# 5G Security
Date:2019/8/15
洪立宇
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## Outlines
- 5G Security Function
- 5G Security Threats
- 5G Security Solution and Mitigation
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## 5G Security Functions
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### Service Based Architecture (SBA)

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### Security Functions in 5G Architecture

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### 5G Security Functions
- SEPP: Receives all service layer messages and forwards them to the appropriate network function after verifying security
- SEAF: Allows for the re-authentication of the device when roaming, or even without full authentication method (ex: AKA)
- AUSF: Verifies UE authentication & stores key for future re-use

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### 5G AKA Authentication

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### 4G AKA Authentication

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## 5G Security Threats

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### 5G New Design

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### 5G Security Threats

- OAM: Orbital Angular Momentum
- Source: Taiwan National Communications Commission, NCC
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### Key Security Challenges in 5G
- Flash network traffic & DoS
- Security of radio interfaces: Radio interface **encryption keys** are sent over **insecure channels**
- User plane integrity: No cryptographic **integrity protection** for the user **data plane**
- Roaming security: User-security parameters are not updated with roaming from one operator network to another
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## Challenges and Solution
- SDN
- NFV
- Mobile Cloud & MEC
- Privacy
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### SDN Challenges and Solution
- Programmable SDN controller updates or modifies flow rules, **control info can easily identified -> DoS attack**
- Centralization of network control & SDN architecture (i.e., OpenFlow)->prone to saturation attacks(due to limited flow buffer)
- Sol:
- Use the transparency of SDN to gather flows and packets from CP -> **quick response IDS**
- Create **visibility** of the network to analyze the traffic and build high reactive and proactive **security monitoring**
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### NFV Challenges
- NFV in mobile networks is the dynamic nature of VNFs that leads to **configuration errors**
- **VNFs are vulnerable** to typical cyber-attacks such as spoofing, sniffing, and DoS
- **Common accessibility** of the infrastructure. The attacker can interfere with operations of the infrastructure by inserting malware or manipulating network traffic
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### NFV Solution
- Not only the security in VNF in **multi-tenant environment** but also physical entities of telecom network(ex: hypervisor)
- **Firewalls** and **IDSs** can be used to prevent outside attacks.
- **Identity and access management mechanisms** (e.g., role-based access control) can be used to mitigate the impact of insider attacks
- **Multiple controllers** may increase resilience to security attacks. However, misconfiguration forwarding elements or inter-federated conflicts will hinder security policy enforcement.
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### MEC Challenges
- **Multi-tenant** cloud networks where tenants run their own control logic, interactions can cause **conflicts in network configurations**
- **Cloud-enabled IoT** environment and the **open APIs** for MEC applications and end users are vulnerable
- **Man‐in‐the‐middle (MitM)** and **malicious mode** problems have been identified
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### MEC Solution
- Visibility of the network topology (NPB,APM)
- Secure Operating System for Edge Platforms
- VPN and General Encryption of All Data
- User Access Management (Authentication)
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### Privacy Challenges
- Semantic information attacks (ex: App)
- Timing attacks
- IMSI catching attack (fake BS)
- 5G have **different actors** such as virtual mobile network operators (VMNOs), communication service providers (CSPs)->**synchronization of privacy polices**
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### Subscription Identification Security
- 4G: Trigger of IMSI
- When Mobile connect to the Network: (New connection or roaming)
- When Mobile connect to impersonate BS
- 5G: Use of SUPI (Permanent Id)& SUCI ( Concealed Id)
- SIDF: Decrypt of SUCI and get SUPI
- But still attacker may force UEs to communicate in non-5G mode (Bidding Down Attack)
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### Subscription Identification Security

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### Subscription Identification Security

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### Privacy Solution
- Requirement of better mechanisms for **accountability, data minimization, transparency, and access control**
- **Hybrid cloud-based** approach, which mobile operators are able to store and process highly **sensitive data locally** and **less sensitive data in public** clouds
- **Encryption-based** system, a message can be encrypted before sending to a location-based services (LBS) provider
- **Location-cloaking-based** algorithms and **Obfuscation** for location privacy
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### Security Challenges in 5G Technologies

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### Security Solutions for Targeted Threats

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### 5G Visibility
- Reason: Huge Network traffic
- Network Packet Broker(NPB) : **Efficiently manage traffic** to the monitoring tools.
- NBP Cut the Band in to small part(segmentation) which makes each part easily managed
- 5G -> **Small Cells** -> Small cell backhaul requires many more **high-speed links** connecting to the wireline network -> All Links should be protected and monitored
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### NPB
- Used to use DPI(Tap or Port Mirror) to inspect the packet, which break and rebuild packet from layer 2 to layer 7 when pass through each device.
- NPB benefit:
- Efficient Traffic Filtering
- Secure Removal of Repetitive Data
- Network Packet Brokers Optimize Packets
- Capacity for Fault Tolerance
- Network Packet Brokers for Load Balancing
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### NPB

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# The End
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