# Governance upgrade: call agenda ### Situation We (DAO Ops team) work on the DG landscape doc to figure out if the DG is the best solution for the principal-agent problem of Lido DAO governance. When discussing principles and constraints, we realized we are not exactly sure of the final goals we set. Options we see (one of these or both? which one is higher in priority): - protect stakers and their assets in case of governance misalignment - protect the protocol in case of governance misalignment ### Questions Q1. What is the final goal of governance upgrade? Q2. What properties of the upgraded governance are musthave, what are optional? Q3. For DG, the new attack vectors originate from using a utility token as a governance token. Why DG as a potential solution is being prioritized over setting up some kind of structure with overriding permissions (e.g. using a safeguard multisig instead of granting veto power to utility token holders)? Pretty much any solution we consider adds extra risks and attack vectors. For constraints, we figured out we weren't sure about which of them have bigger weight, e.g. - Credible neutrality as a requirement rules out using multisigs. Is this requirement critical (see Q3)? - is preserving the option for stakers to quit before any breaking changes have been implemented vital? - is having the simplest possible solution vital? If we only want to protect the stakers, we can go with a much simpler solution, than when trying to save the protocol (e.g. some kind of global settlement etc.). ### Notes Point of tension: is following the credible neutrality principle really important to the point where we choose to introduce new risks rather than using a multisig setup. In case our problem with using multisigs is impossibility to gather a proper group of signers (because they aren't willing to participate), we need to make a field research first and make sure this is true. ### Links [DG landscape draft outline](https://hackmd.io/7HNjePLWQu2kHSsFabNH-g?view)