--- tags: Forum at a Glance --- # Forum at a Glance: February 24th - March 2nd, 2022 ![](https://i.imgur.com/BBaBtuT.png) Welcome to the one-stop-shop for a TL;DR on everything being discussed on the MakerDAO forum right now. *Links reflect my view of the most noteworthy activities in the governance, risk, and oracles categories. Disagree? Think something should be added? Leave a reply or send a PM.* > A public PDF version of this post can be found [here.](https://pdfhost.io/v/NNR6XobN4_Forum_at_a_Glance__Feb_24_March_2_2022) ## Three-Point Summary ‘What is the most relevant information on the forums this week for MKR and Dai holders?’ - Welcome our new recognized delegate, [Flipside Crypto](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/flipside-crypto-delegate-platform/13456). - Check out and vote on the proposal to [aid Ukraine by sending Dai](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/ukraine-vault-loan-war-bond-purchase-proposal/13529). - Submit your feedback and opinions for new educational content [here](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/maker-academy-educational-content-poll-forms-now-accessible/13497). ---------- ## News and Announcements **[Flipside Crypto Delegate Platform](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/flipside-crypto-delegate-platform/13456)** Welcome to @fig and his governance team at [Flipside Crypto](https://flipsidecrypto.xyz/), who have thrown their hats into the ring and announced their recognized delegate platform. Flipside Governance was established in September 2021 to directly support, contribute to, and drive participation in partner communities, helping improve the efficiency of this critical piece of protocol health. The team operates in various DAOs and communities, such as Aave, SushiSwap, ENS DAO, OlympusDAO, and many others. Flipside Crypto presents some of its accomplishments to show its value as a delegate in the MakerDAO community. Flipside Crypto believes there is plenty of room for improved proposals, a greater understanding of the governance landscape, and strong relationships with key players and stakeholders. The team believes governance is best achieved through: - Proper education (what votes mean and why) - Fairly distributed voting power (quadratic voting, voting rewards) - Engaged, rewarded community members Flipside aims to represent the views of a range of users and provide unique analytics to justify their data-driven decisions. As delegates, Flipside Crypto promises: - Constant monitoring of votes and participation in each vote - Open discussion and contribution to the DAO forum and Discord - Transparency about when they vote and how they vote - A shared commitment to the future success of Maker Conflicts of Interest: - ENS Delegation - Paladin Delegation/Transferability Committee - Aave Grants *Flipside Crypto Delegate presented their delegate platform on Wednesday, March 2nd during the [Meet Your Delegate #10.](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/meet-your-delegate-10-doo-wan-nam-and-flipside-crypto/13248)* **[[EXECUTIVE VOTE NOTICE] 3F Delegate Cannot Support an INCREASE of the GUSD PSM Debt Ceiling](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/executive-vote-notice-3f-delegate-cannot-support-an-increase-of-the-gusd-psm-debt-ceiling/13461)** 3F Delegate states their opinion to *not* increase the GUSD PSM DC. They believe there is a lack of motivation supporting the [recent executive vote](https://vote.makerdao.com/executive/template-executive-vote-gusd-psm-maximum-debt-ceiling-increase-makerman-retroactive-delegate-compensation-february-25-2022?network=mainnet#proposal-detail). ![](https://i.imgur.com/Sw7B6UG.png) The Growth CU team has indicated to 3F Delegate that there are no deals in their pipeline associated with GUSD. Growth does maintain an open relationship with Gemini, but increasing the GUSD PSM is not a priority for either party. In addition, there haven't been any changes when comparing Curve’s exposure to GUSD from November 2021 to February 2022. The GUSD PSM may now lack network effects; how can we be sure that the GUSD PSM will attract users? Finally, 3F Delegate reminds us that they previously Polled NO to the Increase of the PSM-GUSD Debt Ceiling Poll on February 14, 2022: ![](https://i.imgur.com/HeS7hUA.png) **[Recognized Delegate Compensation Breakdown - February 2022](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/recognized-delegate-compensation-breakdown-february-2022/13518)** February's Recognized Delegate Compensation is here! | Recognized Delegate | Amount (DAI) | Notes | | --- | --- | :---: | | Flip Flop Flap Delegate LLC | 12,000 | | schuppi | 12,000 | | Feedblack Loops LLC | 12,000 | | MakerMan | 8,512 | | ACREinvest | 6,494 | | monetsupply | 5,072 | Performance Modifier of 58.96% applied | | JustinCase | 927 | | GFX Labs | 660 | | Gauntlet | 0 | Total Payout for February 2022: 57,665 DAI. **Comments** Calculations around starting/leaving delegates: - Recognized Delegate's MKR weight is measured once per day, which is used to generate an average for the month. - The amount of MKR Recognized Delegates are credited with is an average of the days they were active for the month. - The average referenced in the previous point counts MKR delegated on each day to a maximum of 10,000 MKR in line with the intention to cap the benefit from delegated MKR at the upper threshold of 10,000 MKR. - We apply pro-rata scaling to compensation for Recognized Delegates that were only active for part of the month. Performance Modifier: The vote to introduce a Performance Modifier [passed on-chain](https://vote.makerdao.com/polling/QmbKaHAv). monetsupply's amount was amended by the Performance Modifier this month—see Notes column in the table above. Distribution: Recognized Delegate Compensation will be distributed as part of the first Executive Vote of the month. **[Parameter Changes Proposal](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/parameter-changes-proposal-ppg-omc-001-2022-02-24/13434)** The MakerDAO Open Market Committee has put forward a set of proposed parameter changes: * WSTETH-A: Increase debt ceiling to 300M and gap to 30M. This will "allow Maker to meet growing demand and cement our position as a leading DeFi platform for liquid staking tokens." * DIRECT-AAVEV2-DAI: Reduce bar to 2.85%, increase the debt ceiling to 300M, and increase the gap to 65M. This "is expected to lead to full or nearly full utilization of the D3M debt ceiling, which should drive a roughly 3M increase in annualized protocol revenue despite a marginal decrease in deposit rate earned." The proposed changes, if confirmed, should increase yearly revenue by about 3 million Dai due to an increase in expected debt exposure to the Aave D3M. The MOMC is not recommending any other rate or parameter changes at this time but may submit a mid-month proposal depending on how market conditions develop. --- :wave:*Looking for more posts and updates? *Check out [recent Core Unit monthly updates](https://forum.makerdao.com/tag/cu-update).* *Check out the weekly [updates](https://forum.makerdao.com/tag/update) and [summaries](https://forum.makerdao.com/tag/summary) from our teams and Core Units.* *Check out the monthly Financial Reports [here.](https://forum.makerdao.com/tag/financial-report)* --- ## [Active Discussions](https://forum.makerdao.com/latest) ‘What is going on? You think what?! You are 100% wrong, and here is why…’ **[Ukraine Vault/Loan/”War Bond” Purchase Proposal](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/ukraine-vault-loan-war-bond-purchase-proposal/13529)** @Allan_Pedersen has submitted an informal poll proposing that Maker lend 1-5M DAI to Ukraine to aid their ongoing war effort. If the community supports the idea, Oasis Pro Markets and Monetalis have pledged to help execute it using real-world collateral. [quote="Allan_Pedersen, post:1, topic:13529"] I cannot, exactly, at this hour, tell you what will be the specific means of execution, but I will strive for getting to a situation where, as real-world collateral, we will have a loan obligation from the Nation of Ukraine (preferably a recognized bond) held by a Monetalis-Maker BVI Trust (or similar) structure and then a vault, set up specifically for this situation, and an immediate DAI minting (and probable exchange to USD) and payment. [/quote] Polls are currently underway to gauge support for the loan and the amount if the proposal is approved. **[Maker Academy: Educational Content Poll [Forms Now Accessible]](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/maker-academy-educational-content-poll-forms-now-accessible/13497)** The Sustainable Ecosystem Scaling Core Unit seeks feedback on what it should focus on when producing new educational content. Fill out the forms to share your perspective: * [Topics in Governance Relevant to MakerDAO](https://forms.gle/jmPpboTjWKqAr1nv6) * [Organizational Topics Relevant to MakerDAO](https://forms.gle/SrHxUikYFmy79G3X6) * [Financial Topics Relevant to MakerDAO](https://forms.gle/Q4hZzAKethx6UiXU8) * [Legal Topics Relevant to MakerDAO](https://forms.gle/PR4c77DwSKeoVbXr9) * [Topics Relevant to the Maker Protocol's Architecture](https://forms.gle/NQCDBGonG6vF7HXx9) * [Topics in Development Relevant to the Maker Protocol](https://forms.gle/NrpPCffgRLr97uqw6) **[Offloading growing Centralization risks to Maker and DAI. Opening a general discussion](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/offloading-growing-centralization-risks-to-maker-and-to-dai-opening-a-general-discussion/13469)** @MakerMan made an extensive post discussing Maker collateral custody centralization. USDC, wBTC, USDP each account for over 500M worth of collateral. Because these assets are issued and controlled by centralized entities, there is a chance that this collateral could be removed at any moment. @MakerMan argues that such an event's effects on the MKR market cap and DAI adoption are not well understood. He outlines both a set of potential solutions and a set of questions these issues raise. [quote="MakerMan, post:1, topic:13469"] Put; the collateral risk is centralized at the vault level. Worse, Dai in being over collateralized is rapidly approaching at best a 100% collateralized due to the PSMs. With the tin/tout, 0/0 Maker makes ZERO return on parties laying off their collateral in exchange for DAI. Solutions all involve one form or another of growth. * Try to get more decentralized collateral on-board (well, oracle costs are causing MakerDAO to offload collateral, creating an increasing collateral concentration risk) * Bring on institutional vaults. This again centralizes counter-party risk because instead of having 100’s or thousands of autonomous agents managing risk on a finer grain, Maker instead has maybe ten players responsible for over 50% of the collateral assets. This means (as we have seen in the past week) a single player can shift their assets away from Maker and significantly decrease our revenues. This will eventually be seen in the surplus buffer dropping vs. rising. * RWF. Frankly, to date, RWF hasn’t gone anywhere. Nor does it appear to be materializing in a way that helps us at all with risk. In the loosest sense, practical concerns are causing our RWF players to want large vaults that they manage because doing deals for specific collateral 10M or even 50M at a time won’t scale to B’s much less a T DAI borrowed. If Maker brings on even one player and gives them a 500M DC, we then centralize our exposure to a centralized player again. ... So here we are left with questions. * What is the latency to apply such collateral? * Is this using one kind of centralization to offload risk of another kind of centralization * Does it cost more or less to have more or less centralized players with more or less DC. (i.e., take 4B and spread 400M across ten managers cost more than 1B across 4? which is better or worse) * Does having an arranger model where we have single arrangers with 1B vaults (even institutions) create its form of centralization risk that puts the protocol at risk. Is having a single deal or chunk deals of 100-200M simply not practical to manage this risk, and then is MakerDAO forced to centralize * Is there any other approach that could mitigate this growing centralization risk, more D3Ms * Maker finally taking the step to grow a treasury of assets we can borrow DAI against as a secondary backstop before MKR is flopped - that is liquid and not centralized (say Uniswap, GUNI, and other assets in DeFi that has reduced price and value volatility that maybe can also earn a return while providing DAI liquidity in case of losses). [/quote] **[Multi-protocol stablecoin stability vault](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/multi-protocol-stablecoin-stability-vault/13427)** @jrkirby proposed an idea for improving the stability of "struggling stablecoins" as a way to "improve Dai stability, help alleviate the demand for Dai, and additionally to provide revenue to the protocol." The idea involves collaborating with another stablecoin protocol to back a stability vault jointly. "When someone creates a vault, both protocols will jointly mint stablecoins, such that no stablecoin trade imbalance is needed to create (or liquidate) vaults." @jrkirby argues that many stablecoin protocols would jump at the chance to generate such liquidity, "even with terms more favorable to makerdao." **[Intra DeFi stablecoin issuers money-market](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/intra-defi-stablecoin-issuers-money-market/13432)** @SubVentures detailed his idea for a decentralized clearinghouse for stablecoins and how such an entity could fit in with Maker. He describes the idea—codenamed ClearingDAO—as "a PSM-like interface that is a money-market in the background. You can, for instance, convert 1 DAI to 1 FEI and, in the background, MakerDAO issue a $1 loan to Tribe Protocol according to a bilateral agreement." ClearingDAO solves two problems: 1. It provides price equivalence to all major DeFi stablecoins ($1). 2. It moves the supply/demand imbalance from the price to an interest rate stablecoins issuers will pay each other. How does this relate to Maker? [quote="MakerMan, post:1, topic:13469"] In short, it is similar to a D3M but with more features and a different profile. Like the D3M, it allows to delegate the investment part for non-strategic items to other players and focus on other strategic items. Moreover, it’s safer in the sense of being an investment in a diversified portfolio with credit enhancement (but with an idiosyncratic smart-contract and governance risk). The huge value-add is that it is fully one chain. Investing in short-term bonds is off-chain, but the activity of other stablecoin issuers should be mainly on-chain. ... An illustrative example is below where MakerDAO extends a loan to Fei Protocol with 2x the notional as FEI collateral. ![](https://i.imgur.com/hIjd9lD.png) ... It fits well with MakerDAO as the decentral bank of DeFi as we will be a funding provider (of last resort and high rate during a crisis?). [/quote] **[Proposed parameters for offboarding TUSD-A](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/proposed-parameters-for-offboarding-tusd-a/13506)** @primoz of the Risk Core Unit published a list of proposed parameters for offboarding TUSD-A: - Enable liquidations - Use `Abacus/LinearDecrease -- tau [seconds]` - Set liquidation penalty to 0 - Set liquidation ratio to 150% - Set `buf` to 1 - Set `ilk.hole` to 5m - Set `tau` to 21,600,000 second (est. 10bps drop per 6 hours = 250 days till 0) - Set `tail` to 432,000 seconds (5 days, implies a minimum price of 0.98) - `cusp` is not relevant, stays the same (tail will stop the auction) - Set `chip` to 0 (no need to be fast) - Set `tip` to 500 (bit higher value so that we guarantee kicking all vaults) These changes will safely liquidate current open positions, taking user experience and protocol loss into account. ------ ## [Seeking Consensus](https://forum.makerdao.com/tag/active-signal) ‘Yo, do you even signal?’ **[Implement Governance Mining Trial](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/signal-request-implement-governance-mining-trial/13271)** *Signal Request Ends March 2nd* In recent months, a decline in governance participation has been [brought to light](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/improving-governance-participation-rate-at-makerdao/11706). Unfortunately, attracting engaged, informed voters is a problem that has largely gone unsolved. @GFXlabs believes it is time to take an actionable approach through a governance mining trial to help improve voting participation to compare polls treated with potential payments vs. polls before and after the treatment and the difference between treated/untreated and governance participation one year earlier. The initial trial is aimed at polls, with more straightforward metrics to monitor. The design of this trial includes an assurance payment of .1 MKR provided to any address that contributes ≥ 1 MKR in a non-abstain vote on at least one low-turnout poll. A maximum of .1 MKR may be awarded to any address for any individual closing date of this trial. All MKR rewards will be sourced from the MakerDAO treasury. A budget of 8 MKR will be reserved for this trial. This trial will be in effect until the MKR budget is exhausted or after six weeks, whichever occurs first. This design offers the potential for payouts without guaranteeing that MakerDAO will incur expenses and provide a meaningful reward to smallholders willing to provide a public good at their own expense. @GFXlabs agrees to take management of the reporting and administration of this trial. They will track and provide public updates on which addresses (if any) are eligible for assurance payments following the close of each trial date. @GFXlabs will provide a written report (via forum post) and oral report (if desired) on a Governance & Risk call after the close of the trial. > Pros: > >- Potentially increases governance participation, particularly among smaller holders >- Offers payments only when marginal increases in participation are needed >- Allows experimentation with a novel mechanism without committing to large or ongoing payments >- Trial will be administered by GFX Labs to avoid adding to the governance burden of core units >Cons: > >- Could incur a maximum expense of 8 MKR and 1000 DAI >- May not generate conclusive results >- If chosen to be extended or made permanent, this program would likely require an increased workload to administer on an ongoing basis >- Will require some measure of marketing/communication to make MKR holders aware of the trial program >- If the assurance payment amount of .1 MKR is too low to attract voters to polls, then rewards would accrue to those already voting rather than the marginal voter @GFXlabs is asking the community whether MakerDAO should implement the Governance Mining Trial. **[Fund Ambassadors Program Pilot](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/signal-request-fund-ambassadors-program-pilot/13199)** *Signal Request Ends March 4th* The Ambassador Program, which provides non-English-speaking communities with resources and educational materials, had its funding disrupted by the [offboarding of MKT-001.](https://vote.makerdao.com/polling/QmYk1XN5?network=mainnet#poll-detail) @Kat took the initiative to spearhead the Program without the attachment of a Core Unit and is seeking 25,000 DAI to complete the pilot and associated projects over the next three months. She is asking the community whether MakerDAO should fund the Ambassador Pilot Program. **[Allocate 20M to Protocol-Owned Uniswap V2 MKR/DAI LP](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/signal-request-allocate-20m-to-protocol-owned-uniswap-v2-mkr-dai-lp/13150)** *Signal Request Ends March 3rd* In response to a recent discussion, @psychonaut believes the simplest method for improving MKR liquidity is to add protocol-owned Dai/MKR LP shares to UniV2. He asks the community whether Maker should allocate 20M to a protocol-owned UniV2 MKR/Dai LP and presents his argument that the pros outweigh the cons: >Pros: >- Simple >- No need to wait on sweeping tokenomic redesigns that have had difficulty finding consensus (e.g. [Sagittarius Engine](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/sagittarius-engine/10852), [gbMKR](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/signal-request-gbmkr-a-proposal-to-benefit-long-term-mkr-holders/12756), etc.) >- Mostly orthogonal to MKR [flap auctions](https://manual.makerdao.com/parameter-index/surplus-auction) >- Helps identify a minimum and maximum MKR price for both flap and flop auctions >- Automatically buys low, sells high and captures the spread >- Obtains some return on otherwise idle capital sitting in the surplus buffer >- Extremely gas efficient (i.e., set it up and forget about it) > >Cons: >- Potentially interferes with the ability to raise large amounts of DAI from MKR sales >- Trading strategy is nearly the opposite of [flop auctions](https://manual.makerdao.com/parameter-index/debt-auction) **[Bring Back the MKR Burn Part II](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/signal-request-bring-back-the-mkr-burn-part-ii/13146)** *Signal Request Ends March 4th* @ultraschuppi states that the recent executive vote to temporarily disable Surplus Auctions and MKR burn had intentions to return to the [original `lerp` mechanic](https://vote.makerdao.com/polling/QmUqfZRv?network=mainnet#poll-detail). However, an on-chain poll added the Rate Limiter to the Flapper Module. In response, Schuppi asks the community whether the protocol should return to the previous partial burning configuration as agreed in November, but with the following conditions: - The [Rate Limiter](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/rate-limited-flapper/13056) has been installed on mainnet; this will take a couple of weeks. - An [initial configuration](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/rate-limited-flapper/13056#next-step-setting-lid-3) for the Rate Limiter has been set. ----- ## [Ongoing Initiatives](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/governance-initiatives/1347) ‘Oh my god, this is taking ages; why can’t things be simple?’ [Maker Operational Manual](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/announcing-maker-operational-manual/12553) - @GovAlpha-Core-Unit release the launch of the Maker Operational Manual and invite all members and Core Units to reach out if they wish to provide any help or documentation to add for the Manual. [Recognised Delegate Requirements](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/recognised-delegate-requirements/9421) - @LongForWisdom writes a detailed overview of the current requirements and application system to become a delegate in the Maker community. Check out this [thread](https://forum.makerdao.com/search?expanded=true&q=%40LongForWisdom%20%23governance%3Adelegates) for more posts related to delegation. [Where to Find Opportunities at MakerDAO](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/where-to-find-opportunities-at-makerdao/10076/2) and [Open positions at MakerDAO](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/open-positions-at-makerdao/12197) - Looking for job opportunities at MakerDAO? Perfect! @Davidutro and @manomad set up individual threads containing resources to help find available job listing and hiring practices. *If anybody has additional information on unique hiring practices or job listings, please comment on the thread.* [:mega: Collateral Calls - Calling all Projects!](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/collateral-calls-calling-all-projects/3715) - @juan sets up a signup thread for projects wishing to present on the bi-weekly collateral call. Know any potential collateral partners that want to present? Refer them here. [Collateral Status Index](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/collateral-status-index/2231) - Confused about the current status of the various collateral types that have been discussed recently? Check out this post to determine the status and current position within the onboarding process. [Weekly MIPs Updates](https://forum.makerdao.com/tag/mips-update) - @blimpa brings the latest updates in the world of MIPs. [The Official Welcome Thread](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/the-official-welcome-thread/771/4) - A welcome and introductions thread. Not strictly governance, but if anyone new or old wants to introduce themselves, now is your chance! ----- ## [Help Wanted](https://forum.makerdao.com/c/miscellaneous/help-wanted/11) ‘Oh %#$?, we need a doodad, and we need it now.’ [Wanted: Governance Contributors for GovAlpha](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/help-wanted-govalpha/8811) - @LongForWisdom puts out the call for new team members! Different tracks are available depending on interest and time commitment. We could always use help reviewing [MIPs in the Request for Comment phase](https://forum.makerdao.com/tag/rfc). ## [Feedback Survey](https://survey.sogosurvey.com/r/qTb1p7) *Please, check out the [Forum at a Glance feedback survey](https://survey.sogosurvey.com/r/qTb1p7) to help us improve and scale these reviews - It will be fun, I promise.* Credit: @Artem_Gordon @nothsa