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- Outside actors (chain analysis, and exchanges)
- Participants of the transaction
Each address is like a new identity...
Advertising an addresss on social media for example would link your real world identity too any UTXOs
#### Blockchain analytics
Blockchain analytics companies looking in try to figure out how to cluster a set of addresses that belong to individuals. They then decide which coins they want to mark as tainted — but this concept does not exist on bitcoin. Bitcoin does not distinguish coins from on there are entities which apply a concept of taint
- Bitcoin fungiability, two things are indistinguihsable from one another
- Verifying the supply
- Taint analysis, extera label on the coins from chain analysis. Common input heuristic trrying to guess who the coins belong to.
- Batched transactions.
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- Addresses - can be used to track your transaction history
- Transaction history - can be used to lookup the amounts or specitic transaction on the blockchain
- Someone has access, or can see to device with the wallet
- Privacy on-chain
- chain analysitics
- solutions
- limitations of to solutions
Some methods to protect your privacy
- Single use addresses (avoiding address reuse)
- Coin selection / labelling
- Coin join / Pay join
The coins you select for a payment can leak information to the previous entities you have received payments from. Because of this structure, choosing to optimise for privacy, lower transaction fees, or speed are things you need to consider when designing a payment experience.
## Solutions
- Address reuse and labeling
- Things which are not in UIs
- automatic coin selection
- payjoin
- address reuse
- dust attack
- Coin control