---
# System prepended metadata

title: 'Forum at a Glance: January 20th - January 27th, 2022'
tags: [Forum at a Glance]

---

---
tags: Forum at a Glance
---

# Forum at a Glance: January 20th - January 27th, 2022

![](https://i.imgur.com/FubNdgk.png)

The one-stop shop for finding out what’s being discussed by governance right now.

*Links reflect my view of the most noteworthy activities in the governance, risk, and oracles categories right now. Disagree? Think something should be added? Leave a reply or a pm.*

## Three-Point Summary

‘What’s the most relevant information on the forums this week for MKR and Dai holders?’

- Check out the [analysis on the performance of the Collateral and Surplus auctions](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/flappy-friday-clip-and-flap-analysis/12790) during Flappy Friday.
- Please, welcome a [new Incubating Core Unit, Maker Academy!](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/maker-academy-new-incubating-core-unit/12761)
- Take a look at the [Governance-Boosted MKR token proposal.](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/gbmkr-a-proposal-to-benefit-long-term-mkr-holders/12756)
----------
## ICYMI - Announcements

**[Parameter Changes Proposal - PPG-OMC-001 - 2022-01-27](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/parameter-changes-proposal-ppg-omc-001-2022-01-27/12883)**
With the outcome of recent events and volatility in the crypto market, it's important to bring light to today's Parameter Changes Proposal. 

Competitive Rates in DeFi have been pretty stable until last week’s crash but have dropped significantly since then as borrowers deleverage their debt positions to protect against getting liquidated or reduce their long exposure in anticipation of bearish market sentiment. Similarly, funding rates on Centralized exchanges fell and are holding close to 2 years lows at 3.07% currently on Binance.

Aside from the changes on the overall Lending Market, there has also been a huge DAI supply through the USDC-PSM, pushing the stablecoin ratio from ~50% to ~62%, and we, therefore, propose to lower the rates across the board for non-stable-assets and LP-vault-types to stimulate DAI minting.

Below are the proposed changes:
(*Please visit the original post for more information on these proposed changes*)

- ETH-A: decrease Stability Fee by 0.25% from 2.50% to 2.25%
- WBTC-A: decrease Stability Fee by 0.25% from 4.00% to 3.75%
- ETH-B: decrease Stability Fee by 2.50% from 6.50% to 4.00%
- WBTC-B: decrease Stability Fee by 2.00% from 7.00% to 5.00%
- WBTC-C: decrease Stability Fee by 0.75% from 1.50% to 0.75%
- AAVE-D3M: decrease Target Borrow Rate (bar) by 0.25% from 3.75% to 3.50%
- WSTETH-A: decrease Stability Fee by 0.50% from 3.00% to 2.50%
- GUNIV3DAIUSDC1-A: decrease Maximum Debt Ceiling (line) from 500 MM to 100 MM
- GUNIV3DAIUSDC2-A: decrease Stability Fee by 0.25% from 0.50% to 0.25%, increase Maximum Debt Ceiling (line) from 500 MM to 750 MM, and increase Target Available Debt (gap) from 10 MM to 50 MM
- UNIV2DAIETH-A: decrease Stability Fee by 1.00% from 2.00% to 1.00%
- UNIV2WBTCETH-A: decrease Stability Fee by 1.00% from 3.00% to 2.00%
- UNIV2USDCETH-A: decrease Stability Fee by 1.00% from 2.50% to 1.50%
- TUSD-A: decrease Stability Fee by 1.00% from 1.00% to 0.00%

Revenue Effects:
The PPG anticipate the effect on annualized revenue - assuming stable levels of utilization - to be:

- -5.0 MM by the Stability Fee decrease on ETH-A
- -2.4 MM by the Stability Fee decrease on WBTC-A
- -1.0 MM by the Stability Fee decrease on ETH-B
- -0.0 MM by the Stability Fee decrease on WBTC-B
- -0.0 MM by the Stability Fee decrease on WBTC-C
- +2.5 MM by the Target Borrow Rate decrease on AAVE-D3M
- -0.2 MM by the Stability Fee decrease on WSTETH-A
- -0.1 MM by the Stability Fee decrease on GUNIV3DAIUSDC2-A
- -0.0 MM by the Stability Fee decrease on UNIV2DAIETH-A
- -0.0 MM by the Stability Fee decrease on UNIV2WBTCETH-A
- -0.1 MM by the Stability Fee decrease on UNIV2USDCETH-A
- -0.3 MM by the Stability Fee decrease on TUSD-A (note: is already undercollateralized and will be negated as soon the vaults are liquidated)

The proposed changes, if confirmed, should decrease yearly revenue by about 6.7 MM DAI.

**[Data API 1.1.0: Introducing Protocol Parameters](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/data-api-1-1-0-introducing-protocol-parameters/12866)**
@data-insights-cu have a freshly baked dataset that focuses on the parameters of the protocol. From collateral-specific parameters to system-wide parameters.

You can filter the data by parameter name, collateral, or by date, allowing you to answer the following questions and more:

- What were the protocol parameters at this date?
- What impact or changes did this executive vote have on the protocol?
- What were the historical values of this parameter for this collateral?

They provided three new endpoints:

- parameter_list: list of all available parameters
- parameter_snapshot: the value of the parameter
- parameter_events: the change in value for the parameter

You can pair any of your datasets and analyses with a good glass wine the parameters dataset to understand the effect of spells on the protocol.

They have improved the governance dataset and provided a dedicated endpoint for spells. We’ve included an item called “impact,” which lets you know how many protocol parameters it has impacted.

Other additions to the API include a new executives endpoint; while the original one allows you to get all events related to the executive, the new one acts as a summary of all available executives, including their human-readable title!

**[On the State of the Auctions UIs](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/on-the-state-of-the-auctions-uis/12844)**
These past days of high market volatility (i.e., Flappy Friday) have painfully pointed out that the state of UIs built for interacting with auctions (CLIP, FLAP, and FLOP auctions) is fragmented, somewhat deprecated, and clunky. With this thread, we hope to clarify the state of these UIs, where they are going and lastly, announce some short-term measures to increase the discoverability of the appropriate UIs for end-users.

Right now, there are three UIs in the MakerDAO ecosystem that allows for interacting with auctions—varying in functionality and user-friendliness. This is confusing to users, especially given the lack of documentation/clarity on how/when to use these UIs, which are detailed in the *original* post. 

While @sidestream-core-unit is building out their new Unified Auctions UI during this transition period, it is yet a feature parity. By identifying this transitionary period, @dux-core-unit decided to target the low-hanging fruit of improving the discoverability of UIs; In collaboration with @lukass of the @sidestream-core-unit, the @dux-core-unit have defined a couple of short-term measures that would increase the discoverability of the right UIs for end-users.

- @dux-core-unit adds a banner to the old Liquidations Portal, informing users of the newly built Unified Auctions UI.
- @sidestream-core-unit adds banners/indicators to ilks that are not yet supported by the new Unified Auctions UI, redirecting users to the old Liquidations Portal.
- Throughout MakerDAO’s websites and documentation, @dux-core-unit makes sure to point users to the Unified Auctions UI 4—this page serves as a landing page for all things auctions, given that it includes explainers and up-to-date links to all relevant resources. This includes makerdao.com, makerdao.world, vote.makerdao.com, etc.
- Through the Collateral Management for OnChain (CMON) initiative, the @dux-core-unit continues to work through this transition phase until @sidestream-core-unit is ready to fully own the domain of auction UIs—@dux-core-unit can then decide on the fate of the older UIs and their URLs.

*Visit the original post for some more details on the new Unified Auctions UI.*

**[Flappy Friday - CLIP and FLAP Analysis](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/flappy-friday-clip-and-flap-analysis/12790)**
Friday was one for the history books, another stress test of the liquidation system, not dissimilar to the COVID market meltdown of March 2020. The protocol performed quite well, processing $134MM of liquidations through the improved Liquidations 2.0 system without any major issue. This liquidation event was the largest in MakerDAO’s history. As a result, approximately 15.5MM in penalty fees were collected and sent to the Surplus Buffer. During this time, a few Core Units took the opportunity to claim their budgets while the rest of the excess surplus was sent to buy and burn MKR through Surplus Auctions.

The RISK Core Unit put out a timely [analysis on the performance of the Collateral and Surplus auctions](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/flappy-friday-clip-and-flap-analysis/12790) showing: 

>...that collateral auctions performance was good in terms of outcome for Maker as all penalty fees got collected, but less efficient when looking at the amount of collateral received back by certain larger vault owners that got liquidated. As for `FLAP`s(surplus auctions), the slippage or the auction inefficiency was much lower than initially expected, thanks to community bidding through `Flap` UI and helping protocol avoid 0 bids.

The report covers many specific details of Friday’s auctions, including specific coverage of the largest concern early in the day regarding the [7-siblings vault owner that had 632m debt at risk](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/flappy-friday-clip-and-flap-analysis/12790#h-7-siblings-vault-owner-2), as well as the eventual [Flap Auction performance](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/flappy-friday-clip-and-flap-analysis/12790#flaps-surplus-auctions-3) that incurred larger-than-acceptable slippage.

>the (surplus auction) bids were not as efficient as they normally are (on average, about 3-4% slippage measured historically). The effective slippage of these auctions was 19.55% which means protocol overspent about 2.5m DAI for MKR collected. Assuming regular slippage of 3-4%, the inefficiency cost of this event measures about 2.1m.

Follow-up governance actions are pending. Recognized Delegate, @Ultraschuppi posted an [Urgent Signal Request](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/urgent-signal-request-stop-mkr-burning/12806) to temporarily deactivate MKR burn by setting the Surplus Buffer to 250MM. This is intended as a short-term action to buy the DAO time for determining the wisest next steps. Some options include; rate-limiting surplus auctions, converting them to the dutch auction mechanism(Liquidations 2.0), and longer-term solutions like reconsidering the tokenomics of the burn mechanism itself.

**[Cayman Islands and the EU AML High Risk Third Countries List](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/cayman-islands-and-the-eu-aml-high-risk-third-countries-list/12805)**
The Maker protocol’s Real World Finance program continues to attract potential asset originators from Europe and other jurisdictions. As the Real World Finance Core Unit, with the support of Legal, reviews potential structures to adopt real-world assets into the Maker vault, @Real-World-Finance will need to be attuned to regulatory developments in various jurisdictions.

The European Union [recently proposed](https://maples.com/en/knowledge-centre/2022/1/cayman-islands-and-the-eu-aml-high-risk-third-countries-list) to add the Cayman Islands to the list of “high-risk countries.” As noted in the Maples link provided below: “Amendments made to the EU Securitisation Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 on April 9th, 2021 affect the use of special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”) established in non-EU jurisdictions included on the EU AML List. Accordingly, specific advice should be taken by affected EU entities concerning securitizations (defined in the EU Securitisation Regulation) which use Cayman Islands SPVs.”

**[Maker Academy: New Incubating Core Unit](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/maker-academy-new-incubating-core-unit/12761)**
Maker Academy is a new incubating core unit under SES's incubation program.

Core Unit Introduction:

-   Maker Academy will strive to be the go-to source of education regarding MakerDAO. Learners of MakerDAO will no longer be presented with a conflicting, fragmented, and unorganized body of information.
-   Maker Academy will become an essential part of onboarding by leveraging its future, active community of MakerDAO learners to create a pool of potential hires. Maker Academy will also specialize in making onboarding content for each core unit.
-   Maker Academy plans to both produce educational content and facilitate the production of it. Maker Academy will guide creators in making exceptionally clear and concise content, accomplished by following the highest standards of communication and pedagogy.
-   Maker Academy will encourage knowledge-sharing amongst the core units to aggregate their documentation, new discoveries, and other relevant information in one easy-to-find place.

Facilitator Introduction:

-   Colby Anderson has a strong background in pedagogy/education, previous experience in project management, and in-depth technical knowledge of computer science and finance that gives me the ability to create and curate the highest quality educational material about blockchains/DeFi.
-   4 years studying pedagogy/epistemology, three years studying computer science and blockchains, two years studying finance/DeFi, two years in project management, 0.5 years with MakerDAO
-   Discord: colbyanderson#8887

What's Next?

-   Our first goal is to create the Maker Academy website that will host all of our educational material. Maker Academy plans to already have a few pieces of content when they release our MVP. They will have a more official introduction of our core unit after the release of the MVP. If the MVP generates a positive response, they plan to move forward with our MIP submissions.

Call to Action:

-   Maker Academy needs more employees to accomplish our goals. They need a [front end developer](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1NEJqCvVSKCrUw2u6qxegmpq2KCMc91ZfKx_M31kTMis/edit?usp=sharing) and a [content producer](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1dQUANrZgj62v08eaX2aZI_0t0-vzvFfsDJMOTWZXhbc/edit?usp=sharing). If you know of anyone, please contact me on Discord.
-   If you have any ideas regarding Maker Academy...directions they could pursue, adding to our vision, suggesting more problems that Maker Academy can solve, best ways to produce content, basically any idea... please comment on this post or reach out in Discord!
-   If you or someone you know is developing any educational material regarding MakerDAO or if you need material developed, please reach out to me in Discord!

Resources:

-   [Maker Academy's Mission, Vision, & Strategy](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1OVND7VUNhdDCpC2xMpHqZEH0xsvVSvF3rpL0iAapdl0/edit?usp=sharing) This document is still under development. Feel free to leave comments on this document!
-   [Maker Academy's Roadmap](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Ab3sNHyCnm54OZAHXveFjUlXfyme3S4mPVhyj66mjt4/edit?usp=sharing) This document is still under development. Feel free to leave comments on this document!
-   [Maker Academy's Discord.](https://discord.gg/FTwZQJkbZr)

**[Collateral Management Lifecycle (CML)](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/collateral-management-lifecycle-cml/12751)**
Since the inception of CES, managing Maker protocol collateral as a product has become a central theme: MIP39c2-SP12, MIP39c2-SP20, and Collateral Engineering Services Product Plan. Now that @collateral-core-unit has successfully hired a team and is operational, the focus shifts to the formation and execution of the product plan.

To achieve the CES mandate, "Scale the Dai supply by enabling anyone to onboard collateral in a stable and cost-effective manner," it is imperative @collateral-core-unit manage collateral as a product and introduce what we refer to as the Collateral Management Lifecycle (CML).

When @collateral-core-unit reduces the CML to the basics, several distinct Lifecycle Initiatives reinforce the Maker protocol's CES mandate and continuing requirements.

- Support the ongoing onboarding needs of On Chain (crypto native) collateral.
- Architect and implement Off-Chain (real-world assets) collateral solutions to aggressively onboard and scale Dai.
- Enable a portion of prospective collateral to be onboarded using individuals, partners, and/or intermediaries.
- Maintain and operationalize all collateral within the Maker protocol.
- Support the entire collateral lifecycle with Product Management best practices.

Currently, the Maker protocol comprises two main [types of collateral](https://daistats.com/#/collateral), which are on-chain and off-chain. It is important to note while both types of collateral follow the same CML, there are differences in the implementation details, and with that in mind, @collateral-core-unit are developing the CML to encompass all collateral types while addressing the specific needs of the assets.

*Check out the original post for a thorough breakdown of the CML's processes, deliverables, operations, and goals.*

---
:wave:*Looking for more posts and updates?*

##### *Check out [recent Core Unit monthly updates](https://forum.makerdao.com/tag/cu-update) for December. Keep in mind that there will be a COMPLETE post of all January 2022 Core Unit and non-Core Unit team updates published early February by yours truly, COM-001 :smile:*

##### *Check out the weekly [updates](https://forum.makerdao.com/tag/update) and [summaries](https://forum.makerdao.com/tag/summary) from our teams and Core Units.*

##### *Check out the monthly Financial Reports [here.](https://forum.makerdao.com/tag/financial-report)*

-----
## [Active Discussions](https://forum.makerdao.com/latest)

‘What’s going on? You think what?! You’re 100% wrong, and here’s why…’

**[[Informal Poll] RWA Borrowers to Pay for Maker’s External Legal Costs](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/informal-poll-rwa-borrowers-to-pay-for-makers-external-legal-costs/12816)**
It is a common market practice that the borrower pays for the lender’s counsel to prepare financing documents. These amounts may be subsequently financed under the financing documents, enabling the borrower to finance such external legal costs. If the financing never closes, the borrower assumes these external legal costs at its risk.

As the Maker community seeks to scale the Real World Finance program, the Real World Finance Core Unit and the Maker community must support external counsel. This is commercially standard practice. To that end, this Poll seeks Maker community support of the approach that borrowers be required to pay for Maker’s external legal support.

To manage the borrower’s costs, it is proposed that overall transaction legal fees be divided as follows:

- Fees incurred by Maker: External legal review of agreements relating to legal entities specific to interacting with the Maker protocol (e.g., Delaware statutory trust or similar legal entity required for financing through the Maker protocol).
- Fees incurred by Borrower: All other external legal reviews associated with the transaction (e.g., legal due diligence, financing agreements, etc.).
- External counsel can easily allocate their time on the above basis.
- Borrowers may object to this approach to add to their transaction costs. However, it is common market practice. Further, it will ensure that borrowers carefully review their budgets and structures before engaging with Maker.
- Borrowers may want to have an external counsel of their choice. This is not acceptable. Borrowers may be incentivized to find low-cost, inexperienced counsel.

In the first instance, there can more recommendations for the borrowers to consider. It may also be acceptable for borrowers to present two or more law firms for consideration regarding any transaction. In any event, the final selection should have lender alignment.

As we continue to provide legal support to the Real World Finance Core Unit, we will coordinate with the Real World Finance Core Unit to review the proposed firms and together will reach a collaborative decision on which firm to choose based on (1) relevant lawyer transaction experience, (2) comparative cost, and (3) ability to execute a transaction on the proposed timeline.

**[Thoughts on increasing the difficulty of a successful governance attack](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/thoughts-on-increasing-the-difficulty-of-a-successful-governance-attack/12840)**
With everything that has happened, it's easy to forget that just last week, we were shown that a sufficiently motivated actor with enough collateral could at a low cost get hold of enough MKR to be able to affect the governance process and, in some cases even get enough to dictate it. This is detrimental to the long-term stability of Maker. The recent routs in the markets have only lowered these costs and made it easier to borrow most tokens and buy the rest.

The following gives an overview of MKR in governance at the time of writing:

- Around 75k MKR usually decides proposals. Most of the votes are cast by the recognized delegates.
-   Between them, recognized delegates have 77k MKR
    -   There is a total of 9 recognized delegates
    -   The largest Delegate controls 42% of all recognized delegate votes, the second-largest 26%, and the third-largest 13%
-   Shadow delegates have 21k MKR between them
    -   There are a total of 11 shadow delegates
    -   The largest shadow delegate controls 8% of all delegated votes, the second-largest 6%, and the third-largest 5%
    -   Shadow delegates vote infrequently
-   Votes coming from outside delegates are minuscule compared to delegated vote, rarely breaking 2k MKR.

As we saw, gaining 40k MKR is easily possible in the open market. This means that such an actor alone, with support from a few actors inside the protocol, could sway the vote in whatever direction desired. It also means that decisions are largely determined by what the three largest delegates determine. Overall that leaves very few failure points for this vector of attack.

The long-term solution is to increase the incentives for MKR holders to get involved in governance. There has been [one great thread discussing that](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/improving-governance-participation-rate-at-makerdao/11706), and there has also been discussion about lock-in periods or giving MKR more voting power for being locked up longer. My opinion is that the root cause is still too many disincentives for the MKR holder to have it participate in governance.

While we address the root cause, we think there might be a shorter-term solution to make the protocol more robust in the face of governance attacks. The key is in the MKR treasury. We could utilize MKR held in the treasury by placing it in some form of delegation. Some of the MKR in treasury is committed for vesting, but at least 50k is freely available in the short and medium-term (2-3 years). Delegation does not transfer any ownership and is freely able to be withdrawn for practical purposes should the need arise. I've thought of several possible configurations.

-   Delegating parts of the treasury to Recognized Delegates as an even sum per Delegate. As an example, 3k MKR.
-   Immediately increases the barrier to governance attack by 27k MKR
-   Decreases the relative voting power between the delegates
-   Must make provisions for what happens when new delegates join or quit and whether there should be other requirements to qualify (i.e., performance metrics, length of time served, the minimum number of MKR delegated)
-   Increases relative voting power to recognized delegates at the expense of shadow delegates and undelegated actors
-   Must maintain a reserve of MKR in the treasury to add more delegates or redistribute at certain points.
-   Delegating parts of the treasury to recognized delegates on a pro-rate to the numbers they already have delegated. Example 30k MKR total, 42% to largest Delegate, 26% to second largest, and so on.
    -   Immediately increases the barrier to governance attacks by 30k
    -   Maintains the relative voting power between delegates
    -   Must make provisions for what happens when new delegates join or quit, when delegates either get more or less MKR delegated, and whether there should be other criteria to qualify (i.e., performance metrics, length of time served, the minimum number of MKR delegated)
    -   Increases relative voting power to recognized delegates at the expense of shadow delegates and undelegated actors
-   Creating a treasury voting proxy and delegating a set amount to it. Example 50k MKR.
    -   Maintains relative voting powers between all MKR holders, except in cases where this delegation is deemed necessary.
    -   Must make provisions for who controls the treasury votes and under what circumstances they will be deployed.
    -   Potentially slower to react as it will not be a regular part of governance

The different parameters within each configuration merit their discussions, but we wanted to provide a framework to start from.

We fully realize that as a recognized delegate, there is a potential conflict of interest here, but we still think there is merit to the discussion and if the community deems it fit that someone not similarly constrained, put it into a more formal proposal.

**[gbMKR, a proposal to benefit long-term MKR holders](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/gbmkr-a-proposal-to-benefit-long-term-mkr-holders/12756)**
Instead of voting with MKR, as is done today, this proposal suggests gbMKR (governance-boosted MKR) replace MKR in governance voting. MKR would be locked up to 4 years in a contract to mint gbMKR.

The current Maker governance system allows any holder of the MKR token to vote on proposals that have meaningful long-term effects on the protocol. gbMKR improves on existing MKR governance by empowering long-term token holders.

Instead of voting with the token amount, MKR tokens are lockable in a VotingEscrow for a selectable lock time t1, where t1 < tmax, and tmax = 4 years. After locking, the time left to unlock is t ≤ t1. The voting weight is equal to: w = a*t/tmax.

The voting power of gbMKR decreases linearly as a function of time since lock. For example, when a user sets a four-year lock for some amount of gbMKR - that amount has an initial 100% voting weight. After one year, the weight will be 75%; after two years, the weight will be 50%. gbMKR holders must continually extend their lock time to maintain voting weight.

gbMKR is a non-transferable token. However, as pointed out by YFI, this can be “bypassed via wrapped derivatives such as the Yearn yveCRV vault or Convex’s cvxCRV product.”

As additional consideration, users could unlock their gbMKR back into MKR before the set lock time. The tradeoff for the early unlock would be an MKR penalty distributed back to the other gbMKR holders.

@paraficapital mentions potential engineering considerations by proposing a Mandate for Maker Developers to create the components at their discretion. In addition, they will provide future considerations that give gbMKR token holders a governance boost but no additional economic incentives. The following could be implemented later to introduce further incentives.

@paraficapital welcome any feedback and would like for the community to discuss this proposal and incorporate items as needed. They plan to have a signal vote before moving on-chain.

**[In defense of bigger Surplus Buffer](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/in-defense-of-bigger-surplus-buffer/12875)**
In this short write-up, @krzkaczor wants to personally convince our dear Maker holders why increasing Surplus Buffer is the right strategy to ensure the long-term growth of the protocol.

Big Surplus Buffer fuels future protocol growth by allowing us to get involved in riskier endeavors without risking flop auctions. There are many riskier activities that DAO can do, which have the independent risk of total failure. Debt ceilings of the size of the whole surplus buffer can be used to cap exposure for each of these. This way, we can prevent these activities from becoming an existential threat to the protocol yet still tap into new markets.

@krzkaczor believes that Maker is in the place where we shouldn’t seek short-sighted gains by burning MKR but rather reinvest in growth. Increasing SB is the simplest way to do that. This doesn’t mean a decrease in MKR price. By focusing on future growth, the value of MKR should increase in the eyes of many investors. A perfect example here is Amazon, which never issued any dividends, but it is still one of the most valuable stocks in the world. Burning MKR now is like preferring cents today rather than millions in a few years.

If you support this idea, please vote in favor of a high SB in any future governance voting. 250M recently voted in is fine for now, in my opinion, but we shouldn’t be burning MKR again anytime soon.

------
## [Seeking Consensus](https://forum.makerdao.com/tag/active-signal)

‘Yo, do you even signal?’

**[[Signal Request] bring back the MKR burn](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/signal-request-bring-back-the-mkr-burn/12837)**
*Signal Request Ends February 4th*
With the [executive vote](https://vote.makerdao.com/executive/template-executive-vote-temporarily-prevent-surplus-flap-auctions-and-mkr-burn-january-24-2022?network=mainnet#proposal-detail) that was recently scheduled, we are going to have the [Surplus Buffer](https://manual.makerdao.com/parameter-index/core/param-system-surplus-buffer) set to 250 MM so no further burning will happen anytime soon ([discussion](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/urgent-signal-request-stop-mkr-burning/12806)). This has been done as a counteraction of the [events of last friday](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/flappy-friday-clip-and-flap-analysis/12790) is meant as a short term fix.

[@hexonaut](https://forum.makerdao.com/u/hexonaut) from the Protocol Engineering Team already has drafted a more [sustainable solution](https://github.com/makerdao/dss/pull/244) that has the potential to be activated on mainnet soon. This will introduce rate limiting into the Flapper, limiting the number of parallel auctions.

However, multiple ideas of replacing the current Flapper have been floating around in the past. In response, @ultraschuppi submits a Signal Request to find out whether the community would like to either (A) do nothing and not burn any more MKR until we have a long term solution in place, or (B) introduce Rate Limiting into the Flapper and bring back MKR burning as soon as possible.

**[Offloading TUSD-A](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/signal-request-offloading-tusd-a/12814)**
*Signal Request Ends February 4th*
A [discussion](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/tusd-is-undergoing-a-material-change-to-its-ownership-structure-is-there-a-process-for-reducing-exposure-in-the-event-of-a-material-change/5691) and [signal-request](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/signal-request-manage-tusd-exposure-due-to-ownership-change/5821) submitted over a year ago passed and set the Debt Ceiling of TUSD-A to 0 DAI. Today, there is still about ~26MM DAI of outstanding debt, and the increase of the Stability Fee to 1% has not changed anything. In response, @ultraschuppi offers three options as potential changes to TUSD-A and asks the community whether they want to:

- Offload to a new TUSD-PSM with a DC of 0.
- Activate liquidations on TUSD-A keepers.
- Keep as is and do nothing.

**[Extend the Delegate Compensation Trial](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/signal-request-extend-the-delegate-compensation-trial/12686)**
*Signal Request Ends January 31st*
The initial Signal Request that approved the Delegate Compensation Trial implemented a three-month trial period. We recognized that initial parameter requirements were too harsh and subsequently introduced the Performance Modifier [via Signal Request](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/signal-request-should-we-introduce-a-performance-modifier-to-the-delegate-compensation-trial/11850), which has been added to MIP61.

As things stand, MIP61 has not been formally submitted, as there are still a few changes being discussed. Consequently, January 2022 is the final month currently covered by the trial, and compensation for Recognized Delegates would cease after this month. In response to these events, @Patrick_J asks whether we should extend the Delegate Compensation Trial by a maximum of 6-months and end it when MIP61 is ratified.

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## [Ongoing Initiatives](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/governance-initiatives/1347)

‘Oh my god, this is taking ages; why can’t things be simple?’

[Maker Operational Manual](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/announcing-maker-operational-manual/12553) - @GovAlpha-Core-Unit release the launch of the Maker Operational Manual and invite all members and Core Units to reach out if they wish to provide any help or documentation to add for the Manual.

[Recognised Delegate Requirements](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/recognised-delegate-requirements/9421) - @LongForWisdom writes a detailed overview of the current requirements and application system to become a delegate in the Maker community. Check out this [thread](https://forum.makerdao.com/search?expanded=true&q=%40LongForWisdom%20%23governance%3Adelegates) for more posts related to delegation.

[Where to Find Opportunities at MakerDAO](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/where-to-find-opportunities-at-makerdao/10076/2) and [Open positions at MakerDAO](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/open-positions-at-makerdao/12197) - Looking for job opportunities at MakerDAO? Perfect! @Davidutro and @manomad set up individual threads containing resources to help find available job listing and hiring practices. *If anybody has additional information on unique hiring practices or job listings, please comment on the thread.*

[:mega: Collateral Calls - Calling all Projects!](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/collateral-calls-calling-all-projects/3715) - @juan sets up a signup thread for projects wishing to present on the bi-weekly collateral call. Know any potential collateral partners that want to present? Refer them here.

[Collateral Status Index](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/collateral-status-index/2231) - Confused about the current status of the various collateral types that have been discussed recently? Check out this post to find out the status and current position of each within the onboarding process.

[Weekly MIPs Updates](https://forum.makerdao.com/tag/mips-update) - @blimpa brings the latest updates in the world of MIPs.

[The Official Welcome Thread](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/the-official-welcome-thread/771/4) - A welcome and introductions thread. Not strictly governance, but if anyone new or old wants to introduce themselves, now is your chance!

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## [Help Wanted](https://forum.makerdao.com/c/miscellaneous/help-wanted/11)

‘Oh %#$?, we need a doodad, and we need it now.’

[Wanted: Governance Contributors for GovAlpha](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/help-wanted-govalpha/8811) - @LongForWisdom puts out the call for new team members! Different tracks are available depending on interest and time commitment.

We could always use help reviewing [MIPs in the Request for Comment phase](https://forum.makerdao.com/tag/rfc).

## [Feedback Survey](https://survey.sogosurvey.com/r/qTb1p7)

*Please, check out the [Forum at a Glance feedback survey](https://survey.sogosurvey.com/r/qTb1p7) to help us improve and scale these reviews - It will be fun, I promise.* 