# <center><i class="fa fa-edit"></i> 5G Security: Comparision </center>
###### tags: `Internship`
:::info
The main goal is to create a table comparing the security threat mentioned in the four documents.

**Resources:**
[O-RAN Security Task Group](https://www.o-ran.org/blog/2020/10/24/the-o-ran-alliance-security-task-group-tackles-security-challenges-on-all-o-ran-interfaces-and-components)
[A guide to 5G network security](https://www.ericsson.com/48fcab/assets/local/news/2018/10201291-04_gir_report_broschure_dec2018_webb_181212.pdf?_ga=2.63593709.33572225.1614428136-783979408.1614428136)
[5G Security: Forward Thinking](https://www.huawei.com/minisite/5g/img/5G_Security_Whitepaper_en.pdf)
[Securing the 5G Era](https://www.gsma.com/security/securing-the-5g-era/)
:::

# Output

| Document | Target | Threat |
| -------- | -------- | -------- |
| O-RAN Security Task Group | RAN surface | The disaggregation of functions increases the RAN threat surface |
| | The whole Open RAN network | The increase of the Open RAN dependence on secure development practices within open source communities |
| | The whole Open RAN network | The use of AI in the RAN may lead to unanticipated monsequences |
| | The whole Open RAN network | The increasing likelihood of attacks by compromised devices |
| | The whole Open RAN network | The open fronthaul interface operating the lower layer split (LLS) interface (Due to the separation of the O-DU and O-RU) |
| A guide to 5G network security | signaling traffic | Modification of signaling traffic may be attempted to re-route calls or intercept SMS messages of a target for eavesdropping purposes or denying service. |
| | user payload traffic | The privacy of the user and the confidentiality of enterprise or government data would be at risk. |
| | management traffic | The management plane is an attractive target for hackers to gain access to network resources, where they can manipulate and disturb network traffic and data. |
| | Telecom networks | Fairly trivial malware |
| | Telecom networks | Crime-ware (attack toolkits) |
| | Telecom networks | hacktivists |
| | Telecom networks | Insider threats such as disgruntled former employees or employees who seek to exploit their trusted position for personal gain. |
| 5G Security: Forward Thinking | New Business Model | The network based hop-by-hop security approach may not be efficient enough to build differentiated end-to-end (E2E) security for different services. |
| | IT-Driven Network Architecture | New security concerns are emerging when new IT technologies (virtualization and Software Defined Network (SDN)/Network Functions Virtualization (NFV)) injecting new vigor into their networks. |
| | IT-Driven Network Architecture | Issues of how to isolate, deploy, and manage virtual network slices securely |
| | Heterogeneous Access | The heterogeneous access might imply that the access network architecture from different networks are different. |
| | Privacy Protection | As open network platforms, 5G networks raise serious concerns on privacy leakage. The service type sensing may involve user privacy. |
| Securing the 5G Era | Virtualisation | The risk of data leakage and the impact of virtualisation aware malware outbreaks |
| | Cloud Services | Data is leaked and the code can be used to exploit the cloud provider or operator network. |
| | Network Slicing | The security model for each slice may not be adapted to the use case. |
||Mobile IoT|Three common attack scenarios: Attacks on the devices (endpoints) via the applications running on the device remote attacks from the internet and via physical attack; Attacks on service platforms (i.e. the cloud) and Attacks on the communications links (e.g. Cellular, WLAN, BLE air interface etc.)|
||Artificial Intelligence (AI)|This technology is available to the attacker and AI-driven attacks are anticipated.|