--- title: 'Lecture 06 Wireless Security' disqus: hackmd --- :::info ST1004 Infocomm Security ::: Lecture 06 Wireless Security === <style> img{ /* border: 2px solid red; */ margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; width: 80%; display: block; } </style> ## Table of Contents [TOC] Wireless Attacks --- - atks against wireless system - bluetooth atks - NFC atks - radio freq identification systems - wireless lan atks ### Bluetooth Attacks - bluetooth - wireless tech that uses short-range radio freq (RF) transmissions - provide rapid device pairings - personal area network (PAN) tech - piconet - established when 2 bluetooth devices within range of ea other - 1 master device control all wireless traffic - 1 slave device takes commands - active slaves send transmissions - parked slaves connected but not actively participating ![](https://i.imgur.com/SrDsxxx.png) #### Bluejacking - atk that sends unsolicited msgs to bluetooth devices - more annoying than harmful - no data stolen #### Bluesnarfing - atk that accesses unauth info from wireless device through bluetooth conn - often between phones & laptop - atker copies emails, contacts & other data by connecting to bluetooth device w/o user knowledge ### Near Field Communication (NFC) Attacks - near field comm (NFC) - set of standards used to establish comm between devices in close proximity - devices brought within 4cm of ea other & tapped tgt - comm established - devices using NFC can be active/passive - passive nfc device - contain info that other devices can read - dont read/receive any info - Eg. NFC tag - active nfc device - can read info & transmit data ![](https://i.imgur.com/Z4mfYsz.png) #### Example of NFC Applications - automobiles - entertainment - office - retail stores - transportation - contactless payment systems - consumer pay for purchase by tapping payment terminal with smartphone #### Types of Attacks ![](https://i.imgur.com/CH3Iyqr.png) ### Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Attacks - radio freq identification (RFID) - commonly used to transmit info between employee inventory badges/tags/book labels/paper-based tags that can be detected by proximity reader - most RFID tags are passive - dont have own power supply - hence very small - current ver of rfid standards is Generation 2 - contain security enhancements over prev version #### Types of Attacks ![](https://i.imgur.com/JtbNXfa.png) ### Wireless Local Area Networks Attacks - wlan designed to replace/supplement wired lan - impt to know - history & specs of IEEE wlans - hardware needed for wireless network - diff types of wlan atks directed at enterprise & home users #### IEEE WLANs - institute of electrical & electronics engineers (IEEE) wlans - most influential org for computer networking & wireless comms - 1884 - began developing network arch standards in 1980s - 1997 - release of IEEE 802.11 - standard for wlans - higher speeds (5.5mbps & 11mbps) added in 1999 - IEEE 802.11b - IEEE 802.11a - specifies max rated speed of 54mbps using 5ghz spectrum - IEEE 802.11g - preserve stable & widely accepted features of 802.11b - increase data transfer rates similar to 802.11a - IEEE 802.11n - ratified in 2009 - improvements - speed - coverage area - resistance to interference - strong security - IEEE 802.11ac - ratified in early 2014 - data rates over 7gbps ![](https://i.imgur.com/VkKByqt.png) #### WLAN Hardware - wireless client network interface card adapter - same func as wired adapter - antenna send & receive signals through airwaves - access point (AP) major parts - antenna & radio transmitter/receiver send & receive wireless signals - bridging software to interface wireless devices to other devices - wired network interface allow it to connect by cable to standard wired network - AP funcs - act as base station for wireless network - act as bridge between wireless & wired networks - can connect ot wired through cable ![](https://i.imgur.com/L8vYL5I.png) - wlan using AP is operating in __infrastructure mode__ - network not using AP oprating in __ad hoc mode__ - devices only comm between themselves - cannot conenct to other networks - wifi alliance created similar tech specification called __Wi-Fi Direct__ - residential wlan gateway - used by small offices/home users to connect to internet - features - AP - firewall - router - dynamic host config protocol (DHCP) server - others #### Types of Attacks - continued below WLAN Enterprise Attacks --- - __hard edge__ - well-defined boundary that protects data & res in network - intro of wlans in enterprises changed hard edges to __blurred edges__ ![](https://i.imgur.com/fnn9XhJ.png) ![](https://i.imgur.com/ufiRVb6.png) - types of wireless atks - rogue access pts - evil twins - intercepting wireless data - wireless replay atks - denial of service atks ### Rogue Access Point - unauth access pt that allow atker to bypass network security configs - usually set up by insider (employee) - may set up behind firewall, opening network to atks ### Evil Twin - ap set up by atker - mimic authorised ap - atkers capture transmission from user to evil twin ap ![](https://i.imgur.com/yAUpNEK.png) ### Intercepting Wireless Data - atker pick up RF signal from open/misconfiged ap - using wlan to read data can yield significant info to atker regarding wired enterprise network ### Wireless Replay Attack - AKA hijacking - atker captures transmitted wireless data, record it & send to orig recipient w/o atker ebing detected - accomplished using evil twin ap - AKA mitm atk ### Wireless Denial of Service Attack - RF jamming - atkers use RF interference to flood rf spectrum with enough interference to prevent device from comm with ap - spoofing - atker create fake frame that pretends to come from trusted client - manipulating duration field values - atkers send frame with duration field set to high value - prevents other devices from transmitting for that period of time ### Wireless Home Attacks - most home users fail to config security on home networks - atkers can - steal data - read wireless transmissions - inject malware - download harmful content Vulnerabilites of IEEE Wireless Security --- - orig IEEE 802.11 committee recognised wireless transmission are vulnerable - implemented several wireless security protections in standard - left others to wlan vendor's discretion - protections vulnerable & led to multiple atks ### Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) - IEEE 802.11 security protocol designed to ensure only authorised parties can view transmissions - encrypt plaintext into ciphertext - secret key shared between client & ap - vulns - only use 64bit or 128bit key - __initialisation vector (IV)__ only 24 of those bits - short length = easy break - violates cardinal rule of cryptography - avoid detectable pattern - atkers can see dupes when IVs start repeating ### Wired Protected Setup (WPS) - optional means of configuring security on wlans - 2 common wps methods - __PIN method__ - use PIN printed on sticker of wireless router/displayed through software wizard - user enter pin & security config auto occurs - __push-button method__ - user push btn & security configs happen - design & implementation flaws - no lockout limit for entering PINs - last pin char is only checksum - wireless router reports validity of 1st & 2nd halves of pin separately ### MAC Address Filtering - method to control wlan access - limit device's access to ap - media access control (MAC) address filtering - used by nearly all wireless ap vendors - permits/blks device based on mac - vulns - addresses exchanged unencrypted - atker can see addr of approved device & sub with own - managing large num of addr challenging ![](https://i.imgur.com/69CqEc1.png) ![](https://i.imgur.com/fmfeCom.png) ### SSID Broadcasting - service set identifer (SSID) - user-supplied network name of wireless network - broadcast so any device can see - broadcast can be restricted - some wireless security sources encourage users to config their APSs to prevent broadcast of SSID - not advertisiing SSID only provide weak degree of security - limitations - SSID can be discovered when transmitted in other frames - may prevent users from freely roaming from 1 AP coverage to other - not always possible to off SSID beaconing Wireless Security Solutions --- - unified approach to WLAN security needed - IEEE & wifi alliance began developing security solutions - standards used today - IEEE 802.11i - WPA & WPA2 ### Wifi Protected Access (WPA) - introduced in 2003 by wifi alliance - subset of IEEE 802.11i - 2 modes - WPA personal - WPA enterprise - WPA addresses both encryption & auth #### Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) Encryption - TKIP encryption - used in WPA - uses longer 128bit key than WEP - dynamically generated for ea new packet - includes __message integrity check (MIC)__ designed to prevent MITM atks #### Preshared Key (PSK) Authentication - auth for WPA personal uses preshared key (PSK) - after AP configed, client device must have same key value entered - key shared prior to comm - use passphrase to generate encryption key - must be entered on ea AP & wireless device in advance - devices with secret key auto auth by AP #### WPA Vulnerabilities - key management - key sharing done manually w/o security - keys must be changed regularly - key must be disclosed to guest users - passphrases - PSK passphrases of fewer than 20 chars subj to cracking ### WPA2 - 2nd gen of WPA - introduced in 2004 - based on final IEEE 802.11i standard - 2 modes - WPA2 personal - WPA2 enterprise - addresses major security areas of WLANs - encryption - auth #### AES-CCMP Encryption - advanced encryption standard (AES) blk cipher - AES performs 3 steps on every blk (128bits) of plaintext - within 2nd step, multiple iterations performed - bytes substituted & rearranged - __counter mode with cipher block chaining message authentication code protocol (CCMP)__ - encryption protocol used for WPA2 - specifies use of CCM with AES - __cipher blk chaining msg auth code (CBC-MAC)__ component of CCMP provides data integrity & auth - both CCMP & TKIP use 128bit key for encryption - both use 64bit MIC value ### IEEE 802.1x Authentication - orignally developed for wired networks - higher degree of security by implmenting port-based auth - blks all traffic on port-by-port basis until client authenticated ![](https://i.imgur.com/6jm47Ac.png) #### Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) - framework for transporting auth protocols - defines msg format - uses 4 types of packets - request - response - success - failure - common EAP protocol is __protected EAP (PEAP)__ - simplifies deployment of 802.1x using microsoft windows logins & passwords - creates encrypted channel between client & auth server ![](https://i.imgur.com/wCwqvSp.png) More Wireless Security Protections --- - other security steps - rogue AP system detection - using correct type of AP - AP config settings - wireless peripheral protection ### Rogue AP System Detection - rogue AP discovery tools - 4 types of wireless probes can monitor airwaves for traffic - wireless device probe - desktop probe - access pt probe - dedicated probe - one suspicious signal detected by wireless probe - info sent to centralised db whr WLAN management system software compares it to list of approved APs - any device not on list considered rogue AP ### AP Types - devided into - fat vs thin - controller vs standalone - captive portal APs #### Fat vs Thin APs - autonomous APs have intelligence to manage wireless auth, encryption & other funcs for wireless devices they serve - __fat APs__ - lightweight APs dont contain all management & config funcs found in fat APs - __thin APs__ #### Standalone vs Controller APs - controller APs managed through dedicated __wireless LAN controller (WLC)__ - WLC is single device that can be configed & settings automatically distributed to all controller APs - other advantages of controller APs - handoff procedure eliminated as all auths performed in WLC - offer tools that provide for monitoring env & providing info regarding best locations for APs, wireless AP config settings & power settings ![](https://i.imgur.com/8cwrttH.png) #### Captive Portal APs - use standard web browser to provide info - gives wireless user the opportunity to agree to policy/present valid login credentials ### AP Configuration & Device Options - other AP config settings designed to limit spread of wireless RF signal - so that min amt of signal extends past phy boundaries of enterprise to be accessible to outsiders - site surveys - in-depth examination & analysis of wireless LAN site - signal strength settings - some APs alow adjustment of power lvl which LAN transmits - reducing power allows less signal to rch outsiders - spectrum selection - some APs provide ability to adjust freq spectrum settings including - freq band - channel selection - channel width - antennas - AP shld be located near center of coverage area - place high on wall to reduce signal obstructions & deter theft - possibly, AP & antenna shld be positioned so minimal amt of signal reaches beyond security perimeter of building - wireless peripheral protection - vulns in wireless mice & keyboards common - 1 atk can let threat actor inject mouse movements/keystrokes from nearby antenna up to 100 yards away - protections include - updating/replacing any vuln devices - switching to more fully tested bluetooth mice & keyboards - substitute with wired mouse/keyboard Chapter Summary --- ![](https://i.imgur.com/kyZxutk.png) ![](https://i.imgur.com/HeJtbt3.png) ![](https://i.imgur.com/47yUbXx.png) ###### tags: `ISEC` `DISM` `School` `Notes`