# 5G Security Date:2019/8/15 洪立宇 --- ## Outlines - 5G Security Function - 5G Security Threats - 5G Security Solution and Mitigation --- ## 5G Security Functions --- ### Service Based Architecture (SBA) ![](https://i.imgur.com/4LoSlUa.png) --- ### Security Functions in 5G Architecture ![](https://i.imgur.com/Ic7CEKf.png) --- ### 5G Security Functions - SEPP: Receives all service layer messages and forwards them to the appropriate network function after verifying security - SEAF: Allows for the re-authentication of the device when roaming, or even without full authentication method (ex: AKA) - AUSF: Verifies UE authentication & stores key for future re-use ![](https://i.imgur.com/ovBNkMa.png) ---- ### 5G AKA Authentication ![](https://i.imgur.com/tIsDRnQ.png) ---- ### 4G AKA Authentication ![](https://i.imgur.com/JJgC2W1.png) --- ## 5G Security Threats ![](https://i.imgur.com/JCQJoxA.png) --- ### 5G New Design ![](https://i.imgur.com/dTmDa4h.png) --- ### 5G Security Threats ![](https://i.imgur.com/YaLmRvJ.png) - OAM: Orbital Angular Momentum - Source: Taiwan National Communications Commission, NCC --- ### Key Security Challenges in 5G - Flash network traffic & DoS - Security of radio interfaces: Radio interface **encryption keys** are sent over **insecure channels** - User plane integrity: No cryptographic **integrity protection** for the user **data plane** - Roaming security: User-security parameters are not updated with roaming from one operator network to another --- ## Challenges and Solution - SDN - NFV - Mobile Cloud & MEC - Privacy --- ### SDN Challenges and Solution - Programmable SDN controller updates or modifies flow rules, **control info can easily identified -> DoS attack** - Centralization of network control & SDN architecture (i.e., OpenFlow)->prone to saturation attacks(due to limited flow buffer) - Sol: - Use the transparency of SDN to gather flows and packets from CP -> **quick response IDS** - Create **visibility** of the network to analyze the traffic and build high reactive and proactive **security monitoring** --- ### NFV Challenges - NFV in mobile networks is the dynamic nature of VNFs that leads to **configuration errors** - **VNFs are vulnerable** to typical cyber-attacks such as spoofing, sniffing, and DoS - **Common accessibility** of the infrastructure. The attacker can interfere with operations of the infrastructure by inserting malware or manipulating network traffic --- ### NFV Solution - Not only the security in VNF  in  **multi-tenant environment** but also physical entities of telecom network(ex: hypervisor) - **Firewalls** and **IDSs** can be used to prevent outside attacks. - **Identity and access management mechanisms** (e.g., role-based access control) can be used to mitigate the impact of insider attacks - **Multiple controllers** may increase resilience to security attacks. However, misconfiguration forwarding elements or inter-federated conflicts will hinder security policy enforcement. --- ### MEC Challenges - **Multi-tenant** cloud networks where tenants run their own control logic, interactions can cause **conflicts in network configurations** - **Cloud-enabled IoT** environment and the **open APIs** for MEC applications and end users are vulnerable - **Man‐in‐the‐middle (MitM)** and **malicious mode** problems have been identified --- ### MEC Solution - Visibility of the network topology (NPB,APM) - Secure Operating System for Edge Platforms - VPN and General Encryption of All Data - User Access Management (Authentication) --- ### Privacy Challenges - Semantic information attacks (ex: App) - Timing attacks - IMSI catching attack (fake BS) - 5G have **different actors** such as virtual mobile network operators (VMNOs), communication service providers (CSPs)->**synchronization of privacy polices** --- ### Subscription Identification Security - 4G: Trigger of IMSI - When Mobile connect to the Network: (New connection or roaming) - When Mobile connect to impersonate BS - 5G: Use of SUPI (Permanent Id)& SUCI ( Concealed Id) - SIDF: Decrypt of SUCI and get SUPI - But still attacker may force UEs to communicate in non-5G mode (Bidding Down Attack) ---- ### Subscription Identification Security ![](https://i.imgur.com/S3eCZjg.png) ---- ### Subscription Identification Security ![](https://i.imgur.com/TZdHp2E.png) --- ### Privacy Solution - Requirement of better mechanisms for **accountability, data minimization, transparency, and access control** - **Hybrid cloud-based** approach, which mobile operators are able to store and process highly **sensitive data locally** and **less sensitive data in public** clouds - **Encryption-based** system, a message can be encrypted before sending to a location-based services (LBS) provider - **Location-cloaking-based** algorithms and **Obfuscation** for location privacy --- ### Security Challenges in 5G Technologies ![](https://i.imgur.com/QIK0ivN.png) --- ### Security Solutions for Targeted Threats ![](https://i.imgur.com/waMQSZz.png) --- ### 5G Visibility - Reason: Huge Network traffic - Network Packet Broker(NPB) : **Efficiently manage traffic** to the monitoring tools.  - NBP Cut the Band in to small part(segmentation) which makes each part easily managed - 5G -> **Small Cells** -> Small cell backhaul requires many more **high-speed links** connecting to the wireline network -> All Links should be protected and monitored --- ### NPB - Used to use DPI(Tap or Port Mirror) to inspect the packet, which break and rebuild packet from layer 2 to layer 7 when pass through each device. - NPB benefit: - Efficient Traffic Filtering - Secure Removal of Repetitive Data - Network Packet Brokers Optimize Packets - Capacity for Fault Tolerance - Network Packet Brokers for Load Balancing ---- ### NPB ![](https://i.imgur.com/DTCmavR.png) --- # The End
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