# Summary

The data show that aggression toward neighboring countries generally favors Russian President Vladimir Putin at home. The rapid improvement in attitudes toward Putin and the lack of lasting consequences could explain why the Kremlin repeats even ineffective tactics. The potential payoff is high. Maintaining power is a life-or-death matter for Putin today. The cost to both leadership and the Russian public has not dissuaded either that aggression abroad is unwise.

Whether the tactics, like energy blackmail, are judged to be successful depends upon the aim of these actions. Russia's continued aggression abroad has done more than increase the government's approval rates. It also has achieved a desired geopolitical outcome: Preventing or delaying states from joining NATO. If the objective has been to delay or deter accession to NATO, then Russia has succeeded with Georgia and Ukraine.

Just as Putin has adapted to the system around him, NATO can too. NATO can respond to the current circumstances, which seem to incentivize these behaviors from multiple angles. The boost in support associated with taking military action--if genuinely explained by it--is remarkable, lasting, and only seems to wane when Putin violates the unspoken norms of their social contract, as with raising the age for pensions or mobilizing them to fight in Ukraine.

Policymakers who wish to deter Russia from what is now a well-worn series of tactics must tie undesirable actions to costs that the Russian people will perceive as violating Putin's social contract with his subjects. The common behaviors or happenstances that accompany Russian escalation and aggression ([detailed here](/ifGD9IkyQsaXCq85nJDacg)), should be tied to consequences that violate the Russian social contract.


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In 2008, Hedenskog predicted the invasion of Ukraine, shortly after the Russian war with Georgian in 2008 [^5]:
>Logic suggests that Crimea, the only region in Ukraine with an ethnic Russian majority (in addition largely pro-Russian and anti-Western), with its historical links to Russia and contested affiliation to Ukraine, and with its Hero City Sevastopol (the base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet), would be an easy target for the Kremlin's neo-imperialist policy. Other conceivable targets such as Estonia and Latvia – both with substantial Russian minorities – are now members of NATO, which increases the risk for the Kremlin. However Ukraine is still left on its own, without reliable security guarantees from the West.

When the previous excerpt was written, Russia had already acted covertly in Crimea. Tactics commonly associated with Russia and disinformation, more generally like the magnified minority, were mentioned as contributing to the overestimation of the size of "pro-Russian separatist" support. Credible media had heavily covered the "separatists" in Ukraine and thus lent legitimacy to the Kremlin's claims [^8]:
>Despite the fact that the majority of the organisations supported by Russia are still rather small and that their actions and demonstrations rarely gather more than a couple of hundred activists, the activities of these organisations attract large coverage in the mass media and are supported at a high political level in Russia.

Although Russia was aggressive toward Estonia, notably during Estonia's relocation of the Bronze Soldier[^6], the threat from NATO likely encouraged Russian restraint. Compare that with the treatment of Montenegro, where the GRU plotted to kill Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic to dissuade the country from joining NATO[^9]. Despite this extreme act Montenegro joined, but it was the period of two years between its invitation to join and its actual accession that permitted Russia to act. Montenegrins have elected a pro-NATO leader every year since they gained their independence in 2006 so the desire to join NATO alone was not enough to trigger such treachery[^10].

### A self-perpetuating cycle
Russia's behavior creates the incentive for countries to join NATO by unleashing wanton devastation against states like Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine, while exercising restraint toward NATO countries. The Second Chechen War was part of the motivation for Georgia and Ukraine to join.


While some conclude that joining NATO somehow increases the risk of violence, no evidence supports this claim. Decades of evidence show the precise opposite. Russia has never attacked or invaded a NATO country but it has attacked and invaded other countries multiple times. NATO has never invaded or offensively attacked another country.

Russia threatened nuclear retaliation in Sweden, and Finland joined NATO [^12]. When they joined, Russia pretended the situation made "no big difference"[^11]. Juxtapose this sequence of events against what happens when NATO meets expressions of interest with hesitation and delay, as with Georgia and Ukraine. With more time between the decision and accession, it seems likely Russia might have attempted to dissuade both countries.

Nuclear threats have become something of a standard potential response to anything that offends Russia:

* 2008 - [Putin issues nuclear threat to Ukraine over plan to host US shield](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/13/russia.putin)
* 2014 - [Russia simulating nuclear strikes on Sweden](https://www.vice.com/sv/article/dpwk4q/why-is-russian-military-hanging-out-on-swedish-territory)
* 2014 - [Russia threatens nuclear strikes over Crimea](https://thediplomat.com/2014/07/russia-threatens-nuclear-strikes-over-crimea/)
* 2015 - [Russia threatens to use 'nuclear force' over Crimea and the Baltic states](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-threatens-to-use-nuclear-force-over-crimea-and-the-baltic-states-10150565.html)
* 2015 - [Russia threatens to aim nuclear missiles at Denmark ships if it joins NATO shield](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-denmark-russia/russia-threatens-to-aim-nuclear-missiles-at-denmark-ships-if-it-joins-nato-shield-idUSKBN0MI0ML20150322)
* 2016 - [Russia threatens Norway with nuclear attack if it host 350 US Marines](https://www.thelocal.no/20161031/norway-will-suffer-russia-makes-nuclear-threat-over-us-marines)
* 2019 - [Putin Threatens to Target U.S. if it Deploys Nuclear Weapons in Europe](https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2019-02-20/putin-threatens-to-target-us-if-it-deploys-nuclear-weapons-in-europe)

### Living up to a grand idea and noble promise
We see a grand promise: Anyone may join. When countries facing serious security threats, an obvious impetus for interest, express a desire to join NATO, their interest is often met with hesitation or delay, leaving them vulnerable to sabotage and military action from Russia. Russia understands the rules--though it certainly doesn't follow them--which is why it threatens other countries' territorial integrity.

NATO must also learn from the situation by finding a path to membership that removes removing that incentive, while also attaching consequences for aggression to the Russian social contract.

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###### tags: `Hoaxlines` `Russia` `autocracy` `Timeline`

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[^1]: The separatist movements in Georgia appear to have been substantial on their own and have a history that dates back to the fall of the Soviet Union. That does not appear to have been true in Ukraine, and individuals leading it have been identified as Russian military. Emails [exchanged between](https://informnapalm.org/en/frolovleaks-vii-budgeting-the-russian-spring-mayhem/) collaborators in Ukraine and contacts within the Kremlin show that the call for referendum were largely manufactured. Russia attempted to foment a civil war and when that was unsuccessful, sent troops without markings.

[^2]: NATO airstrikes came after several years of genocide--[a real one](https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/stories/atrocities041099.htm)--and forced Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milosevic, to withdraw from Kosovo. In the case of Chechnya there was no clear leader who could acquiesce to Russia. "[Between July 12 and 17 (1995)](https://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/20/world/prosecutors-say-document-links-milosevic-to-genocide.html) more than 7,000 unarmed Muslim men and boys were executed by forces under Bosnian Serb control. Many were transported en masse to sites near Srebrenica and then killed; others died when they tried to escape after being captured."

[^3]: Another pipeline explosion happened in a section controlled by Gazprom, which purchased nearly all of Turkmenistans gas. [2009 - [Russia blamed for pipeline blast](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7993625.stm)]
[^4]: **Figure 1.**
Brown, Sierra (2019) ["Russia's Use of the Energy Weapon: How Russia Manipulates Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic States,"](https://digitalcommons.morris.umn.edu/horizons/vol6/iss1/1) Scholarly Horizons: University of Minnesota, Morris Undergraduate Journal: Vol. 6: Iss. 1, Article 1.
[^5]: Hedenskog, J. (2008). (rep.). [_Crimea After the Georgian Crisis_](https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--2587--SE) (Ser. Security, safety and vulnerability analysis , p. 7). Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Defence Research Agency.
[^6]: Herzog, S. (2011). [Revisiting the Estonian Cyber Attacks: Digital Threats and Multinational Responses.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/26463926) Journal of Strategic Security, 4(2), 49–60.; 2) Mardiste, D. (2007). Russia to Estonia: Don’t move our statue. [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-estonia-russia-statue-idUSL2378719620070125); 3) Yasmann, V. (16:23:37Z). Monument Dispute Gets Dirty. [Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty](https://www.rferl.org/a/1076297.html).
[^7]: (1) [Claim (in 2004, 2015 and 2017): The U.S. government supported Chechen separatism](https://www.russiamatters.org/node/20317) (2) [Imitating NATO: A Script Is Adapted for Chechnya (Published 1999)](https://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/28/world/imitating-nato-a-script-is-adapted-for-chechnya.html) (3) [Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies](https://web.archive.org/web/20140501050127/http:/mdb.cast.ru/mdb/3-2002/ac/raowdsmcc/#:~:text=Nevertheless%2C%20they%20have,of%20Urus%2DMartan.), a group based in Moscow, reported of the Stinger missiles: "...a Stinger has a service life of two years and the United States long ago stopped their deliveries to Afghanistan from where Chechen rebels received them." (4) The CIA [attempted](https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1992-12-06-9204210095-story.html) to buyback these missiles. (5) Members of the Taliban [came from](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan) the Mujahideen, a group that had resisted the Soviet Union occupation of Afghanistan with covert help from the CIA, although not all members of the Mujahideen went on to become the Taliban. Furthermore, the Taliban [recognized](https://web.archive.org/web/20210909020840/https://jamestown.org/program/the-taliban-formally-recognizes-chechnya/) Chechen independence in 2000, and Russia had accused the Taliban of supporting Chechen separatists. Thus, this seems the most probably explanation for how the Chechens came to possess a Stinger missile as the US did not even recognize Chechen independence.
[^8]: Hedenskog, J. (2008). (rep.). [_Crimea After the Georgian Crisis_](https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--2587--SE) (Ser. Security, safety and vulnerability analysis , p. 7). Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Defence Research Agency.
[^9]: Russia Monitor. (2019, May 9). Russian GRU Agents Found Guilty of Attempted Montenegro Coup. Warsaw Institute. https://warsawinstitute.org/russian-gru-agents-found-guilty-attempted-montenegro-coup/

[^10]: Senate Hearing 115-459: The Attempted Coup in Montenegro and Malign Russian Influence in 1 Europe. (2017). US Government Publishing Office. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg34738/html/CHRG-115shrg34738.htm
[^11]: Reuters. (2022, May 17). Russia’s Lavrov says Finland, Sweden joining NATO makes “no big difference.” Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-lavrov-says-finland-sweden-joining-nato-makes-no-big-difference-2022-05-17/
[^12]: Faulconbridge, G. (2022, April 14). Russia warns of nuclear, hypersonic deployment if Sweden and Finland join NATO. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-warns-baltic-nuclear-deployment-if-nato-admits-sweden-finland-2022-04-14/