---
# System prepended metadata

title: 'Forum at a Glance: March 10th - March 16th, 2022'
tags: [Forum at a Glance]

---

---
tags: Forum at a Glance
---

# Forum at a Glance: March 10th - March 16th, 2022

![](https://i.imgur.com/noHiZsy.png)

Welcome to the one-stop-shop for a TL;DR on everything discussed on the MakerDAO forum.

*Links reflect my view of the most noteworthy activities in the governance, risk, and oracles categories. Disagree? Think something should be added? Leave a reply or send a PM.*

> A public PDF version of this post can be found [here.](https://pdfhost.io/v/GzZ~BLB9e_Forum_at_a_Glance__March_10_16_2022)

## Three-Point Summary

‘What is the most relevant information on the forums this week for MKR and Dai holders?’

- The Protocol Engineering Core Unit proposed an [aggressive growth strategy](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/aggressive-growth-strategy/13958) to tackle the issue of decreased vault demand as the bull market subsides.
- @cryptenthusiastic made an [interesting proposal](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/anti-inflationary-proposal/13928) for decoupling Dai from the inflationary pressures brought on my fiat currencies.
- The Sustainable Ecosystem Scaling Core Unit [presented](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/introducing-the-ecosystem-performance-api-and-dashboard-objective/13899) the Ecosystem Performance Dashboard, a tool aiming to increase transparency and accountability while reducing information costs.

----------
## News and Announcements

**[No Planned Executive - 2022-03-18](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/no-planned-executive-2022-03-18/13923)**

With nothing in the backlog and this week’s polls not requiring immediate action, there is no planned executive proposal for this Friday.

**[Financial Report - 2022-02](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/financial-report-2022-02/13832)**

Overall Net Protocol Income was $4.8M, down 81% month on month and 27% year over year.

*Summary:*

[quote="adcv, post:1, topic:13832"]

* Recurring income decreased to $4.5M (-27% vs. a year ago) driven by a 34% decline in net interest income, offset by lower workforce expenses
* DAI risk ratios increased favorably on the back of an 11% reduction in risk-weighted assets
* ETH lending share declined 21% YoY vs. 3% increase in the supply of ETH. Aave and other protocols have been increasing supply at our expense with aggressive liquidity mining incentives
* Maker WBTC lending market share increased >300% YoY, well ahead of WBTC supply YoY increase of 110%
* Dai outstanding increased to $9.4bn, up 0.9% vs. the prior month

[/quote]

![](https://i.imgur.com/hei0JxV.png)

**[Aggressive Growth Strategy](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/aggressive-growth-strategy/13958)**

As the bull market subsides, vault demand decreases while Dai demand rises. Keeping the peg balanced requires onboarding an increasing amount of USDC, which does not bear interest, reducing protocol revenue and increasing centralized counterparty risk. The post's authors and contributors believe that the best way to approach this issue is by kicking the push toward real-world assets into high gear with a two-step approach.

![](https://i.imgur.com/eJveuPP.png)

Step one is raising capital by stopping the burn and shoring up a large surplus. This can be achieved both by issuing debt. The team proposes an insurance fund module to protect Maker from large individual loss events.

![](https://i.imgur.com/5JYCqXA.png)

Step two involves taking on a more risk-on approach, thereby boosting revenues.

The full post goes into much detail, so be sure to check it out if this is a topic that interests you.

**[Content for the MakerDAO Twitter Account](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/content-for-the-makerdao-twitter-account/13819)**

The Growth Core Unit will be managing two content calendars for the MakerDAO Twitter account: one internal calendar and one DAO-wide calendar with content from all the Core Units. The team has come up with four main types of communications:

[quote="MarianoDP, post:1, topic:13819"]

1. Discussions around the future of Maker and Dai: In the forum, there are engaging discussions about the future of Maker and Dai, although for a regular forum user, it’s easy to understand, we want to aim for the inclusion of a broader audience by using Twitter to explain these discussions. We already published a thread explaining one of these discussions extracted from the forum. The next step is to thematize this type of recap.
2. The Maker Community Update (Maker UpDaits): A general update about the state of MakerDAO, we will talk about governance, the protocol, and community matters. Initially, the recurrence will be bi-weekly to study its performance, and depending on the results, we could modify this event in the calendar. Wait for the first Maker UpDait next Monday!
3. CU Updates (CU UpDaits): Monthly updates of the milestones achieved by the Core Units through their work within their specific MakerDAO vertical. We're hoping to publish the first version in April’s first week to explain what happened in March.
4. MakerDAO Announcements: We have the responsibility to update our users with changes occurring in Maker, such as collateral onboardings and offboardings, liquidation updates, and any other change that will have a direct impact on them. Also, Partnerships or special initiatives fall into this category.

[/quote]

The post also provides a step-by-step guide to preparing Tweets.

**[[StarkNet] DAI Bridge and StarkNet Platform Technical Risk Assessment](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/starknet-dai-bridge-and-starknet-platform-technical-risk-assessment/13950)**

The Protocol Engineering Core Unit has put together a very thorough assessment of StarkNet and the potential risks involved with the StarkNet Dai bridge.

So far, the implementation of the bridge has undergone an initial audit by ChainSecurity, with the final audit set to take place after the release of StarkNet 0.8.0.

After giving an overview of the StarkNet zk-rollup platform and its platform risks, the post dives into the StarkNet Dai bridge implementation and its associated risks.

![](https://i.imgur.com/iEIcj9K.png)

Topics include authorization, controlling the amount of bridged Dai, a deposit limit, upgradability, minting uncollateralized L2 Dai, censorship, and a lot more.

**[Attention TUSD-A Users: Collateral Offboarding](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/attention-tusd-a-users-collateral-offboarding/13927)**

The TUSD-A vault type is being offboarded. Check out the relevant [Signal Request](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/signal-request-offloading-tusd-a/12814) for more details.

[quote="Davidutro, post:1, topic:13927"]

***Method***

TLDR; The facility will have its liquidations turned on, Liquidation Penalty set to 0, and Liquidation Ratio adjusted 150%. This will enable all these vaults to be liquidated.

* Enable liquidations for TUSD-A
* Use Abacus/LinearDecrease 1
* Set Liquidation Penalty to 0
* Set Liquidation Ratio 1 to 150%
* Set Auction Price Multiplier (buf) to 1
* Set Local Liquidation Limit (ilk.hole) to 5 million DAI
* Set tau for Abacus/LinearDecrease to 21,600,000 second (estimated 10bps drop per 6 hours = 250 days till 0)
* Set Max Auction Duration (tail) to 432,000 seconds (5 days, implies minimum price of 0.98)
* Set Proportional Kick Incentive (chip) 1 to 0
* Set Flat Kick Incentive (tip) to 500

[/quote]

**[Introducing the Ecosystem Performance API and Dashboard Objective](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/introducing-the-ecosystem-performance-api-and-dashboard-objective/13899)**

In this post, The Sustainable Ecosystem Scaling Core Unit presented the Ecosystem Performance Dashboard, a tool that aims to:

[quote="_Jack, post:1, topic:13899"]

* Increase transparency by allowing for ease of comparison across timeframes and highlighting work performed and delivered output
* Increase accountability by making the data provided by Core Units more accessible and easily understandable
* Reduce information costs by collating scattered information into more consumer-friendly formats

[/quote]

The full post dives into why we need a performance dashboard, the benefits of an API-first approach, and much more.

The team hopes this tool will help "increase the level of transparency and quality control" in the Maker organization as it grows in size and complexity.

**[The Lending Oversight Core Unit (LOVE-001): CU Overview & Incubation Update](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/the-lending-oversight-core-unit-love-001-cu-overview-incubation-update/13858)**

Note: This core unit hasn't been ratified yet and is currently in the seedling phase of incubation by the SES core unit.

The Lending Oversight Core Unit (LOVE-001) wants to help Maker on its quest to become the central pillar of the DeFi monetary ecosystem by onboarding tens of billions of complex assets with use cases beyond trading.

LOVE believes that a new approach to onboarding real-world assets needs to be developed so that the process can scale gracefully. This involves focusing on credit quality, scalability, structuring, and risk management.

The team also believes that it's time to move toward 100 billion Dai. We'll need to ensure coordination, improve connectivity, move to scale, protect protocol resilience, and continue educating.

This initiative will involve several Core Units. @williamr will help set up a lending incubator dedicated to scaling, accelerating, and further decentralizing all activities related to structured financing.

![](https://i.imgur.com/S36yDUq.png)

**[Introducing: RWF-001 Weekly Office Hours!](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/introducing-rwf-001-weekly-office-hours/13809)**

The Real World Finance Core Unit team will be hosting weekly office hours for anyone to drop in and ask questions.

[quote="williamr, post:1, topic:13809"]

This meeting takes place weekly Wednesdays at 17:00 UTC.

RWF Office hours call details
Video call link: https://meet.google.com/kwf-qayf-xdq 7
Or dial: ‪(NZ) +64 9-888 9450‬ PIN: ‪164 719 655 2775‬#
More phone numbers: https://tel.meet/kwf-qayf-xdq?pin=1647196552775

Please come with structured finance questions or topics in mind!

[/quote]

---
:wave:*Looking for more posts and updates?
*Check out [recent Core Unit monthly updates](https://forum.makerdao.com/tag/cu-update).*
*Check out the weekly [updates](https://forum.makerdao.com/tag/update) and [summaries](https://forum.makerdao.com/tag/summary) from our teams and Core Units.*
*Check out the monthly Financial Reports [here.](https://forum.makerdao.com/tag/financial-report)*

---
## [Active Discussions](https://forum.makerdao.com/latest)

**[Product Discussion: Maker Owned Fuse Pools and Maker Fuse D3M](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/product-discussion-maker-owned-fuse-pools-and-maker-fuse-d3m/13955)**

This post explores product ideas regarding Rari Capital’s Fuse Protocol. The Risk Core Unit Team believes onboarding a Maker-owned Fuse Pool and implementing a D3M for that pool is an idea worth investigating.

The post is broken down into four sections: "(i) a brief introduction to Rari Capital’s Fuse Protocol, (ii) examples of other stablecoin issuers that are currently involved in Fuse, (iii) how MakerDAO could potentially benefit from Fuse, and (iv) an overview of the suggested next steps."

As the post puts it, "Rari Capital’s Fuse Protocol allows the creation of lending pools, or money markets, with any combination of tokens for lending and borrowing." In contrast to the single-pool model, the Fuse Protocol isolates risk into siloed pools.

Fuse can benefit Maker in several ways:

[quote="Sean, post:1, topic:13955"]

***Possibility 1: Supporting Long-Tail Assets***

In the last few months, we have seen occurrences of collateral offboarding. There have been two main reasons for this. (i) The maintenance costs have outweighed the revenue produced. (ii) Certain collateral types have been too illiquid, which has increased the risk of the vaults.

Fuse allows pool creators to choose between different third-party oracle providers. In practice, the fees associated with the oracle are subsidized as there are no recurring oracle costs. Fuse normally charges a 10% fee generated from the interest paid by borrowers. However, the key point is that, unlike Maker, no revenue threshold from stability fees is required to meet oracle costs.

A Maker-owned Fuse pool would also allow MakerDAO to support low liquidity assets. The advantage of a Fuse pool is that creators have greater control of risk parameters. They can mitigate risk by setting supply caps, whitelisting certain addresses, and limiting particular collateral from being borrowed and only supplied.

In summary, by adopting Fuse, Maker would have greater flexibility and choice in onboarding either new or previously offboarded collateral types that we would like to support but are currently not viable as vault collateral.

***Possibility 2: D3M - Full Control of Our Own Secondary Market***

The D3M is a very powerful tool. However, the exposure of the D3M is normally limited by the particular parameters and conditions of the associated lending market to which the DAI is being issued. This includes solvency and credit risk of the counter protocol.

A D3M implementation to a Maker Fuse Pool would allow Maker to extend DAI minting rights to its lending market. By having full control of the market where DAI is issued via the D3M, Maker could eliminate certain counter protocol-related risks. However, other risks would still be involved, such as governance risk, smart contract risk, and competitive risks.

***Possibility 3: MKR as Collateral - Safety through Flexibility***

Fuse pools can be easily customized. This flexibility means that pools can support assets as collateral while disabling the same asset for borrowing. The usefulness of the MKR token would be increased if MakerDAO were to offer it as lending collateral in a Fuse pool to generate yield. By disabling borrowing of the MKR token, the risk of governance attacks or Emergency Shutdown (ES) attacks would be controlled. At present, MKR can be borrowed on Aave and Compound. This entails preexisting governance and ES attack risk. Maker could create a Fuse pool for MKR tokens and several acceptable stablecoins, including DAI and the ones currently held in PSMs. The governance and ES attack risks could be reduced if the incentives for depositing MKR on a Maker Fuse pool were higher than on Aave and Compound.

A D3M should probably not be deployed to a pool where MKR is used as collateral to avoid collateralizing DAI with MKR tokens.

***Possibility 4: D3M - Scaling DAI by Supporting other Fuse Pools***

D3Ms can also be added to any other Fuse Pool that supports DAI. For example, Maker could implement a D3M to the FeiRari Pool 8 1 as it supports DAI for both borrowing and lending.

[/quote]

**[Anti-inflationary proposal](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/anti-inflationary-proposal/13928)**

In this post, @cryptenthusiastic proposes a way to decouple the value of Dai from the inflation factor of fiat currency in such a way that:

[quote="cryptenthusiastic, post:1, topic:13928"]

1. If the Dollar decreases, Dai would remain stable
2. If the Fed succeeds in making the Dollar rise in value (which is difficult to maintain in the long run), Dai would rise along with the Dollar

[/quote]

@cryptenthusiastic argues that achieving this would lead to increased Dai adoption.

Potential risks and disadvantages include:

[quote="cryptenthusiastic, post:1, topic:13928"]

* Mild impermanent loss in Dai pairs with other stable currencies.
* Will probably slow down the adoption process in the short and medium-term; borrowers will be a bit less motivated to open a vault because of rising interest rates.
* It would be less attractive for users borrowing Dai to buy and increase their position in different cryptos (the solution to this may be option B below).

[/quote]

**[stkMKR: Maker Staking and Tokenomics Revision](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/stkmkr-maker-staking-and-tokenomics-revision/13890)**

In this post, the Risk Core Unit describes a new economic token mechanism to supplement the existing buyback value accrual system.

The new mechanism aims to preserve the gas and tax efficiency of the existing buy-and-burn mechanism while also addressing its drawbacks.

[quote="monet-supply, post:1, topic:13890"]

* Lack of targeted incentives - token economics can incentivize positive behavior within a protocol, but buyback and burn returns capital to all MKR holders equally and doesn’t target incentives towards those token holders providing excess value
* Weak crypto narrative - buy and burn is out of favor, and an update could stoke greater interest in the Maker protocol; while in my opinion tokenomics should not be focused on price impacts, positive narrative shifts benefit the protocol by making MKR issuance for hiring, capital raising, and user incentivization more efficient
* Limited deterrence against governance attacks - Currently, it is possible for MKR owners to vote on a malicious proposal and then immediately withdraw funds and interact with DeFi protocols, which makes it nearly impossible to burn an attacker’s stake (they could be commingled with lending or AMM exchange pools and contaminate funds held by other users)

[/quote]

The new mechanism, dubbed stkMKR, is inspired by Cosmos governance and the token economics of stkAAVE and xSUSHI.

The process works as follows:

[quote="monet-supply, post:1, topic:13890"]

A new token, stkMKR, will replace MKR as the core governance token of MakerDAO. stkMKR will be non-transferable and represents MKR staked in governance. Staked token-holders will receive a share of MKR tokens purchased through surplus auctions so that stkMKR will be backed by an increasing amount of MKR over time (automatically compounding like xSUSHI). Withdrawing from stkMKR requires waiting through a pre-set unbonding period, which improves protocol resilience and governance security (similar to Cosmos and stkAAVE).

The figures below offer a high-level overview of the stkMKR mechanism.

![](https://i.imgur.com/XaCrxod.png)

Users can stake MKR in governance to receive stkMKR, representing their voting power and right to redeem a share of underlying MKR. stkMKR is held within voting contracts and can be freely delegated/redelegated across registered voting contracts with no delay or unbonding period.

![](https://i.imgur.com/RaTJI86.png)

A portion of MKR received through surplus auctions is diverted from burning to stkMKR holders. This could also be topped up manually by governance from the treasury or new minting. MKR is drip-fed into the pool overtime to smooth out yield volatility and support countercyclical yield increases if a large share of staked MKR is withdrawn. Rewards gradually increase the ratio of MKR per stkMKR.

![](https://i.imgur.com/GnJhwoF.png)

Users must initiate withdrawal and then wait through a fixed unbonding period to withdraw funds. During this time, stkMKR is burned, and the corresponding MKR is transferred to an escrow, where it will no longer earn yield or have voting rights. After the unbonding period elapses, users can claim liquid MKR tokens from the escrow.

Any additional withdrawal requests from the same address will overwrite the escrow unlock date, prolonging the unbonding period for any partially unbonded MKR. Alternatively, users can immediately re-stake their MKR back into stkMKR during the unbonding period (for example, if they want to vote on an important proposal).

[/quote]

**[Call for Responsible Budget and Process](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/call-for-responsible-budget-and-process/13816)**

Delegate Doo Nam made a post calling for streamlining the budgeting process. 

While every budget modification request needs to be carefully examined, this has been difficult due to having too many budgets to review and cultural pushback against challenging budgets.

Doo presents several suggestions for discussion:

[quote="Doo_Nam, post:1, topic:13816"]

1. Implement a hard freeze for an increase in a budget request for a long time frame

For example, once they have an approved budget, a Core Unit should not be allowed to ask for an increase in the budget request for at least six months or one year. While this might hinder some flexibility, it encourages Core Units to do more with less.

2. Limits the number of Budget Reviews per cycle

For example, we can set a cap, whether 1 or 2, instead of too many to allow the Maker community to fully discuss and examine the budget increase request. I believe the SES can also help by encouraging only a limited number of potential CUs to be presented.

3. Require or encourage the budget submissions to also provide market rates.

For example, what’s the market rate for a potential new contributor's role? If it’s a budget for a new service, how much would this service cost if it was a third-party professional company? Even major companies like Apple don’t build everything by themselves as it’s sometimes more efficient to use partners instead.

4. Rethinking the structure of Core Units.

Currently, Maker Core Unit is quite heavy with both budget and MKR vesting. There are many benefits to allowing a more flexible approach, especially with services that are more likely to be temporary.

[/quote]

**[RFC Budget request MIP - Break on-going from expansion budget requests. Budget Polling to RCV](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/rfc-budget-request-mip-break-on-going-from-expansion-budget-requests-budget-polling-to-rcv/13877)**

@MakerMan made another post providing some suggestions for dealing with budget requests.

[quote="MakerMan, post:1, topic:13877"]

I want to propose for discussion the following suggestions to help governance manage budgets.

* All budget requests should break into ‘on-going’ costs for services provided, delineating these services and their associated costs. In these budget requests, a first shot analysis of what happens if funding for the CU ongoing request is cut to 95, 90, 80, 50, or 0% should be undertaken to provide governance information as to what happens to services the CU provides is cut.
* All CU ‘expansions’ to budget need to be a separate request including what new CU functions will be added, what including these will do to the ‘ongoing budget’ and implications, if any, for what we won’t have if the budget expansion is rejected. Also, an analysis of what we get or extended timelines if this expansion is funded at 50,80,90,95%.
* Change polling on budget requests from yes/no on these to ranked-choice voting 100, 95, 90, 80, 50, 0 (a choice of 0 effectively being a no to this request).

Goals of these changes.

* For both CUs and governance to get a sense of budgetary continuity
* Segregate budget expansions from ongoing expenses.
* Allow governance not to have to deny a total budget due to an unsatisfactory expansion component
* Allow governance the first shot at reducing budgets (50,0 would be extreme, but 95% not so much)
* Allows governance to adjust not just the total budget but also the total MKR vesting over the budgetary period - these should track anyway, so why not have them track in the budget process

[/quote]

------
## [Seeking Consensus](https://forum.makerdao.com/tag/active-signal)

‘Yo, do you even signal?’

**[Promote “MIP4c3-SP1: Amend MIP64 to clarify critical web bounty amount” to on-chain poll](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/signal-request-promote-mip4c3-sp1-amend-mip64-to-clarify-critical-web-bounty-amount-to-on-chain-poll/13649)**

Psychonaut submitted a very straightforward Signal Requesting.

At issue: [Amend MIP64 to clarify critical web bounty amount 6](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/mip4c3-sp1-amend-mip64-to-clarify-critical-web-bounty-amount/13439)

Considerations (not pros and cons):

-   Increase the payout for critical severity web bugs from 5k-50k to a single amount of 50k.
-   Reduce negotiation around the critical severity bounty amount.
-   Increase incentive for whitehat hackers to pursue Critical potential severity web bugs.

**[Onboard D3M For Notional Finance](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/signal-request-onboard-d3m-for-notional-finance/13782)**

Recognized Delegate GFX Labs is signaling to onboard a D3M (DAI Direct Deposit Module) for Notional Finance’s 3-month-maturity DAI lending pool 1, with an initial debt ceiling of 10 million DAI (unless recommended otherwise by Risk Core Unit).

[quote="GFXlabs, post:1, topic:13782"]

Pros:

1. Increased revenues. The 3-month rate on Notional is north of 7%, on a base of around 85m DAI. For example, even a trial 10m DAI DC would firmly put a Notional D3M in the top 10 ilks by revenue. (10m DAI is currently estimated to suppress rates only to 6% as of writing)

![](https://i.imgur.com/eXOSWq5.png)

For reference, estimated yearly revenue from other top ilks are below:

![](https://i.imgur.com/M1blEWM.png)

1. Increased control over the front end of the yield curve. Strategically, Maker’s use of D3Ms across multiple lending venues will exert control over more of the total market, dampening effects of fragmented liquidity for DAI and volatility during market downturns. Being fairly insensitive to gas costs, Maker’s D3M for Aave has allowed steady DAI rates even in intense volatility. That stabilization can also be applied to the very shortest portion of the yield curve.
2. Diversification of counterparties. Maker currently faces existential risk from various counterparties: Circle, Lido, Bitgo, Paxos, and occasionally Aave. By growing DAI supply and increasing the rate by which the Surplus Buffer grows, a program of diverse D3Ms advances the goal of reducing excess reliance on individual counterparties.
3. Familiar credit risks and technological risks. The risks represented by exposure to Notional’s overcollateralized lending platform (listed under Cons) are risks that Maker has deep expertise in evaluating and monitoring through Collateral Engineering Services, Risk, and Protocol Engineering Core Units.
4. Reduced reliance upon stablecoin collateral. The DAI supply is 68% backed by stable collateral, the bulk of which is 5,300,000,000 USDC and nearly 500,000,000 USDP. D3Ms can scale quickly and are limited only by the depth of their deployed markets, allowing them to grow as demand for DAI on the lending platform grows. This increases DAI supply, but it should also lower the demand for the PSMs, as there are alternative methods of obtaining DAI.

![](https://i.imgur.com/x1YvXA1.png)

Cons:

1. Smart contract risk. There is always smart contract risk with any protocol-to-protocol interaction. Steps to mitigate this for Notional include [an audit by ABDK](https://github.com/notional-finance/contracts-v2/blob/master/audits/ABDK%20-%20Notional%20V2%2C%20Sept%201%202021.pdf), a \$1,000,000 bug bounty program on Immunefi, [analysis via Code4rena](https://code4rena.com/reports/2021-08-notional/), formal [verification via Certora](https://github.com/notional-finance/contracts-v2/blob/master/audits/Certora%20-%20Formal%20Verfication%20Report%2C%20Nov%201%202021.pdf), and a pending diligence report by Consensys.
2. Multisig risk. Notional's governance mechanisms are still in the early stages of decentralizing. At the moment, key portions of the protocol are governed by a 3 of 5 multisig. No firm timeline is set, but the multi-sig's admin powers will be phased out over time. A possible mitigant of risk to Maker is that [one of its delegates (GFX Labs) is one of the signatories, and all signatories are fully doxxed 1](https://etherscan.io/address/0x22341fB5D92D3d801144aA5A925F401A91418A05#readProxyContract). Note that other underlying collaterals already in Maker's portfolio also include governances with multisigs, so this is not a novel form of risk.
3. Illiquidity risk. If the amount of DAI in the liquidity pool drops due to LPs withdrawing their capital, there may be insufficient liquidity for Maker to withdraw 100% of its capital before maturity. It should be noted that Maker will always be able to withdraw its capital upon maturity regardless of the liquidity in the pool. This illiquidity risk only refers to withdrawals before maturity. A gradual scaling of maximum exposure can keep in mind to mitigate this.
4. Capital loss risk. If liquidations do not perform properly, capital loss is risk. Notional has built a [robust liquidation infrastructure 1](https://blog.notional.finance/understanding-liquidations/) and currently utilizes conservative parameters. Being an overcollateralized lending platform, the risk of bad debt stemming from default is, in principle, low. While probably unnecessary for Maker, there is also coverage available for Notional under Nexus Mutual.
5. Oracle risk. Notional utilizes Chainlink oracles for the four listed assets. [Maker is already exposed to Chainlink oracles via Aave](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/d3m-risk-assessment/9353) and [(soon) Compound](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/compound-d3m-risk-assessment/12580).

[/quote]

**[Onboard PAXG](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/signal-request-onboard-paxg/13768)**

Another Signal Request for new collateral onboarding was posted by the Strategic Finance Core unit, this time for onboarding PAXG (PAX Gold).

[quote="SebVentures, post:1, topic:13768"]

Pros

* Gold might be an important building block for DeFi. When we onboarded WBTC, it was small and unproven in DeFi; since then, it has been an important piece, thanks to MakerDAO. The same thing can happen with PAXG.
* DeFi can provide yield for gold and attract TradFi people
* This onboarding might increase our relationship with Paxos.
* US Dollar dominance is under attack (especially after the weaponization of the dollar), and strong inflation is on the menu. Both are good for gold.

Cons

* Gold can fall into oblivion soon.
* The current rates increase are bad for gold.
* PAXG is centralized by Paxos
* Demand can be lacking, and we would incur a loss and a defocus (Oracle costs)

[/quote]

-----
## [Ongoing Initiatives](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/governance-initiatives/1347)

‘Oh my god, this is taking ages; why can’t things be simple?’

[Maker Operational Manual](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/announcing-maker-operational-manual/12553) - @GovAlpha-Core-Unit release the launch of the Maker Operational Manual and invite all members and Core Units to reach out if they wish to provide any help or documentation to add for the Manual.

[Recognised Delegate Requirements](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/recognised-delegate-requirements/9421) - @LongForWisdom writes a detailed overview of the current requirements and application system to become a delegate in the Maker community. Check out this [thread](https://forum.makerdao.com/search?expanded=true&q=%40LongForWisdom%20%23governance%3Adelegates) for more posts related to delegation.

[Where to Find Opportunities at MakerDAO](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/where-to-find-opportunities-at-makerdao/10076/2) and [Open positions at MakerDAO](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/open-positions-at-makerdao/12197) - Looking for job opportunities at MakerDAO? Perfect! @Davidutro and @manomad set up individual threads containing resources to help find available job listing and hiring practices. *If anybody has additional information on unique hiring practices or job listings, please comment on the thread.*

[:mega: Collateral Calls - Calling all Projects!](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/collateral-calls-calling-all-projects/3715) - @juan sets up a signup thread for projects wishing to present on the bi-weekly collateral call. Know any potential collateral partners that want to present? Refer them here.

[Collateral Status Index](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/collateral-status-index/2231) - Confused about the current status of the various collateral types discussed recently? Check out this post to determine the status and current position within the onboarding process.

[Weekly MIPs Updates](https://forum.makerdao.com/tag/mips-update) - @blimpa brings the latest updates in the world of MIPs.

[The Official Welcome Thread](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/the-official-welcome-thread/771/4) - A welcome and introductions thread. Not strictly governance, but if anyone new or old wants to introduce themselves, now is your chance!

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## [Help Wanted](https://forum.makerdao.com/c/miscellaneous/help-wanted/11)

‘Oh %#$?, we need a doodad, and we need it now.’

[Wanted: Governance Contributors for GovAlpha](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/help-wanted-govalpha/8811) - @LongForWisdom puts out the call for new team members! Different tracks are available depending on interest and time commitment.

We could always use help reviewing [MIPs in the Request for Comment phase](https://forum.makerdao.com/tag/rfc).

## [Feedback Survey](https://survey.sogosurvey.com/r/qTb1p7)

*Please, check out the [Forum at a Glance feedback survey](https://survey.sogosurvey.com/r/qTb1p7) to help us improve and scale these reviews - It will be fun, I promise.* 

Credit:
@nothsa
@Artem_Gordon
