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# System prepended metadata

title: Proposal 16 - Timelock instructions

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# [Draft] Proposal 16 - Timelocked Transactions

#### Type

Operations project

#### Entrepreneur(s)

HenryE, Prophet

## Overview

The current governance contracts remain susceptible to the risk of malicious proposals passing due to manipulation of the TWAP or other methods still unknown.

Putting the assets under the control of a timelock contract can help to mitigate that risk. The timelock contract would initiate a countdown triggered by Governance votes, delaying the execution of proposal transactions by 3 to 5 days. This provides a long enough window for a permission revoking proposal to be passed before the timelocked transactions can be executed.

An additional benefit of the timelock contract is that it adds support for multiple transaction execution, something missing from the current autocrat contract. 

While the contract itself is mostly finished, there needs to be a discussion of what other attack vectors or risks moving assets over to a timelock contract might bring.

## Discussion Points

- How does knowing about the existence of the timelock change the incentives of keeping the proposal markets efficient. Will people simply let bad proposals pass knowing they can more easily revoke them later on than deal with a manipulator head on?
- Can the DAO be griefed by malicious proposals to revoke permission of genuine proposals that already passed?


## Execution

### Move to Futarchy repo

The contract is currently up as a PR https://github.com/metaDAOproject/futarchy/pull/163 . Migrating DAO assets to be under a timelock's control could be done as part of the next set of program upgrade.
