. I wish I could have said it as well, when I write; but that's exactly--I completely agree. And, of course, the paper that we are talking about does not have any concrete evidence of what you just said, but I would say it is a perfectly--in my view, the right explanation for this misperception and so on.

Alberto Alesina：我非常同意。你说得很好。我希望我在写作的时候也能这么说，但那正是-我完全同意。当然，我们现在谈论的论文并没有任何具体的证据来证明你刚才所说的，但我会说它是一个完美的-在我看来，对这种误解的正确解释等等。

24:46
Russ Roberts: So, let's talk about a few other variables and then we'll get into some of the redistribution issues. You mention, for example, that conservatives in America are more likely to see immigrants as lazy; and liberals are more likely to see them as hard-working. How do you get at that difference? Is it a scale variable? Do you have--when you ask people?

24：46 Russ Roberts：那么，让我们谈谈其他一些变量，然后我们将讨论一些重新分配的问题。例如，你提到，美国的保守派更有可能将移民视为懒惰；而自由派则更有可能将他们视为勤奋工作的人。你是如何获得这种差异的？它是一个比例变量吗？你有没有-当你问别人的时候？

Alberto Alesina: No. Well, this is actually--the issue of--let me open a slight, but I think this is important. The issue of laziness or not laziness is something that more broadly in my earlier research, some of it with Stefanie as well, some of it is that attitude toward redistribution, both comparing in the United States and Europe but comparing people within each country, has to do with whether people that, the poor are worthy of their[?] or not. So, if you think are poor but they are lazy, everything else the same, you are less favorable to the redistribution. If you think that the poor are unfortunate, then you are more favorable to redistribution. It turns out that there are a ton of papers that confer that these are very, very important determinants of people's preference and willing to redistribute. So, in general, so that's a fact, that we knew even [?] in this paper. So, the way these attitudes are pursued is, in general, to ask a question which is a variant of a question that is in the World Values Survey, which is a worldwide, respected survey about attitudes and about aid to countries. And the question is--I don't remember the exact wording, but it's pretty close to saying, 'Do you think that the poor are poor because of lack of effort in their work, or because they are unfortunate?' Just to give you a number, in the United States something like 70% of respondents say that the poor are poor because of lack of effort; and in Europe, that number is 30%. So, this was an important--it is an important determinant of preference for redistribution. So, in evaluating in this paper to discuss the preference for redistribution versus immigration, one issue is to say, 'Do natives believe that immigrants are lazy?' So, we asked the question, 'Do you think that immigrants are poor because they are lazy?' And the vast majority of respondents responded that the immigrants are poor because they are lazy. But then we did something which is, we thought that was actually interesting: that namely, then we ask another question along the same line, which is, we said, 'Do you think immigrants are poorer than natives because they are lazier than natives?' And, to some surprise, in all countries there is a good portion that people did not think that immigrants were that much lazier than--

Alberto Alesina：没有。那么这实际上是-这个问题-让我稍微打开一下，但是我认为这很重要。懒惰或不懒惰的问题在我早期的研究中是更广泛的问题，其中一些是关于燕姿的，其中一些是对再分配的态度，无论是在美国和欧洲比较，还是比较每个国家的人，都与穷人是否值得他们的[？]或者不去。所以，如果你认为他们很穷，但他们很懒，其他一切都一样，你对再分配就不那么有利了。如果你认为穷人是不幸的，那么你更倾向于重新分配。事实证明，有大量的论文认为，这些是人们偏好和愿意重新分配的非常重要的决定因素。所以，总的来说，这是一个事实，我们甚至知道[？]在这篇论文里。所以，追求这些态度的方式，通常是问一个问题，这个问题是世界价值观调查中的一个问题的变体，世界价值观调查是一个世界范围内的，受人尊敬的关于态度和对国家的援助的调查。问题是-我不记得确切的措辞了，但它非常接近于说，‘你认为穷人之所以贫穷是因为他们在工作中缺乏努力，还是因为他们很不幸？’只是给你一个数字，在美国大约有70%的受访者说穷人是因为缺乏努力而变得贫穷；而在欧洲，这个数字是30%。因此，这是一个重要的-它是一个重要的决定因素，对重新分配的偏好。因此，在评估本文讨论重新分配与移民之间的偏好时，一个问题是，“当地人认为移民是懒惰的吗？”所以，我们问了这个问题，‘你认为移民穷是因为他们懒惰吗？’绝大多数受访者回答说，移民之所以贫穷，是因为他们懒惰。但后来我们做了一件事，我们认为这实际上很有趣：也就是说，然后我们问另一个同样的问题，那就是，我们说，‘你认为移民比当地人穷，因为他们比当地人懒惰吗？’而且，令人惊讶的是，在所有国家中，有很大一部分人并不认为移民比-懒惰得多-

Russ Roberts: native-born[?]--

拉斯·罗伯茨：土生土长的[？]-

Alberto Alesina: A little bit--they were a little bit. But, not that much lazier than natives. So, the natives think that the immigrants aren't lazy, but, you know, not much more than the lazy poor. So, in other words, in Sweden, they think that poorer people are not lazy, neither the natives nor the immigrant, even though the immigrant a bit more than the natives. And in the United States, lots of people think that the poor are lazy, and the immigrant a little more than the natives, but not much more.

Alberto Alesina：有一点-他们有一点。但是，并不比当地人懒惰多少。所以，当地人认为移民并不懒惰，但是，你知道，并不比懒惰的穷人多少。所以，换句话说，在瑞典，他们认为穷人不是懒惰的，既不是本地人也不是移民，即使移民比本地人多一点。在美国，很多人认为穷人是懒惰的，移民比本地人多一点，但也不会多很多。

29:02
Russ Roberts: So, I'm going to make a little confession here; this is a digression. When I was younger, I felt that, you know, the America economy was so great, that anyone can find a job here--which still might be true in some dimension. But, it's also the case, since I've gotten older, I've gotten much more sympathetic to the straits and challenges facing people who grow up in situations very different from my own. And so I'm much more open-minded and agnostic about the question of why certain people struggle to make a living, say. There's all kinds of stuff going on. There's family background; there's genetics; there's bad luck; there's the current state of the economy--could be in recession. There's our horrible education system that predictably punishes--it's not horrible for everybody; it's particularly bad though for people in America who are growing up in very poor neighborhoods. Hard to disentangle that from family issues and culture, but it's still, I think, a problem. So, I'm much more agnostic about the question. Having said that, about whose "fault" it is why people are poor. And I'm much more sympathetic to the challenges of life. But, having said that, it's kind of interesting to think about that distinction you mentioned between the United States and Europe--that 70% of Americans blame the poor for their own poverty. And, in Europe it's basically reversed. What did you say? What did you say, 20% or--

29：02 Russ Roberts：所以，我要在这里做一个小小的忏悔；这是一个离题。当我年轻的时候，我觉得，你知道，美国经济如此之好，以至于任何人都可以在这里找到一份工作-这在某种程度上可能仍然是正确的。但是，情况也是如此，自从我长大后，我对那些在与我自己完全不同的环境中长大的人所面临的困境和挑战更加同情。因此，对于为什么某些人要努力谋生这个问题，我的思想更加开放，也更加不可知。有各种各样的事情在发生。有家庭背景；有遗传；有厄运；有目前的经济状况-可能处于衰退之中。我们可怕的教育系统是可以预见的惩罚-它并不是对每个人都很可怕；但对那些在非常贫困的社区长大的美国人来说尤其糟糕。很难将其从家庭问题和文化中解脱出来，但我认为这仍然是一个问题。所以，我对这个问题更加不可知。话虽如此，关于谁的“过错”，人们之所以贫穷。我对生活中的挑战更有同情心。但是，话虽如此，想想你提到的美国和欧洲之间的区别-70%的美国人把自己的贫困归咎于穷人，这是一种有趣的想法。而且，在欧洲，情况基本上是相反的。您说什么？你说什么，20%还是.

Alberto Alesina: Yeah. Basically, it's close to being reversed. These are slightly, you know, 4- or 5-year old data, but I don't think they've changed that much in 5 years.

Alberto Alesina：是的。基本上，它几乎被颠倒了。这些是稍微，你知道，4或5年前的数据，但我不认为他们在5年内改变了那么多。

Russ Roberts: No. So, what strikes me about that--it's a digression from our conversation, but I think it's interesting--of course, I suspect it's the case that it's easier for a poorer person in America to find work than it is in Europe. I think the American economy still is more dynamic than the European economy, especially for younger people struggling to get into the labor force, make the investments. And, of course, the welfare state in Europe is more generous--in Europe than it is in the United States--overall, at least across the board. And for certain groups, maybe, you know, one of which I'll turn to[?] is a little different. But, in general, across the board, for, say, working-age men, I think Europe is more generous. And so, it's--can you blame someone for taking a welfare payment that's more generous? So, it's reasonable that Europeans and Americans would differ. That doesn't necessarily get at the true, underlying perception they have of their situation versus, say, poor people. Now, I do agree--I think it's hard for successful people to empathize with people who are struggling. I think it's easy for successful people to credit their own merit rather than good luck. And yet, I do think there's some merit. And I do think there's some bad luck for people who are poor. But, I do think, it's not--that statement about your person in the United States--there's a lot going on there. That's what I'm trying to say, I guess.

罗伯茨：没有。所以，给我留下深刻印象的是-这是我们谈话的离题，但我认为这很有趣-当然，我怀疑情况是这样的，美国的穷人比在欧洲的人更容易找到工作。我认为美国经济仍然比欧洲经济更有活力，特别是对于努力进入劳动力大军、进行投资的年轻人来说。当然，欧洲的福利国家更慷慨-欧洲的福利国家比美国的更慷慨-总体来说，至少是全面的。对于某些群体，也许，你知道，我会求助于其中的一个[？]有点不同。但是，总的来说，对于，比如说，工作年龄的男性来说，我认为欧洲更加慷慨。所以，这是-你能责怪某人拿了更慷慨的福利金吗？因此，欧洲人和美国人有不同意见是合理的。这并不一定就是他们对自己的处境与穷人之间的真实的、潜在的看法。现在，我确实同意-我认为成功的人很难同情那些正在挣扎的人。我认为成功的人很容易相信自己的优点而不是运气。然而，我确实认为这是有价值的。而且我确实认为对于穷人来说会有一些坏运气。但是，我确实认为，这不是-关于你在美国的人的声明-那里发生了很多事情。我想这就是我想说的。

Alberto Alesina: Yes. I mean, actually, I have a comment, a comment and an important digression, and then a related point would bring us back to the paper. The first point is that there are data on social mobility in the United States and Europe. And I actually, in a previous paper with Stefanie Stantcheva and Edoardo Teso which is published in the AER [American Economic Review] of this year, we actually do work which is somewhat related methodologically to the paper we are talking about, asking people about what they think about social mobility in the United States, and in the same countries in Europe. And what it turns out is something that I hypothesize without much data in a book with Ed Glaeser about 10 years ago, is that Americans think, as you said, that there are much more options for upward mobility in the United States than in Europe. And, Europeans think that there is much less mobility than in the United States. And, but, in reality, the data on social mobility for the United States and Europe show that, on average, there is not that much difference. Europe--in the United States, of course, there is a huge variance. There is part of the country where social mobility is very high. Parts of it are very low. But just looking at the average, which is actually [?] number, is not that different from, say, Germany, France, and Italy. But Americans think that it is much bigger than what it is. And Europeans think that it is worse than it is. And therefore Americans are more optimistic about poor can make it. And probably more optimistic than they should be. And Europeans are very pessimistic, probably more pessimistic than they should be, about whether a poor can make it or not. Especially given the generous welfare state that you just mentioned--

Alberto Alesina：是的。我的意思是，实际上，我有一个评论，一个评论和一个重要的离题，然后相关的观点会把我们带回到论文上。第一点是，美国和欧洲有关于社会流动性的数据。实际上，在Stefan ie Stantcheva和Edoardo Teso在今年的“美国经济评论”上发表的一篇论文中，我们实际上做的工作在方法论上与我们正在讨论的论文有一定的关系，询问人们对美国和欧洲相同国家的社会流动性的看法。结果是我在大约10年前与Ed Glaeser合著的一本书中没有很多数据的假设是，美国人认为，就像你说的，在美国有比在欧洲更多的向上流动的选择。而且，欧洲人认为这里的流动性比美国少得多。而且，但在现实中，美国和欧洲的社会流动性数据显示，平均而言，差异并不大。欧洲-当然，在美国，有一个巨大的差异。在这个国家的部分地区，社会流动性非常高。它的某些部分非常低。但是只看平均值，实际上是[？]数字与德国、法国和意大利等国并没有太大的不同。但美国人认为它比实际情况要大得多。而欧洲人认为情况比实际情况更糟。因此，美国人对穷人能够做到这一点更加乐观。而且可能比他们本该乐观的多。对于穷人能否成功，欧洲人非常悲观，可能比他们应该悲观得多。特别是考虑到你刚才提到的慷慨的福利国家-

34:02
Russ Roberts: Can I react to that? And then you can hold that thought, your second thought, which is going to bring us back to the paper. But, my thought, when you make that point--and I've seen a lot of those papers that show that, surprisingly American mobility is not that great and there's not that much movement among groups. And, a lot of that is a little bit hard to interpret. Because, first of all, sometimes it's relative mobility--the ability to move, you know, up a number of quintiles, say--as opposed to absolutely mobility: whether you actually can do better. Which are two very different things. And, the second thing is it doesn't--there's, often, I suspect--I just could be wrong; I just don't know. But, I suspect there's this activity, a selection bias problem there. Because the people who are not mobile are not in the sample. You are typically looking at people who have income in Year 1 and you are comparing them to Year 10, and seeing where they are relative to other people in the country. But, a lot of people maybe are not working. The reason I make the point about relative mobility or relative opportunities in the two countries is that the data on unemployment, especially youth unemployment--Europe seems so much higher. Maybe it's not measured the same way. Maybe it's temporary. Maybe it's doesn't last. But, the numbers that I typically read--and maybe they are biased sources--but the numbers I typically read about, say, youth unemployment in France or youth unemployment in the United Kingdom, are shockingly high compared to the United States. And so, I always assume that's a very bad forecast, a very depressing forecast for future opportunity. Do you think that's a relevant issue, the selection bias across countries?

34：02罗斯·罗伯茨：我能对此做出反应吗？然后你可以保留这个想法，你的第二个想法，它会把我们带回到纸上。但是，我的想法是，当你提出这一点时-我看过很多论文表明，令人惊讶的是，美国的流动性并不是很好，群体之间也没有那么多流动。而且，其中的很多都有点难以解释。因为，首先，有时它是相对的流动性-你知道，移动的能力，比如说，向上移动几个五分之一-而不是绝对的流动性：你是否真的能做得更好。这是两件截然不同的事情。而且，第二件事是它不-我怀疑，经常有-我可能是错的；我只是不知道。但是，我怀疑有这样的活动，那里有一个选择偏见的问题。因为不是流动的人不在样本中。您通常会查看在第1年有收入的人，并将他们与第10年进行比较，并查看他们与国家中其他人的相对位置。但是，很多人可能没有工作。我之所以提出这两个国家的相对流动性或相对机会的观点，是因为失业数据，特别是年轻人的失业率-欧洲似乎要高得多。也许它不是用同样的方法测量的。也许是暂时的。也许它不会持续很久。但是，我通常阅读的数字-也许它们是有偏见的来源-但我通常读到的数字，比如法国的青年失业或英国的青年失业，与美国相比高得令人震惊。因此，我总是认为这是一个非常糟糕的预测，对未来机会的预测非常令人沮丧。你认为国家间的选择偏见是一个相关的问题吗？

Alberto Alesina: It's a--that of course is not my research, but I certainly agree with you that this number about unemployment, youth unemployment, in some countries, are staggering. And, of course, when we talk about social mobility we are talking about the past--the past generation. It is perfectly possible that in future generations things will look quite different for Europe. They are certainly looking very different for Italy.

Alberto Alesina：这当然不是我的研究，但我当然同意你关于失业的这个数字，年轻人失业，在一些国家，是令人震惊的。当然，当我们谈论社会流动性时，我们谈论的是过去-过去的一代人。完全有可能在未来几代人中，欧洲的情况看起来会大不相同。对于意大利来说，他们看起来肯定有很大的不同。

Russ Roberts: But I'm making the point that, even in the current, say, recent short-term measures of mobility, people who aren't in the labor force either at the beginning of your sample or the end, are not called stagnant. They are just not in the data. That's what I'm wondering. Because they are not observed to have an income. They are not observed to have any income. They are not treated as a zero. They are just rejected from the sample.

Russ Roberts：但我要指出的是，即使在当前，比如说最近的短期流动性衡量标准中，那些在样本开始或结束时都不在劳动力中的人，也不能被称为停滞不前。他们只是不在数据中。这就是我想知道的。因为他们没有被观察到有收入。他们没有被观察到有任何收入。它们不被视为零。他们只是从样品中被拒绝。

Alberto Alesina: Right. That is a good point. I suspect people that worked on this, like Raj Chetty[?] and company that work for the United States--

Alberto Alesina：对。这是一个很好的观点。我怀疑从事这项工作的人，比如Raj Chetty[？]以及为美国工作的公司-

Russ Roberts: you'd think they'd worry about that, yeah--

拉斯·罗伯茨：你会认为他们会担心这个，是的-

Alberto Alesina: the issue of the--I don't know how, but they must have worried about that. But I'm not that [?]. But, certainly, if you compare the United States and Europe with very different unemployment data, employment subsidies, and treatment of unemployed, I'm not 100% sure what they do.

Alberto Alesina：这个问题-我不知道怎么做，但他们肯定很担心。但我不是那个[？]。但是，当然，如果你将美国和欧洲的失业数据、就业补贴和失业待遇进行比较，我不是100%确定他们做了什么。

Russ Roberts: Okay. So, I interrupted you. Do you remember where you were going to go to bring us back to the paper?

罗斯·罗伯茨：好的。所以，我打断了你。你还记得你要去哪里把我们带回报社吗？

Alberto Alesina: The paper--it's related to the transfer and social welfare and transfer to the poor, and the lazy, and so on. There is one experiment--or not experiment--one question we ask which ask which we thought was fascinating, which was: First, we ask whether the native believe that immigrants receive more, per capita, more transfer than natives. And they answer is, 'Yes. They receive more transfers than natives.' Now, you may say, 'Well, that's fine. If they think that they are poorer it's perfectly normal that they receive more transfers.' But then we asked another question, which is, 'Suppose that in your country there are two individuals. The first one is named, for the United States, say, John--typical American name. And for the other person is named,' and we choose a clearly immigrant name, say, Mohammed or Carlos, or we actually try with different names and the result doesn't make any difference. And, they have the same income, the same work[?]. We make it very clear that they are identical, except the one is native and the other one is presumably immigrant. And there are a very large number of respondents both in the United States and in other countries--I remember a number like 50% of the respondents in a few countries, particularly France and Italy were the worst offender--they answer that the immigrant gets much more than the natives. Simply because he's called Carlos and not John, or Mohammed and not Alberto. And, looking at the answer, there is like something close to 20%--I don't think this is reported in the paper but I remember the number, that about 20% of French respondents--and the number was a bit lower in the other countries but not that much lower--believe that the person named with an immigrant name received more than twice as much as the native. So, there is--

Alberto Alesina：论文-它涉及到转移和社会福利，转移给穷人，以及懒惰，等等。有一个实验-或者不实验-一个我们认为很有趣的问题，那就是：首先，我们问当地人是否相信移民比当地人得到更多，人均，更多的转移。他们的回答是，‘是的，他们收到的转账比本国人多。’现在，你可能会说，‘好吧，那很好。如果他们认为自己更穷，那么他们得到更多的转移是完全正常的。’但是后来我们问了另一个问题，那就是，‘假设在你们国家有两个人。第一个人的名字是美国的，比如说约翰-典型的美国名字。而另一个人的名字是，’然后我们选择了一个明显的移民名字，比如穆罕默德或卡洛斯，或者我们实际上尝试用不同的名字，结果没有任何区别。而且，他们有相同的收入，相同的工作[？]。我们非常清楚地表明，他们是相同的，除了一个是本地人，另一个可能是移民。在美国和其他国家都有非常多的受访者-我记得一些国家的受访者中大约有50%，特别是法国和意大利是最严重的罪犯-他们回答说移民得到的比本地人多得多。仅仅因为他叫卡洛斯而不是约翰，或者穆罕默德而不是阿尔贝托。而且，看看答案，有将近20%的人-我认为报纸上没有报道这一点，但我记得这个数字，大约20%的法国受访者-这个数字在其他国家略低一些，但不是那么低-相信以移民名字命名的人得到的收入是当地人的两倍多。所以有.

Russ Roberts: So, it's not like a dollar more.

罗斯·罗伯茨：所以，不会再多花一美元。

Alberto Alesina: So, it sounds like natives perceive that the system discriminates in favor of immigrants. And, with obvious consequences for their views about the welfare state.

Alberto Alesina：所以，听起来像是当地人意识到这个系统对移民有歧视。而且，对于他们关于福利国家的观点来说，这显然会带来一些后果。

39:59
Russ Roberts: Now, when you say you gave them two individuals with the same income and the same characteristics except their names, did each respondent get two people to think about? Or did some people get the immigrant, versus some people got the native name?

39：59 Russ Roberts：现在，当你说你给了他们两个人，除了他们的名字之外，他们有相同的收入和相同的特征，每个被调查者有没有让两个人去思考？还是有些人得到了移民，而有些人得到了本地人的名字？

Alberto Alesina: No, no, no. The same person. The same respondent we told: Consider two individuals. The question was, 'Consider two individuals. One is named John, and one is named Mohammed. They have the same income,'--not to make it too boring we wrote a question that was meant to make think that they were economically identical. But--they had the same number of children, where one was, [?] named John and the other one, and how much did they get? And there were varied[?] options: the same, which of course, the right answer. And, by the way, in Sweden, they, like, you know--no, actually, it was Germany, they were actually right. Like, 90% of the German respondents said they get the same. Which is, of course, the right answer. But in all the other countries there was, you know, up to 20% of people said that Mohammed gets more than twice as much.

Alberto Alesina：不，不。同一个人。我们告诉的同一个应答者：考虑两个人。问题是，‘考虑两个人。一个叫约翰，一个叫穆罕默德。他们有相同的收入。’-为了不让它太无聊，我们写了一个问题，旨在让人认为他们在经济上是相同的。但是-他们有同样数量的孩子，其中有一个，[？]名字叫约翰和另一个，他们得到了多少钱？并且有不同的[？]选项：相同，当然，正确答案。顺便说一下，在瑞典，他们，就像，你知道-不，实际上，那是德国，他们实际上是对的。比如，90%的德国受访者说他们得到了同样的结果。当然，这是正确的答案。但是在所有其他国家，你知道，高达20%的人说穆罕默德得到的是两倍多。

Russ Roberts: Twenty percent said that Mohammed gets more than twice as much?

鲁斯·罗伯茨：百分之二十的人说穆罕默德得到的是两倍多？

Alberto Alesina: Yeah.

Alberto Alesina：是的。

Russ Roberts: Wow.

罗斯·罗伯茨：哇。

Alberto Alesina: We didn't report that particular number of the twice as much in the paper; but in the paper we do report that, like, 50% of French believe, and 50% of Italian--more than 50% of French and Italians--believe that the Mohammed guy gets more than John.

Alberto Alesina：我们没有在报纸上报道两倍的具体数字；但是在报纸上我们确实报道了，像是，50%的法国人相信，50%的意大利人相信，超过50%的法国人和意大利人-相信穆罕默德的人比约翰得到的更多。

Russ Roberts: That's fascinating. Kind of extraordinary. And--

罗斯·罗伯茨：这很有趣。有点不寻常。而且-

Alberto Alesina: But in Italy--I live in Italy, where I--I am in Italy where, as you know, there is this crazy--where in Europe where there is this issue of emergency in the Mediterranean and all that. But, a kind of thing you read about immigrants, really blows your mind away. It is unbelievable.

Alberto Alesina：但是在意大利-我住在意大利，我-我在意大利，正如你知道的，那里有这种疯狂的事情-在欧洲，那里有地中海的紧急事件等等。但是，你读到的一种关于移民的东西，真的让你大吃一惊。难以置信。

Russ Roberts: Of this kind, you mean. This kind of result.

罗斯·罗伯茨：你是说这种人。这种结果。

Alberto Alesina: Yeah, this kind. The idea that you read things like, 'These people come here and they become rich with our welfare, and they don't work. And we pay their taxes. And, we pay them, with their taxes.' While it turns out that in Italy, actually because the age in population, which is well known by people who believe in number and not perception that actually illegal[legal?] immigrants are helping us because they are [?] and they have more kids and they pay contribution to our pension system which is in bad shape.

Alberto Alesina：是的，就是这种。你读到这样的想法，‘这些人来到这里，他们在我们的福利下变得富有，他们不工作。我们支付他们的税。我们用他们的税支付他们。’虽然事实证明，在意大利，实际上是因为人口的年龄，这是众所周知的人相信数量而不是认为实际上非法[合法？]移民帮助我们是因为他们[？]而且他们有更多的孩子，他们为我们糟糕的养老金系统支付费用。

Russ Roberts: Yeah. I always like to point out that illegal immigrants typically are contributing to Social Security and other pensions, essentially; but are not going to collect it if they are illegal because they don't have a legitimate Social Security number of their own. They are just using a fake one. But, the other point I would make--

罗伯茨：是的。我总是想指出，非法移民通常是在缴纳社会保障和其他养老金，本质上；但如果他们是非法的，他们就不会去领取，因为他们没有自己的合法社会保障号码。他们只是用了一个假的。但是，我想说的另一点是-

Alberto Alesina: But even the legal contribute more than they get. They help--they help the Social Security System in Italy because they are younger than average--

Alberto Alesina：但是即使是合法的贡献也比他们得到的要多。他们帮助-他们帮助意大利的社会保障系统，因为他们比平均年龄-

Russ Roberts: because they are working. I would point out, again, that I would guess that if you ask the average American what somebody makes on Disability or various welfare programs, they would wildly overestimate the amount. It's just interesting that they even more wildly overestimate it for someone with an immigrant name, rather than a domestic name.

罗伯茨：因为他们在工作。我想再次指出，我会猜测，如果你问普通美国人在残疾或各种福利项目上赚多少钱，他们会严重高估这个数字。有趣的是，他们甚至更疯狂地高估了一个移民的名字，而不是国内的名字。

Alberto Alesina: On this particular score, the Americans were not the worst offenders. I think the Italians and the French were the worst offenders. But even the Americans overestimated wildly.

Alberto Alesina：在这一点上，美国人并不是最坏的罪犯。我认为意大利人和法国人是最糟糕的违规者。但即使是美国人也过分高估了。

43:49
Russ Roberts: Okay. So, I want to turn to redistribution now, and attitudes toward redistribution. So, you did some standard things that were looking at the relationship between people's attitudes towards immigrants and their willingness to support redistribution; expansion of or existence of the welfare state. Or even private charity. But, you also did some very creative things. Well, let's start with that. Let's start with what you found about that, and then I want to move to the priming issue.

43：49罗斯·罗伯茨：好的。所以，我现在想转向再分配，以及对再分配的态度。所以，你做了一些标准的事情，研究人们对移民的态度和他们支持再分配的意愿之间的关系；福利国家的扩张或存在。甚至私人慈善机构。但是，你也做了一些非常有创造性的事情。好吧，让我们从这个开始。让我们从你在这方面的发现开始，然后我想转移到启动问题。

Alberto Alesina: Okay. So, well, first of all, we started with asking people about whether redistribution in a fairly detailed way. We asked them a lot of questions, because we had the same, we used the same question we used in a previous paper. So, we are very specific about a bunch of questions; but probably similarity of the tax system, and whether you want to spend on Social Security or other stuff. And also, we asked them to make a donation. We tell them that they had some ticket for a lottery, and if they win the lottery--I forget what it were but some--

Alberto Alesina：好的。所以，好的，首先，我们首先询问人们，是否以一种相当详细的方式重新分配。我们问了他们很多问题，因为我们有同样的问题，我们使用了以前论文中使用的相同问题。因此，我们非常具体地讨论了一系列问题；但可能是税收制度的相似性，以及你是否想在社会保障或其他方面支出。而且，我们还要求他们捐款。我们告诉他们，他们有一些彩票，如果他们中了彩票-我忘了那是什么，只是一些-

Russ Roberts: $1000, I remember. I read the paper more recently than you have.

罗斯·罗伯茨：1000美元，我记得。我读报纸的时间比你最近。

Alberto Alesina: $1000. Yeah, yeah, right. A thousand dollars. And, but they could donate some of those dollars to a charity, and we specify for each country the charity--a couple of charities they could donate to. Which specifies to make sure that needn't pick one that was hated by most. So, the answer about the distribution was, the answer about the distribution was usually fairly standard: People would be expected in favor of the distribution where[?], and left-wing more than right-wing, and rich people less than poor people. And, you know, all perfectly normal. And then we asked, the second set of questions was about immigration: What do you think about, we should have restricted--various examples of: Do we want to have more restrictive laws about immigration? Limit the number? A bunch of many, many questions which put, classified people as those in favor of welcoming immigrants or people think, 'Let's keep them out.' So, and again, we got very reasonable response. Left-winger were more in favor of immigration. Interestingly, poor people working in immigration-intensive sector did not want immigrant. But, rich people, even though they are living in, immigration-intensive people, wanted them. So, Indian engineer[?] in Silicon Valley where more than welcome by, you know, rich people in Silicon Valley, to pick an example; but poor people did not want workers--is going to be competing with their job--in high-immigration sectors. And then we did a few things. The first experiment we did, which was, we thought the results were quite striking--

Alberto Alesina：1000美元。对，对。一千美元。而且，但是他们可以将其中的一些美元捐给慈善机构，我们为每个国家指定慈善机构-他们可以捐赠的几个慈善机构。它指定确保不需要选择最讨厌的一个。所以，关于分配的答案是，关于分配的答案通常是相当标准的：人们将被期望支持分布[？]，并且左翼比右翼更多，富人比穷人更少。而且，你知道的，一切都很正常。然后我们问，第二组问题是关于移民的：你认为我们应该限制什么-各种各样的例子：我们想不想有更多关于移民的限制性法律？限制数量？很多问题把人们归类为那些支持欢迎移民的人，或者人们认为，‘让我们把他们拒之门外’。所以，再一次，我们得到了非常合理的回应。左翼人士更倾向于移民。有趣的是，在移民密集型部门工作的穷人不想要移民。但是，有钱人，即使他们住在移民密集的人，想要他们。那么，印度工程师[？]在硅谷，你知道，硅谷的富人非常欢迎，来举个例子；但是穷人不想要工人-将会与他们的工作竞争-在高移民的行业。然后我们做了几件事。我们做的第一个实验是，我们认为结果相当惊人-

Russ Roberts: Yes, they are. It's amazing.--

罗伯茨：是的，他们是。太神奇了。-

Alberto Alesina: We did the following. So, half of the respondents, we first showed the, what we call redistribution blocks--a bunch of questions about redistribution. Without ever, ever mentioning immigration. And never, when they start taking the survey, they have any idea that the survey is about immigration. So, the first set of questions they get after their personal characteristic is: What do you think about the distribution? And then, we ask them about various questions about immigration. To the other half of randomly chosen people, we do the opposite: We first ask them a bunch of questions about immigration. And then, we ask them a bunch of questions about redistribution. The same question, the same to blocks, but changing the order. So, the only difference between the order is that those that see immigration first, they are prompt[?] to think about the issue of immigration, of course. In fact, we ask them maybe 15 questions about immigration. So, clearly they have been thinking about immigration. And the result is that those people who have seen the immigration question first, they are much more averse to redistribution--holding everything else constant--than people who have seen the redistribution question first. So, making people think about immigration makes them much less favorable to redistribution. And that is very, very strong--it's just there. No matter how you look at the data, it's just there: The total for every country, [?] for the countries together. And, it's just there.

Alberto Alesina：我们做了以下工作。所以，一半的受访者，我们首先展示了，我们所谓的重新分配块-一堆关于重新分配的问题。从来没有提到过移民。而且，当他们开始进行这项调查时，他们从来没有意识到这项调查是关于移民的。因此，在他们的个人特征之后，他们得到的第一组问题是：你对分布有什么看法？然后，我们问他们有关移民的各种问题。对于另一半随机选择的人，我们做的正好相反：我们首先问他们一堆关于移民的问题。然后，我们问他们一堆关于再分配的问题。同样的问题，同样的块，只是改变了顺序。所以，顺序之间的唯一区别就是那些先看到移民的人，他们是及时的[？]当然是考虑移民问题。事实上，我们可能会问他们15个关于移民的问题。所以，很明显他们一直在考虑移民问题。其结果是，那些首先看到移民问题的人，他们比那些首先看到再分配问题的人更反对再分配-保持其他一切不变。因此，让人们考虑移民问题会让他们更不利于再分配。这是非常强烈的-它就在那里。无论你如何看待数据，它就在那里：每个国家的总数，[？]为了国家在一起。而且，它就在那里。

Russ Roberts: And, what's the magnitude? What kind of magnitudes are we talking about, here? Because, you have to just make an aside here: You can have a statistically significant result that's not very significant. So, how much difference does--what kind of impact does it have? How important is that difference? It's imaginable, I understand, that people who are prompted might respond differently than if they weren't prompted. But, you know, how big is the difference?

罗斯·罗伯茨：还有，震级是多少？我们在这里谈论的是什么样的震级？因为，你必须在这里做一个旁白：你可以得到一个统计上有意义的结果，但不是很重要。那么，有多大的不同-它有什么样的影响？这种差异有多重要？可以想象，我理解，被提示的人可能会和没有提示的人有不同的反应。但是，你知道，差别有多大？

Alberto Alesina: There are of course many ways of looking at the size of the difference in different countries according to different answers about different types of the distribution. One summary answer is to say that, about, a little more than 5% of the people who have seen the immigration question first are likely to say that immigration, that inequality is a problem. In other words, 3% of those, 50%[?] more of the people who see immigration first are more likely to think that immigration is a problem. Again, that number varies across countries; and it varies depending on which measure of redistribution you look at.

Alberto Alesina：当然，根据对不同类型分布的不同答案，有很多方法可以查看不同国家的差异大小。一个简单的答案是说，大约有超过5%的人在第一次看到移民问题时可能会说，移民，不平等是一个问题。换句话说，其中3%，50%[？]更多先看到移民的人更有可能认为移民是一个问题。同样，这个数字在不同的国家也不同；而且它根据你所看到的再分配的衡量标准而有所不同。

Russ Roberts: You say--it's a 5% change. You said?

罗斯·罗伯茨：你说-这是5%的变化。你说？

Alberto Alesina: A 5% change. Which is 3 percentage points.

Alberto Alesina：5%的变化。也就是3个百分点。

Russ Roberts: And I'm looking at the paper here--it says that's about 13% of the gap between Left- and Right-wing respondents. So, it takes you an eighth of the way toward the other ideology.

罗斯·罗伯茨：我正在看这份报告-它说这大约是左翼和右翼受访者之间差距的13%。所以，它需要你向另一个意识形态走八分之一的路。

Alberto Alesina: Exactly.

Alberto Alesina：没错。

50:54
Russ Roberts: So, what do we make of all this? It is very interesting work. It's extremely timely, for better or for worse: it's a huge issue. And, in a recent episode of EconTalk I had a long monologue on the issue why things seem to be so different politically in the United States and in Europe today, relative to, say, 20 years ago. And one answer is, a standard is, that the rise of populism--worries about Brexit, and the vote on Brexit, in the United Kingdom; the election of Donald Trump--that a lot of this is a response to immigration. And my claim, at least in that monologue--and I gave a one-sided view there because I wanted to hope people understand how I think about this. Whether it's right or not, I don't know. But, my claim is that a lot of our attitudes toward various political issues are being created in a very different environment for news and information. That, we are prone to find news sources because of the rise of the Internet, and Cable Television, we are prone to find news sources that confirm our biases, that get us riled up, that make us angry, that vilify our ideological opponents. And, so, the question--I do think people are much more concerned about immigration. But, what your work says, at least the part that confirms my story, is that: It's true people are more concerned about it, but part of their concern is not accurate. It's exaggerated, the impulse that people have to be worried about people who are different from them. And, that we are prone, if we are not careful, to work ourselves up about something that's not as important as we might think it is, or that we might hear it is, over and over and over again--if we watch Fox News or MSNBC, if we read the New York Times versus the Wall Street Journal. And, that this is having a serious impact on our political life. Now, your paper is not about this. Your paper is just trying to characterize how people feel about immigrants, and how they feel, understand, how accurately they understand it; and the results of their support for various forms of redistribution. But, it seems to me that the underlying problem here, whether it's the news environment that I'm thinking I'm particularly worried about these days, or the concerns that people have, are: They are not accurate. It's deeply disturbing.

50：54罗斯·罗伯茨：那么，我们对这一切有什么看法？这是非常有趣的工作。这是非常及时的，无论是好是坏：这是一个巨大的问题。而且，在最近的一期EconTalk节目中，我对这个问题进行了长时间的独白，为什么今天的美国和欧洲的政治状况似乎与20年前相比如此不同。一个答案是，一个标准是，民粹主义的崛起-对英国退欧的担忧，英国的退欧公投；唐纳德·特朗普的当选-这在很大程度上是对移民的回应。我的主张，至少在那段独白中-我给出了一个片面的观点，因为我希望人们能理解我是如何看待这个问题的。不管是对是错，我不知道。但是，我的主张是，我们对各种政治问题的许多态度都是在一个非常不同的新闻和信息环境中产生的。那就是，由于互联网和有线电视的兴起，我们倾向于找到新闻来源，我们倾向于找到证实我们偏见的新闻来源，那些让我们愤怒，丑化我们意识形态对手的新闻来源。所以，问题是-我确实认为人们更关心移民问题。但是，你的工作所说的，至少证实了我的故事的部分是：确实人们更关心它，但他们的关注的一部分是不准确的。这是夸张的，人们不得不担心与他们不同的人的冲动。而且，如果我们不小心，我们很容易在一些不像我们可能认为的那么重要的事情上振作起来，或者我们可能会一遍又一遍地听到它-如果我们看福克斯新闻或MSNBC，如果我们读“纽约时报”和“华尔街日报”的话。而且，这正在对我们的政治生活产生严重的影响。现在，你的论文不是关于这个的。你的论文只是试图描述人们对移民的感觉，他们的感受，理解，他们对移民的准确理解，以及他们对各种形式的再分配的支持结果。但是，在我看来，这里的根本问题，无论是我这些天特别担心的新闻环境，还是人们的担忧，都是：它们不准确。这令人深感不安。

Alberto Alesina: I couldn't agree more. But, let me just add that, we, in our conversation we focused about what is on about redistribution. But there is also another part of the paper in which we look at how these misperceptions about immigrant lead to different views about immigration. Immigration policies. Not redistribution. So, and there, the effect of this misperception are not surprisingly very, very large. Because, if people have complete--if people feel that in their country they are invaded by immigrants, clearly they have different views than if they do not believe that. So, the misperception about the size, type, and nature of immigration affects not only indirectly preference for distribution, but also very directly a discussion about immigration policies, which, as you said, is very divisive, both in the United States and in Europe. And I couldn't agree more with you. I mean, this paper, needless to say, this paper has no prescription for whether, what policies for immigration to have. It's very far from having any policy prescription. But, all we can say, all that this paper suggests is that this conversation should be happening with real data and not with perceived data. And not with ideological screen, but reality. And unfortunately, as you said, with examples in the United States, that's happening in other countries as well. I mean, there's one example that I always make, that is: Even in the more, in the best newspapers in Italy, when there is a crime committed, now it is perfectly normal, acceptable, to say an immigrant from country X has committed this crime. Now, this immigrant may actually be second-generation or an Italian citizen: but the news reads, 'Some guy from,' say, 'Morocco has killed an Italian woman.' And you can imagine what that kind of reaction generates. And there is a lot of it going on. And that indeed would cause many of the misperceptions. And, of course, those people who are anti-immigration, for whatever reason, even for perfectly reasonable and honest and intellectually defensible reason, they have no interest in correcting these biases.

Alberto Alesina：我非常同意。但是，让我补充一下，我们，在我们的谈话中，我们关注的是关于再分配的事情。但是，在论文的另一部分中，我们研究了这些对移民的误解是如何导致对移民的不同看法的。移民政策。而不是重新分配。因此，在那里，这种误解的影响并不令人惊讶地非常大。因为，如果人们完全-如果人们觉得他们在他们的国家被移民入侵，显然他们有不同的观点，如果他们不相信这一点。所以，对移民的规模，类型和性质的误解不仅间接地影响分配的偏好，而且非常直接地影响关于移民政策的讨论，正如你所说的，这在美国和欧洲都是非常有分歧的。我非常同意你的观点。我是说，这个文件，不用说，这个文件没有规定移民有没有什么政策。它离任何政策处方都很远。但是，我们所能说的，这篇论文所建议的就是，这种对话应该发生在真实的数据上，而不是感知的数据中。不是意识形态的屏蔽，而是现实。不幸的是，正如你所说，以美国为例，其他国家也在发生这种情况。我的意思是，我总是举一个例子，那就是：即使在更多，意大利最好的报纸上，当有犯罪行为发生时，现在说来自X国家的移民犯下了这种罪行是完全正常的，可以接受的。现在，这个移民可能实际上是第二代或意大利公民：但新闻上说，“有人来自摩洛哥，杀了一个意大利女人。”你可以想象这种反应会产生什么。而且有很多这样的事情在发生。而这确实会导致许多误解。当然，那些反移民的人，无论出于何种原因，即使是出于完全合理、诚实和理智的辩护理由，他们也没有兴趣纠正这些偏见。

Russ Roberts: Yeah; and I think--you know--for me, I'm very open and up front about the fact that I think immigration is generally a good--has been a good thing for America and continues to be a good thing for most Americans. And I say that out of compassion for people who live in places that are poor, who have come here; and also, their impact mostly overwhelmingly positive on American life--culturally, but also just in the fact that their opportunities to work here, to do things at lower wages than Americans would be happy to do them at, that's hard on some Americans. It's good for a lot of Americans in the money that is saved by paying less is freed up to do other things that helps create opportunities for Americans who have skills like immigrants. So, it's very unclear; and obviously it's a huge debate about who are winners or losers from a more open-border policy. But I'm generally, for a whole bunch of reasons, selfish and non-selfish, interested in having open borders. Whether they should be more open than they are now--I tend to be sympathetic that they should be more open. How open is an interesting question. I think we should get rid of the welfare state for immigrants at least right away; I think we should discourage people coming here to be beneficiaries of the welfare state. But I don't think that's a big problem right now. At least, that's my perception.

罗伯茨：是的；我认为-你知道-对我来说，我非常坦率地面对这样一个事实，我认为移民通常是一件好事-对美国来说是一件好事，对大多数美国人来说仍然是一件好事。我这么说是出于对那些生活在贫困地区的人们的同情，他们来到这里；而且，他们对美国生活的影响大多是积极的-文化上，但也只是因为他们有机会在这里工作，做比美国人更愿意做的事情，这对一些美国人来说是很困难的。这对很多美国人来说是件好事，因为节省下来的钱花得更少，可以腾出时间去做其他事情，这有助于为拥有像移民这样的技能的美国人创造机会。因此，这非常不清楚；显然，这是一场关于更加开放的边境政策谁是赢家还是输家的巨大辩论。但我通常，出于一大堆原因，自私和非自私，对开放边界感兴趣。他们是否应该比现在更加开放？我倾向于同情他们应该更加开放。开放程度是一个有趣的问题。我认为我们至少应该立即取消移民的福利国家；我认为我们应该阻止人们来到这里成为福利国家的受益者。但我不认为现在这是个大问题。至少，这是我的看法。

57:54
Russ Roberts: But, having said all that--so, I'm just laying my cards on the table--I think it's the case--and this is what I want to close on, and hear your reaction: It's the case that American culture generally has been something of a melting pot. We can debate how well it works, how well people assimilate in 2018 versus 1940 or 1880. And those are relevant questions. But, in general, America's identity has always been that we are open to people who aren't just like us--because there's no such thing as just like us. We are a nation of immigrants. And most Americans--of course, it depends on the time of history--but most Americans are pretty positive about that, in general. And so, they are more, in recent years not so much, but in general America I think is fairly open to immigration. Certainly we've taken a lot more immigrants than most other countries. Then you go to a place like Italy, where you are from, originally. So, the point I want to finish there on the American side is: So, somebody who has been here for two generations is not a Mexican-American. They are an American. That's what we call 'em. And you are suggesting that in Italy, and I suspect here as well, there is an intent--an increasing and somewhat disturbing, to me, identification of people with where they came from originally. Not with where they were born. Even if they've been here for 2 or 3 generations. And that, I find, scary. Not so healthy, for America. And certainly not healthy for Italy. But, having said that, my impression is that Europe is much--doesn't see itself as an assimilation, a melting-pot-kind-of-place like America does. There's a very strong Italian culture, a very strong French culture, a very strong British culture, a very strong German culture. And there's a deep concern that people who come from different places don't share that. And they don't come to share it, I think is the concern. Right? And so, you know, when I think of--I've mentioned this before--when I think of many small towns in Italy, they are a little bit like museums. They are very--they are beautifully preserved, and it's great for tourism. It's not so good if you are an immigrant hoping to find opportunity in that place. It may be--but many Italians, I assume, like it that way. They don't want the skyline of Florence to be changed. They love it the way it is. And someone who comes from somewhere else who wasn't raised to love it is not going to love it the way they do, who have lived there for 6 generations or 20 generations. So, I'm kind of rambling here. I'm sorry. But I'd like your reaction to that, in terms of just the cultural issues of identity and how you felt--I'm curious what your personal feeling is, as someone who is identifiably not born in America, because of your accent. You have a name that is not, like, John Smith. You have Alberto Alesina. It's a beautiful name, to me. But, it's different. So, I'm curious. What are your thoughts?

57：54 Russ Roberts：但是，说了那么多-所以，我只是把我的牌放在桌上-我认为是这样的-这就是我想要结束的，并听听你的反应：这是美国文化通常是一个大熔炉的情况。我们可以讨论它的运作有多好，人们在2018年与1940年或1880年的同化程度如何。这些都是相关的问题。但是，总的来说，美国的身份一直是我们对那些不像我们的人是开放的-因为没有像我们这样的东西。我们是一个移民的国家。大多数美国人-当然，这取决于历史的时间-但总的来说，大多数美国人对此相当乐观。因此，他们越来越多，最近几年并不是很多，但我认为总体上美国对移民是相当开放的。当然，我们接收的移民比大多数其他国家要多得多。然后你去了一个像意大利这样的地方，你原来是从那里来的。所以，我想在美国这边结束的一点是：所以，一个在这里生活了两代人的人不是墨西哥裔美国人。他们是美国人。我们就是这么叫他们的。你是在暗示，在意大利，我怀疑这里也有这样一种意图-对我来说，越来越多的，有点令人不安的是，人们对他们最初来自哪里的认同。不是因为他们出生的地方。即使他们已经在这里生活了2到3代。我发现这很可怕。对美国来说不是很健康。而且对意大利肯定不健康。但是，话虽如此，我的印象是，欧洲是-并不认为自己是一个同化，一个像美国那样的大熔炉般的地方。有一个非常强大的意大利文化，一个非常强大的法国文化，一个非常强大的英国文化，一个非常强大的德国文化。来自不同地方的人不能分享这一点，这一点令人深感担忧。他们不是来分享的，我认为这是令人担忧的。对吗？所以，你知道，当我想到-我以前提到过-当我想到意大利的许多小城镇时，它们有点像博物馆。它们非常-它们保存得很好，这对旅游业很有好处。如果你是一个希望在那里找到机会的移民，那就不太好了。可能是-但我想很多意大利人都喜欢这样。他们不希望佛罗伦萨的天际线被改变。他们喜欢它现在的样子。而来自其他地方的人如果从小就不喜欢它，就不会像他们那样喜欢它，他们已经在那里生活了6代或20代。所以，我在这里有点漫不经心。对不起。但我希望你能对此做出反应，仅仅是关于身份认同的文化问题以及你的感受-我很好奇你的个人感受，因为你的口音，作为一个明显不是出生在美国的人，你的个人感受是什么。你的名字不是约翰·史密斯你有Alberto Alesina对我来说这是个美丽的名字。但是，这是不同的。所以我很好奇。你的想法是什么？

Alberto Alesina: Well, first of all, you were not rambling at all. I think you put--you really summarized extremely well what the issues are. And let me, before giving you an [?], let me re-summarize in a slightly different way: The United States is a country of immigrant; it was born as a country of immigrant. And it went through pain and suffering; but they developed a system which is reasonably welcoming for immigrants. And they developed a melting pot. Which is more or less working. Europe does not have that history. And they are not used to waves of immigration. And they face all the issues that you are mentioning. Not only that: They do not have even a culture or a research or a thinking about immigration. I mean, if you--in the United States, I don't know how many thousands and thousands and thousands of pages have been written on integration, immigration, affirmative action--

Alberto Alesina：嗯，首先，你一点也不漫步。我认为你把-你真的很好地总结了问题是什么。在给你们一个[？]之前，让我以一种稍微不同的方式重新总结一下：美国是一个移民国家；它出生时就是一个移民国家。它经历了痛苦和磨难；但他们发展了一个对移民有合理欢迎的制度。他们开发了一个熔炉。或多或少起作用。欧洲没有这样的历史。而且他们不习惯移民潮。他们面临着你提到的所有问题。不仅如此：他们甚至没有关于移民的文化或研究或想法。我的意思是，如果你-在美国，我不知道关于融合，移民，平权行动已经写了几千页-

Russ Roberts: Diversity, multiculturalism--

拉斯·罗伯茨：多样性，多元文化主义-

Alberto Alesina: Diversity, multicul--

Alberto Alesina：多样性，多元-

Russ Roberts: Tolerance--

罗斯·罗伯茨：宽容

Alberto Alesina: I could probably fill[field?] 3 libraries. If you find 10 books written about this in Europe, you'd be lucky. So, Europeans are ages behind Americans in dealing with that, one. Second, they are giving a really despicable [?], or fighting with each other about who can save boats of dying poor North Africans, which is really despicable. And, but, this is all fine. But, yes, you actually have a point: That, since European countries have not been melting pots historically, now, how do immigrants integrate in culture which are much less melting pot but little pots that don't melt? Like Italy, or France, or Portugal, or Greece? Now, to go to the little cities in, you know, even smaller than Florence, but to do in those wonderful small town in Italy, probably they don't see yet a lot of immigrants. They are mostly in big cities. But, still, what you raise is a very, very critical issue. Do I have answers? No. But the only answer I have, which is given in this paper, is that we need to start talking about this--but, with the right--with the reality from [?] and not with stereotypes and from perceptions.

Alberto Alesina：我大概可以填满[field？]3个图书馆。如果你在欧洲找到10本关于这方面的书，你就很幸运了。所以，欧洲人在处理这个问题上比美国人落后很多。第二，他们给了一个非常卑鄙的[？]，或者为谁可以拯救垂死的北非穷人的船只而互相争斗，这真的是卑鄙的。而且，但是，这一切都很好。但是，是的，你实际上有一个观点：既然欧洲国家在历史上没有熔炉，那么现在，移民如何融入那些不是熔炉而是不会熔化的小锅的文化中去呢？像意大利，法国，葡萄牙，希腊？现在，去小城市，你知道，甚至比佛罗伦萨还小，但是在意大利那些漂亮的小镇上，他们可能还没有看到很多移民。他们大多在大城市。但是，仍然，你提出的是一个非常关键的问题。我有答案吗？没有。但是我有唯一的答案，这篇论文给出的答案是，我们需要开始谈论这个-但是，正确的-来自[？]的现实。而不是刻板印象和感知。

Russ Roberts: I look forward to your ongoing work in the area. And I do think it's incredibly important to get the facts right. And, one of the issues that we talk about on EconTalk sometimes is--or I talk about--is how hard it is to measure things. Particularly causation in a multivariate system. And the challenge of econometric analysis. What we've been talking about today are facts. And I always argue the facts are important; that evidence matters. It's just a matter of what's reliable evidence versus what is, what looks like science versus what is science. And, of course, in this paper, you've made lots of decisions, and there are things you had to measure in certain ways. So, it's not like it's measuring the length of a stick with a ruler. But, most of what we are talking about today is just simply what is. Not anything about--not that much about interpretation. There's not that much statistical analysis. There is some in the paper, by the way; we didn't talk about it. But, what I thought was important about this paper is: It just is a window into how we look at the world and the [?] have and its implications for how we vote, and how we treat each other, and how we treat each other when we are not the same. We come from different places; and this strikes me as extremely important work, so I'm very grateful for it.

罗斯·罗伯茨：我期待着你在该领域正在进行的工作。我确实认为把事实弄对是非常重要的。而且，我们有时在EconTalk上谈论的问题之一是-或者我说的-是衡量事物有多难。特别是在多变量系统中的因果关系。以及经济计量分析的挑战。我们今天谈论的都是事实。我总是认为事实很重要，证据很重要。这只是一个问题，什么是可靠的证据，什么是科学，什么看起来像科学，什么是科学。当然，在这篇论文中，你做了很多决定，有些事情你必须以某种方式来衡量。所以，它不像是用尺子测量棍子的长度。但是，我们今天谈论的大部分只是简单的事情。没有任何关于-没有那么多关于解释。没有那么多的统计分析。顺便说一句，报纸上有一些；我们没有谈论它。但是，我认为这篇论文最重要的是：它只是我们如何看待世界和[？]的一个窗口。以及它对我们如何投票，我们如何对待彼此，以及当我们不同时如何对待对方的影响。我们来自不同的地方；这给我的印象是非常重要的工作，所以我非常感激它。

Alberto Alesina: Thank you, Russ. It's been a pleasure, as always, and I hope we can do it again.


Alberto Alesina：谢谢你，Russ。我很高兴，一如既往，我希望我们能再次做到这一点。

