---
# System prepended metadata

title: 'ICOE: Oracle Attack'
tags: [Emergency Resources]

---

---
tags: Emergency Resources
---

# ICOE: Oracle Attack

## Definitions

### Oracle price manipulation (updated 29Nov2021)

If oracle price is manipulated higher than true market price then users can mint up to gap worth of unbacked DAI.

If oracle price is manipulated lower than the true market price then many vaults could be forced to close. This would wreck havoc on vault owners and could cause a temporary DAI shortage, causing the peg to break upward.

## Defense

The Oracle can be frozen without waiting for the governance delay. For example, if a malicious price was queued up in the OSM we could stop it from becoming the current price. The ‘we’ here refers to Maker Governance, NOT the Oracle Core Unit. I [Nik] would like the OCU to have that power, but I think it’s something the community would need to discuss as that heavily impacts the level of trust the community needs to place into a Core Unit. Alternatively the community could choose to trust a multisig composed of many core units.
